congress is not a local legislature, but exercises this particular power, like all its other powers, in its high character, as the legislature of the Union. The American people thought it a necessary power, and they conferred it for their own benefit. Being so conferred, it carries with it all those incidental powers which are necessary to its complete and effectual execution. Whether any particular law be designed to operate without the district or not depends on the words of that law. If it be designed so to operate, then the question whether the power so exercised be incidental to the power of exclusive legislation, and be warranted by the constitution, requires a consideration of that instrument. In such cases the constitution and the law must be compared and construed. This is the exercise of jurisdiction. It is the only exercise of it which is allowed in such a case. For the act of congress directs that "no other error shall be assigned or regarded as a ground of reversal, in any such case as aforesaid, than such as appears on the face of the record, and immediately respects the before-mentioned questions of validity or construction of the said constitution, treaties," etc. The whole merits of this case, then, consist in the construction of the constitution and the act of congress. The jurisdiction of the court, if acknowledged, goes no farther. This we are required to do without the exercise of jurisdiction. The counsel for the state of Virginia have, in support of this motion, urged many arguments of great weight against the application of the act of congress to such a case as this; but those arguments go to the construction of the constitution, or of the law, or of both, and seem, therefore, rather calculated to sustain their cause upon its merits than to prove a failure of jurisdiction in the court. After having bestowed upon this question the most deliberate consideration of which we are capable, the court is unanimously of opinion that the objections to its jurisdiction are not sustained, and that the motion ought to be overruled. Motion denied. JUDICIAL OPINION IN THE CASE OF GIBBONS AGAINST OGDEN, IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, 1824. STATEMENT. This is the leading case on the construction of the third clause of section 8 of article 1 of the constitution, with respect to the regulation of commerce. At the time the constitution was adopted, commerce was confined mainly to the ocean. With the invention of the steamboat, commerce spread over all the great rivers; and finally, with the development of railroads, commerce and communication have been extended over the whole face of the country. The importance of federal control over commerce was appreciated from the very first; indeed, it was one of the principal considerations that brought about the formation of the constitution. Congress began at an early day to legislate upon the subject, and the various acts on this subject have been a fertile source of litigation in the federal courts. This case began with a bill in the court of chancery of the state of New York by Aaron Ogden against Thomas Gibbons, in which were set forth the several acts of the legislature of that state enacted for the purpose of securing to Robert R. Livingston and Robert Fulton the exclusive navigation of all the waters within the jurisdiction of that state, with boats moved by fire or steam, for a term of years which had not then expired, and authorizing the chancellor to award an injunction to protect that grant. The bill alleged an assignment from Livingston and Fulton to John R. Livingston, and from him to the complainant, Ogden, of the right to navigate the waters between Elizabethtown and other places in New Jersey and the city of New York, and that Gibbons, the defendant, was in possession and in active operation of two steamboats running between New York and Elizabethtown, in violation of the exclusive privilege conferred on the complainant. A preliminary injunction having been awarded, Gibbons filed an answer, in which he stated that the boats employed by him were duly enrolled and licensed under the act of congress passed February 18, 1793,1 entitled "An act for enrolling and licensing ships and vessels to be employed in the coasting trade and fisheries, and for regulating the same." By virtue of such license, the defendant insisted on his right to navigate the water between Elizabethtown and the city of New York, the said acts of the legislature of New York to the contrary notwithstanding. At the hearing, Chancellor Kent made the injunction perpetual, being of opinion that the state law was not in conflict with the constitution and laws of the United States, and was therefore valid. He pointed out that the right of the legislature to pass the acts mentioned had been settled so far as the courts of that state could settle it by the decision of the court of errors in Livingston v. Van Ingen. "And if those laws are to be deemed in the first instance and per se valid and constitutional, and as conferring valid and legal rights, a coasting license cannot surely have any effect in controlling their operation. The act of congress referred to never meant to determine a right of property or the use 11 Stat. 305. 9 Johns. 507. 24 Johns. Ch. 150. or enjoyment of it under the laws of the state. Any person in the assumed character of the owner may obtain the enrollment and license required; but it will still remain for the laws and courts of the several states to determine the right and title of such assumed owner, or of some other person, to navigate the vessel. The license only gives tc the vessel an American character, while the right of the individual procuring the license to use the vessel, as against another individual setting up a distinct and exclusive right, remains precisely as it did before. . . . . However unquestionable the right and title to a specific chattel may be, and from whatever source that title may be derived, the use and enjoyment of it must, as a general rule, be subject to the laws and regulations of the state. . . . . The only limitation upon such a general discretion and power of control is the occurrence of the case when the exercise of it would impede or defeat the operation of some lawful measure, or be absolutely repugnant to some constitutional law of the Union. When laws become repugnant to each other, the supreme and paramount law must and will prevail. There can be no doubt of the fitness and necessity of this result in every mind that entertains a just sense of its duty and loyalty. Suppose there was a provision in the act of congress that all vessels duly licensed should be at liberty to navigate, for the purpose of trade or commerce, over all the navigable bays, harbors, rivers, and lakes within the several states, any law of the states creating particular privileges as to any particular class of vessels to the contrary notwithstanding; the only question that could arise in such a case would be whether the law was constitutional. If that was to be granted or decided in favor of the validity of the law, it would certainly, in all courts and places, overrule and set aside the state grant. But at present we have no such case. . . .. There is no collision between the act of congress and the acts of this state creating the steamboat monopoly. The one requires all vessels to be licensed to entitle them to the privilege of American vessels, and the others confer on particular individuals the exclusive right to navigate steamboats, without, however, interfering with or questioning the requisitions of the license. . We must be permitted to require at least the presence and clear manifestations of some constitutional law or some judicial decision of the supreme power of the Union acting upon those laws in direct collision and conflict before we can retire from the support and defense of them. We must be satisfied that "Neptunus muros, magnoque emota tridenti On appeal to the court of errors of New York, Chancellor Kent's decree was unanimously affirmed. The case was then carried to the United States supreme court by writ of error, where it was argued for the plaintiff, Gibbons, by Daniel Webster and William Wirt; for the defendant, Ogden, by Thomas Addis Emmet and Thomas J. Oakley. The judgment of the state court was unanimously reversed on the grounds given in the following opinion by Chief Justice Marshall: OPINION. The appellant contends that this decree is erroneous because the laws which purport to give the exclusive privilege it sustains are repugnant to the constitution and laws of the United States. They are said to be repugnant (1) to that clause in the constitution which authorizes congress to regulate commerce; (2) to that which authorizes congress to promote the progress of science and useful arts. The state of New York maintains the constitutionality of these laws; and their legislature, their council of revision, and their judges have repeatedly concurred in this opinion. It is supported by great names,-by names which have all the titles to consideration that virtue, intelligence, and office can bestow. No tribunal can approach the decision of this question without feeling a just and real respect for that opinion which is sustained by such authority; but it is the province of this court, while it respects, not to bow to it implicitly, and the judges must exercise, in the examination of the subject, that understanding which Providence has bestowed upon them, with that independence which the people of the United States expect from this department of the government. As preliminary to the very able discussions of the constitution which we have heard from the bar, and as having some influence on its construction, reference has been made to the political situation of these states anterior to its formation. It has been said that they were sovereign, were completely independent, and were connected with each other only by a league. This is true. But when these allied sovereigns converted their league into a government, when they converted their congress of ambassadors, deputed to deliberate on their common concerns, and to recommend measures of general utility, into a legislature empowered to enact laws on the most interesting subjects, the whole character in which the states appear underwent a change, the extent of which must be determined by a fair consideration of the instrument by which that change was effected. This instrument contains an enumeration of powers expressly granted by the people to their government. It has been said that these powers ought to be construed strictly. But why ought they to be so construed? Is there one sentence in the constitution which gives countenance to this rule? In the last of the enumerated powers,-that which grants, expressly, the means for carrying all others into execution, congress is authorized "to make all laws which shall be necessary and proper" for the purpose. But this limitation on the means which may be used is not extended to the powers which are conferred; nor is there one sentence in the constitution which has been pointed out by the gentlemen of the bar, or which we have been able to discern, that prescribes this rule. We do not, therefore, think our selves justified in adopting it. What do gentlemen mean by a strict construction. If they contend only against that enlarged construction which would extend words beyond their natural and obvious import, we might question the application of the term, but should not controvert the principle. If they contend for that narrow construction which, in support of some theory not to be found in the constitution, would deny to the government those powers which the words of the grant, as usually understood, import, and which are consistent with the general views and objects of the instrument; for that narrow construction which would cripple the government, and render it unequal to the objects for which it is declared to be instituted, and to which the powers given, as fairly understood, render it competent, then we cannot perceive the propriety of this strict construction, nor adopt it as the rule by which the constitution is to be expounded. As men whose intentions require no concealment generally employ the words which most directly and aptly express the ideas they intend to convey, the enlightened patriots who framed our constitution, and the people who adopted it, must be understood to have employed words in their natural sense, and to have intended what they have said. If, from the imperfection of human language, there should be serious doubts respecting the extent of any given power, it is a well-settled rule that the objects for which it was given, especially when those objects are expressed in the instrument itself, should have great influence in the construction. We know of no reason for excluding this rule from the present case. The grant does not convey power which might be beneficial to the grantor if retained by himself, or which can inure solely to the benefit of the grantee, but is an investment of power for the general advantage, in the hands of agents selected for that purpose, which power can never be exercised by the people themselves, but must be placed in the hands of agents, or lie dormant. We know of no rule for construing the extent of such powers other than is given by the language of the instrument which confers them, taken in connection with the purposes for which they were conferred. The words "Congress shall have power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several states, and with the Indian tribes." The subject to be regulated is commerce; and our constitution being, as was aptly said at the bar, one of enumeration, and not of definition, to ascertain the extent of the power it becomes necessary to settle the meaning of the word. The counsel for the appellee would limit it to traffic, to buying and selling, or are: |