Edward B. Talcott v. The Township of Pine Grove. Nor did it proceed on the ground that the contract was in reliance upon Groves v. Slaughter, for it had been made long before that decision was rendered. Rowan v. Runnels has been repeatedly quoted in subsequent cases. It is among the most deliberate and frequently approved judments of the court. In its circumstances it calls for a far more liberal application of the exception to the general rule which requires us to follow the decisions of the State courts than does the case before us. We could not decide this point adversely to the plaintiff without assuming to disregard this judgment of the Supreme Court. 18 Howard, 595, Pease v. Peck, arose upon the construction of a Michigan Statute of Limitations. By an error of the printer, the statute as published had an exception as to persons "beyond seas," and this had been supposed to be correct for many years, but it does not appear that any judicial decisions had been made based upon this reading. The Michigan Supreme Court decided that the manuscript copy which did not contain the words "beyond seas" must govern. The Supreme Court of the United States refused to follow this construction on the ground that the other view had been so long supposed to be valid that it had become the basis of contracts. In 16 How. 369, State Bank v. Knoop, the Ohio Supreme Court decided that a statute regulating the taxation of the plaintiff bank was not a contract, and that if such had been the intention of the law, it was in violation of the Constitution of the State. This judgment, on writ of error, was reversed by the National Court. It decided that the law did create a contract, and that it was not prohibited by the local constitution. Just what is now asked in the case before us was there done. That the point arose upon writ of error, and that the contract was created more immediately by a statute, are immaterial conditions, will fully appear by sub Edward B. Talcott v. The Township of Pine Grove. sequent citations. The opinion of TANEY, Chief Justice, was delivered in the case of the Trust Company v. Debolt, 16 How. 432, at the same time before the court. It is affirmed, after the most searching argument, in 18 How. 332, Dodge v. Woolsey; 16 How. 380, State Bank v. Knoop; 1 Black, 436, Jefferson Bank v. Skelly. 1 Wall. 175, Gelpcke v. Dubuque, was an action on bonds issued by the city in aid of a railroad company. There had been prior decisions of the Supreme Court of Iowa holding similar bonds valid. Subsequently to the making of those in suit, that court reversed its former rulings and adopting the same conclusions as those arrived at by the Supreme Court of Michigan in the Salem case, declared the law unconstitutional. Justice SWAYNE says: "The same principle applies when there is a change of judicial decision as to the constitutional power of the Legislature to enact the law. To the rule thus enlarged we adhere. It is the law of this court. To hold otherwise would be as unjust as to hold that rights acquired under a statute may be lost by its repeal." And see, following this principle: 4 Wall. 535, Von Hoffman v. Quincy; Meyer v. The City of Muscatine, 1 Wall. 384; Thomson v. Lee County, 3 Wall. 327; Rogers v. Burlington, 3 Wall. 654; Mitchell v. Burlington, 4 Wall. 270. In 3 Wall. 294, Havemeyer v. Iowa City, the doctrines in Gelpcke v. Dubuque, are applied in circumstances going very far beyond the necessities of the case at bar. The question was, whether the law under which the bonds were issued had been so published as to make it effective before the action under it was taken. The State court had expressly decided, subsequent to the creation of the bonds, that it had not. A single prior decision had been made which implied the contrary. But, as the AttorneyGeneral of the State had published the law, and action had taken place under it, the Supreme Court say, at page 303, Edward B. Talcott v. The Township of Pine Grove. that the former State judgment was a recognition of the public character of the act, and the action of the Executive had been in harmony with it. That prior to the changed opinion of the court no intimation had been given that they were otherwise than local, and that it "being posterior to the time the bonds were issued it can have no effect upon them. We can look only to the time when the securities were issued." The rule, it is said, was established upon the most careful consideration, and would be adhered to. 8 Wall. 575, Buttz v. Muscatine. This case is in principle like that of Von Hoffman in 4 Wall. 535, where the power of taxation to pay the bonds was attempted to be taken away by a legislative repeal of the law which authorized it. In this the same effect was produced by judicial decisions. When the bonds were issued, the State law, in the opinion of the Federal court, authorized taxation for their payment, although no State decisions so holding had been made. By adjudications of the Iowa courts subsequent to their issue, it was determined that such power did not exist, and the supervisors therefore refused to assess the tax. Mandamus was applied for in the Circuit Court of the United States to compel it. Judge SWAYNE, in delivering the judgment of the court, after referring with approbation to the Von Hoffman case, and to the cases which hold that the remedy is part of the contract, says that here, although it is taken away, not by repeal, but by judicial decisions, the effect is the same; that in the construction and protection of contracts the court must act independently of the State courts, and the fact that a statute was concerned could not vary the result. The rights of the relator, he said, "could no more be taken away by subsequent judicial decisions than by subsequent legislation. It is as much our duty to protect the contract from the one as the other." If the construction ultimately given by the State court had preceded the issuing of the bonds that would have been followed. Edward B. Talcott v. The Township of Pine Grove. The two preceding and the following judgments are demonstrative of the adoption by the National courts of a principle broad and comprehensive; wholly unfettered by any narrow limitations which will arrest its application this side of the most complete protection of what was done in good faith in reliance upon existing law. No matter what the form of the action, or howsoever the court is called upon to coerce directly the action of local political officials, it will proceed as freely and minutely as though its action was invoked to correct the refusals of National officers. Judgment was obtained in the National Circuit Court in disregard of local judgments. The supervisors, in obedience to the State judgments, refused to levy the tax to pay it, and there was no county property subject to levy to satisfy it.. The court issued mandamus to compel their action, and the State courts enjoined it. The officers, obeying the State instead of the National court's process, refused still to make the assessment. In these circumstances, Amy v. The Supervisors, in 11 Wall. 136, held the officers individually liable for a breach of official duty, in refusing to obey the writs of the National court, and judg ment was given against them for the amount of the tax it was their duty to have assessed. The whole proceeding, from the rendition of the original judgment to that against the contumacious supervisors, was in direct conflict with repeated rulings in the State court upon every point required to sustain the judgment. See Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 50; 6 Wall. 166, Riggs v. Johnson County; 9 Wall. 477, Kenosha v. Lamson. Although elsewhere fully considered, and not germain to the present argument, it is satisfactory to add that the differing local judgments are all overruled by the local courts which made them. It is then not a right only, but an imperative duty, about the performance of which this court has no possible discretion to administer the law as, after the Edward B. Talcott v. The Township of Pine Grove. most full examination in our power, we believe it to be. This should be made in view of all that effect which we must ever give to a State decision that we know was rendered only after the most thorough argument and full and careful consideration; one which has been made in ignorance of no single condition of the question answered, but in a deliberate and conscientious disregard of the most learned, numerous and persuasive body of opinions ever before given upon any one subject in the whole history of our constitutional law. It did not involve a misconception of these opinions, but it was intentionally revolutionary in doctrine. It asserts independence of precedents, and expressly condemns the old conservative idea of stare decisis if the "first judgment in the series" is believed to be wrong. It of all other judgments presents just that exercise of judicial authority which has called forth the condemnatory and dissenting opinions cited by us, and which demand and sustain the ruling which we feel compelled to make. The other question is just as conclusively settled by the Supreme Court, whose judgments we must follow, as the one we have thus far considered. That the law is constitutional, and the contracts valid and obligatory upon the municipalities making them, and that it is our duty to enforce them, has been affirmed in nearly every judgment thus far cited. We have nothing to decide upon principle. The law is settled by adjudication, confirming wide and long-continued usage. Certainly, in the courts of the United States, the question is no longer open. In Gelpcke v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 205, Judge SwAYNE, delivering the opinion of the court referring to the decisions holding such statutes to be constitutional, says: "The earlier decisions, we think, are sustained by reason and authority. They are in harmony with the adjudications of sixteen States. of this Union. Many of the cases in the other States are |