Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

ration of Pennsylvania under the act of that State of June 8, 1891, coal
which is owned by the corporation, but at the time of the assess-
ment situated in another State and not to be returned to Pennsyl-
vania, should not be included. Delaware, L. & W. R. R. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania, 341.

2. Of national banks-Kentucky statute of March 21, 1900, held void-Dis-
crimination.

The statute of Kentucky of March 21, 1900, taxing shares of national
banks, from the years 1893 to 1900 and thereafter held, void and in
conflict with 5219, Rev. Stat., as to those portions which are retro-
active as imposing a burden on the bank not borne by other moneyed
corporations of the State, and valid and not in conflict with § 5219 as
to taxes imposed thereafter. A difference in methods in assessing
shares of national banks from that of taxing state banks does not
necessarily amount to a discrimination, rendering the act invalid under
§ 5219, and justify the judicial interference of courts for the protection
of the shareholders, unless it appears that the difference in method
actually results in imposing a greater burden on the national banks
than is imposed on other moneyed capital in the State. Covington v.
First National Bank, 100.

3. State taxation of personal property employed in interstate transportation—
Taxation of vessels.

The general rule that tangible personal property is subject to taxation
by the State in which it is, no matter where the domicil of the owner
may be, is not affected by the fact that the property is employed in
interstate transportation on either land or water. Vessels registered
or enrolled are not exempt from ordinary rules respecting taxation of
personal property. The artificial situs created as the home port of a
vessel, under § 4141, Rev. Stat., only controls the place of taxation
in the absence of an actual situs elsewhere. Vessels, though engaged
in interstate commerce, employed in such commerce wholly within the
limits of a State, are subject to taxation in that State although they
may have been registered or enrolled at a port outside its limits. Old
Dominion Steamship Co. v. Virginia, 299.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6;
COURTS, 2.

TITLE.

See EJECTMENT.

TRADE.

See RESTRAINT OF TRADE.

TRADE NAME.

Personal name; right to exclusive use.

In an action to restrain the use of a personal name in trade, where it ap-

pears that defendant has the right to use the name and has not done
anything to promote confusion in the mind of the public except to use
it, complainant's case must stand or fall on the possession of the ex-
clusive right to the use of the name. A personal name-an ordinary
family surname such as Remington-cannot be exclusively appro-
priated by any one as against others having a right to use it; it is mani-
festly incapable of exclusive appropriation as a valid trade-mark, and
its registration as such can not in itself give it validity. Every man has

a right to use his name reasonably and honestly in every way, whether
in a firm or corporation; nor is a person obliged to abandon the use of
his name or to unreasonably restrict it. It is not the use, but dis-
honesty in the use, of the name that is condemned, and it is a question
of evidence in each case whether there is a false representation or not.
One corporation cannot restrain another from using in its corporate title
a name to which others have a common right. Where persons or
corporations have a right to use a name courts will not interfere where
the only confusion results from a similarity of names and not from the
manner of the use. The essence of the wrong in unfair competition
consists in the sale of the goods of one person for that of another, and
if defendant is not attempting to palm off its goods as those of com-
plainant the action fails. Howe Scale Co. v. Wyckoff, Seamans &
Benedict, 118.

TREATIES.

Treaty of 1859 with Yakima Indians, construed-Preservation of fishing
rights under-Power of Federal Government to create servitude of lands
which State must recognize.

This court will construe a treaty with Indians as they understood it and
as justice and reason demand. The right of taking fish at all usual
and accustomed places in common with the citizens of the Territory
of Washington and the right of erecting temporary buildings for curing
them, reserved to the Yakima Indians in the treaty of 1859, was not
a grant of right to the Indians but a reservation by the Indians of
rights already possessed and not granted away by them. The rights
so reserved imposed a servitude on the entire land relinquished to the
United States under the treaty and which, as was intended to be, was
continuing against the United States and its grantees as well as against
the State and its grantees. The United States has power to create rights
appropriate to the object for which it holds territory while preparing
the way for future States to be carved therefrom and admitted to the
Union; securing the right to the Indians to fish is appropriate to such
object, and after its admission to the Union the State cannot disre-
gard the right so secured on the ground of its equal footing with the
original States. Patents granted by the United States for lands in
Washington along the Columbia River and by the State for lands
under the water thereof and rights given by the State to use fishing
wheels are subject to such reasonable regulations as will secure to
the Yakima Indians the fishery rights reserved by the treaty of 1859.
United States v. Winans, 371.

TRIAL.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3, 10;
JURISDICTION, F 4;

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

UNFAIR COMPETITION.

See TRADE NAME.

VENUE.

See CRIMINAL LAW.

VESSELS.

See PILOTAGE, 1;

TAXATION, 3.

VOLUNTARY PAYMENT.

See GARNISHMENT.

WAIVER.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11;
GRAND JURY.

WAREHOUSEMEN.

Technical possession of goods-Effect, as delivery of goods, of transfer of ware-
house receipt.

Prior to the petition, the bankrupt, a wholesale merchant in Chicago, walled
off part of the basement of his store and let it at a nominal rental to a
warehouse company and there stored goods, so that they were not seen
from the store, and the company alone had access thereto; and it
exhibited signs to the effect that it occupied the premises and had pos-
session of the goods, it charged the merchant for storage, and issued
to him certificates or receipts for the goods, which he pledged and en-
dorsed over to banks as collateral for loans. In an action brought by
the trustee who claimed that goods were in the possession of the bank-
rupt and not of the warehouse company; Held, that a bailee asserting
a lien for charges has the technical possession of the goods. The trans-
fer of a warehouse receipt is not a symbolical delivery, but a real de-
livery to the same extent as if the goods had been transported to an-
other warehouse named by the pledgee. Upon the facts in this case
there is no reason to deny such a place of storage the character of a
public warehouse so far as the Illinois statutes are concerned. The
receipts issued in this case were to be deemed valid warehouse receipts
so that their endorsement and delivery as security for loans constituted
a pledge of the goods represented thereby valid as against attaching
creditors, and if the receipts were not valid as warehouse receipts, the
transaction constituted an equally valid pledge of the goods as such
security. Union Trust Co. v. Wilson, 530.

WATERS.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 4;

PILOTAGE, 1;

TREATIES.

WHARVES.

See CARRIERS.

WRIT AND PROCESS.

1. Sufficiency of service on foreign corporation.

A Delaware corporation having its principal office in Indiana, and con-
tinuously carrying on a grain and stock brokerage business through the
same persons in Illinois under an arrangement practically equivalent to
agency, held, under the circumstances of this case, and in view of the
statutes of Illinois as to service on foreign corporations, to be carrying
on business in Illinois, and that service on such persons of process in a
suit against it in the Circuit Court of the United States for Illinois was
sufficient. Board of Trade v. Hammond Elevator Co., 424.

2. Where the foreign corporation was doing no business and had no assets
in the State, service upon a former officer residing therein, held, insuffi-
cient under the circumstances of this case. Ib.

3. Semble, service on a director of a corporation, which is doing no business
and has no property in the State, when he is casually in the State for a
few days, is bad.

Remington v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 95.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8;

JURISDICTION, A 2, 3, 4;

NATIONAL BANKS, 2.

Ex E.HR

2

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »