198 U.S. Argument for Appellant. fense was held not to be bribery under § 5451, see United States v. Boyer, 85 Fed. Rep. 425; United States v. Gibson, 47 Fed. Rep. 833; Re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257, 264. No law is alleged or exists prescribing that it shall be the duty of clerks in the General Land Office to maintain secrecy in reference to reports of special agents. There is no allegation of any rule, regulation or order prescribing that it shall be the duty of clerks in the Land Office to maintain secrecy in reference to reports of special agents, or making such reports secret and confidential, and the Government's evidence shows that no such rule, regulation or order existed. If it can be presumed in the absence of definite allegations to that effect, and in the face of the evidence to the contrary, that some rule or regulation had been prescribed and promulgated by the Secretary of the Interior or the Commissioner of the General Land Office, prohibiting the publication of the contents of special agents' reports, nevertheless, such a rule, regulation or order, even if formally promulgated, could not in any event lay the basis for a criminal prosecution. Congress may delegate power to Department officers to make regulations, which, if made pursuant to that authority and in supplement of the act of Congress, will have the force of law. In re Kollock, 165 U. S. 526. But Congress cannot delegate the power to designate or prescribe what acts or omissions shall constitute crimes. United States v. Eaton, 144 U. S. 677. Departmental regulations are not laws. Morrill v. Jones, 106 U. S. 466; 4 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law, 642; United States v. Mard, 116 Fed. Rep. 650; United States v. Manion, 44 Fed. Rep. 800. Section 1014 Rev. Stat. does not authorize a removal to the District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is not a district and the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is not a court of the United States, within the meaning of that section. Appellant being committed for removal to the District Argument for Appellant. 198 U S. of Columbia, is, therefore, deprived of his liberty without due process of law. The District of Columbia did not exist at the time of the enactment of section 33 of the judiciary act and was not, therefore, within its contemplation. It has never been constituted or included within one of the Federal judicial districts and is not, therefore, within the provisions of the present section. By act of February 21, 1871, 16 Stat. 426, the District of Columbia was created a body corporate for municipal purposes. By the act of June 11, 1878, 20 Stat. 102, it was provided that the District of Columbia shall remain and continue a municipal corporation. See also District of Columbia v. Woodbury, 136 U. S. 450; Metropolitan Railroad Co. v. District of Columbia, 132 U. S. 1. See Sen. Rep. No. 658, 43d Cong. 2d Sess.; In re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 886, 898, and cases cited; United States v. Burr, Fed. Cas. No. 14,674a; United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 563. The Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is not a court of the United States within the meaning of § 1014, Rev. Stat. (or its predecessor, section 33 of the judiciary act). McAllister v. United States, 141 U. S. 174; Wingard v. United States, 141 U. S. 201; The Coquitlam, 163 U. S. 346; Thiede v. Utah, 159 U. S. 510; United States v. McMillan, 165 U. S. 510; Corbus v. Leonhardt, 114 Fed. Rep. 12; Jackson v. United States, 102 Fed. Rep. 473, 479. See, however, Moss v. United States, 23 App. D. C. 475, and cases cited. The appellant is in any event entitled under the provisions of the Sixth Amendment to the Constitution to a trial in the State of California. If there was any crime committed it was in California and not the District of Columbia, as according to the indictment the letter containing the money alleged to have been sent as a bribe was mailed in California and the crime, if any, was then complete. United States v. Worrall, 2 Dall. 384; United States v. Plympton, 4 Cr. C. C. 309; United States v. Wright, 198 U. S. Argument for the United States. 2 Cr. C. C. 296; United States v. Bickford, 4 Blatchf. 337; United States v. Fowkes, 53 Fed. Rep. 13; Landa v. State, 26 Tex. Cr. App. 580; Commonwealth v. Dorrance, 14 Philadelphia, 671; Re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257. Section 731, Rev. Stat., is not applicable when applied to the District of Columbia. United States v. Guiteau, 1 Mackey, 564; Burton v. United States, 196 U. S. 283, is not in point. The Solicitor General and Mr. Francis J. Heney, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, with whom Mr. Arthur B. Pugh, Special Assistant United States Attorney, was on the brief, for the United States: Sufficiency of an indictment and all technical objections are to be determined by the court in which the indictment was found, and are not matters of inquiry in removal proceedings. Habeas corpus cannot be used as a writ of error to review judicial action under section 1014, either as to evidence of probable cause or relative to sufficiency of indictment. Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249; Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73; Horner v. United States, 143 U. S. 570; Ex parte Rickelt, 61 Fed. Rep. 203. Section 5451 does not contemplate the violation only of duties specifically required by law. The head of a Department is not compelled to show a statutory provision for everything he does or prescribes. Duties additional to those imposed by law or published regulations may be prescribed from time to time in the ordinary course of administration. United States v. Macdaniel, 7 Pet. 1; Tyner v. United States, 32 Wash. Law Rep. 258. The statute punishes bribery of an officer or employé of the United States "to induce him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty." Such duty includes every act natural and proper to the particular function or which may be directed by a superior officer; and, per contra, refraining from inconsistent and forbidden acts is included. It is not necessary that the violation of duty should itself be a substantive offense, nor that the duty be actually violated. The bribery denounced is accomplished without those elements. The District of Columbia is the proper trial district and the Supreme Court of that District is "a court of the United States" and has cognizance of the offense under sec. 1014. Some payments were made in Washington and cash was sent by mail from San Francisco and received by the addressee at Washington. Section 731, Rev. Stat.; In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257; §§ 1, 61, 83, New Code D. C.; Embry v. Palmer, 107 U. S. 3; Phillips v. Negley, 117 U. S. 665; Moss v. United States, 32 Wash. Law Rep. 342; § 1, ch. 39, p. 337, and § 24, ch. 35, p. 296, Comp. Stat., D. C., 1894; act of June 22, 1874, 18 Stat. 193; United States v. Haskins, 3 Sawy. 262. In re Dana, 68 Fed. Rep. 886, does not support the contrary view. The real ground for refusing removal there was that libel was a local and not a Federal offense and therefore did not fall within § 1014. Absurd and mischievous results must be avoided. The appellant's contention would make the entire United States outside the District of Columbia a refuge for fugitives from the administration of justice there. If there were no other reason for rejecting his contention, that would be sufficient. MR. JUSTICE BROWN, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. But three questions are raised by the arguments and briefs of counsel in this case: 1. That the indictment charges no crime against the United States. 2. That the District of Columbia is not a District of the United States within the meaning of Rev. Stat. sec. 1014, authorizing the removal of accused persons from one District to another. 3. That the crime was committed in California, and is only triable there. The indictment is founded upon Rev. Stat. sec. 5451, which enacts that "Every person who promises, offers, or gives any money or other thing of value to any officer of the United States, or to any person acting for or on behalf of the United States in any official function, under or by authority of any Department or office of the Government thereof, with intent to influence his decision or action on any question, matter, cause, or proceeding which may at any time be pending, or which may by law be brought before him in his official capacity, or with intent to induce him to do or omit to do any act in violation of his lawful duty, shall be punished as prescribed," etc. The first three counts of the indictment charge, in substance, that the defendant was engaged with one Hyde, at San Francisco, California, in the business of unlawfully obtaining the public lands of the United States; that an investigation by special agents of the Land Department of the unlawful transactions so charged was ordered by the Secretary of the Interior; and it became the duty of such agents to make reports to the Secretary, the contents of which should not be revealed to any unofficial person; that at this time a Department clerk was acting as chief of the special service division of the General Land Office, whose duty it was to act upon all reports of such special agents and to preserve and keep for the exclusive use of the Land Department all such reports; and that pending such investigation the defendant unlawfully gave to such officer, in the District of Columbia, certain sums of money, with the intent to induce him to do an act in violation of his lawful duty-that is to say, to reveal to defendant the contents of the reports of such special agents relating to said investigation. These counts are representative of all the others, one of which is based upon the payment of money to another officer of the United States, with like intent. (1) Objection is made to the indictment upon the ground that at the time of payments to these officers the special agents' report had not come into their possession or knowl |