fendants contended that as the Board of Trade permitted, and the quotations related to, transactions for the pretended buying of grain without any intention of actually receiving, delivering or paying for the same, that the Board violated the Illinois bucket shop statute and there were no property rights in the quotations which the court could protect, and that the giving out of the quotations to certain persons makes them free to all. Held, that even if such pretended buying and selling is permitted by the Board of Trade it is entitled to have its col- lection of quotations protected by the law, and to keep the work which it has done to itself, nor does it lose its property rights in the quota- tions by communicating them to certain persons, even though many, in confidential and contractual relations to itself, and strangers to the trust may be restrained from obtaining and using the quotations by inducing a breach of the trust. A collection of information, otherwise entitled to protection, does not cease to be so because it concerns illegal acts, and statistics of crime are property to the same extent as other statistics, even if collected by a criminal who furnishes some of the data. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 236.
1. Mineral lands-Conflict of boundaries—Adverse proceedings by relocator of forfeited senior claim.
Under § 2326, Rev. Stat., where there was a conflict of boundaries between a senior and junior location, and the senior location has been forfeited, the person who made the relocation of such forfeited claim has not the right in adverse proceedings to assail the junior locator in respect to the conflict area which had previously existed between that location and the abandoned or forfeited claim. Lavagnino v. Uhlig, 443.
2. Mineral lands-Abandonment of claim by senior locator.
A senior locator possessed of paramount rights in mineral lands may abandon such rights and cause them to enure to the benefit of the applicant by failure to adverse, or after adverse, by failure to prosecute such ad- verse. Ib.
3. Mineral lands-Section 2326, Rev. Stat., construed to qualify sections 2319 and 2324.
The provisions of § 2326, Rev. Stat., as construed in this case, so qualify §§ 2319 and 2324, Rev. Stat., as to prevent mineral lands of the United States which have been the subject of conflicting locations, from be- coming quoad the claims of third parties unoccupied mineral lands, by the mere forfeiture of one of such locations. Ib.
4. Mineral lands-Right of deputy mineral surveyor to make location of claim. Quare, Whether a deputy mineral surveyor is prohibited by § 452, Rev. Stat., from making the location of a mining claim not decided. Ib.
PUBLIC OFFICERS.
See PUBLIC LANDS, 4.
See CARRIERS;
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 6.
Character as officer of court-Right to sue in foreign jurisdiction. A receiver is an officer of the court which appoints him, and in the absence of some conveyance or statute vesting the property of the debtor in him, he cannot sue in courts of a foreign jurisdiction upon the order of the court appointing him, to recover the property of the debtor. (Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 338.) A receiver's right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction is not recognized upon principles of comity, as every jurisdiction in which it is sought by means of a receiver to subject property to the control of the court, has the right and power to determine for itself who the receiver shall be, and to control the distribution of the funds realized within its own jurisdiction. Where the receiver cannot main- tain an action to recover property in a jurisdiction other than that in which he was appointed, jurisdiction is not established because the action is authorized to be instituted by the receiver in the name of the corporation, if it appears that in case of a recovery the property would be turned over to the receiver to be by him administered under the order of the court appointing him. Great Western Mining Co. v. Harris, 561.
RELEASE AND DISCHARGE.
Release of claim for personal injuries construed.
An employé of a railroad company executed a release which, after reciting that he had been injured in an accident, and that it was desirable to maintain pleasant relations, and avoid all controversy in the matter, and specifying certain slight bodily injuries including a scalp wound, released the company for a consideration of thirty dollars from all "claims and demands of every kind whatsoever for or on account of the injuries sustained in the manner and on the occasion aforesaid;" sub- sequently, after having remained in the company's employ about three months, he sued and obtained a verdict for permanent bodily and mental injuries, resulting from injuries not enumerated in the release, including a fracture of the skull; there was testimony going to show that the fracture was not known when the release was executed and that the permanent disability resulted from non-enumerated injuries. The trial court charged that the release related only to damages sus- tained by the enumerated injuries and to those sustained from the
non-enumerated injuries. Held, not error and that general words in a release are to be limited and restrained to the particular words in the recital; and the release in this case, not being for all injuries but only for the particular ones specified, was not a bar to a recovery for dam- ages resulting from the non-enumerated injuries and that the applica- tion of this rule is not affected by the words "avoid all controversy in regard to the matter" as those words did not relate to the accident but to the specified injuries. Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Dashiell, 521.
1. Time for filing petition for.
If a petition to remove is filed as soon as it appears in the case that the amount in controversy is sufficient to warrant removal it is filed in season even if the time for answer has expired under the New York practice, notwithstanding failure to serve a complaint as to which quære. Remington v. Central Pacific R. R. Co., 95.
2. Petition; to whom presented.
Presenting the petition to a judge in chambers satisfied the statute. Ib.
3. Estoppel to remove; effect of obtaining from state court order relieving from technical default in pleading.
Following up a motion to stay in the state court the day after notice of the amount in controversy, and obtaining an order relieving defendant from any technical default, which order took effect the same day that the petition for removal was filed, two days after such notice does not estop defendant from removing the suit. The facts appearing of record, an allegation in a petition for removal that the time has not arrived at which defendant was required to answer or plead is sufficient. Ib.
4. Power of Circuit Court to reopen question acted on by state court before removal.
Although the state court, before removal, has refused, subject to an appeal, to set aside a summons, the Circuit Court has power to reopen the question and to set the summons aside. Ib.
5. Removal for trial-Degree of proof necessary in proceedings for. In removal proceedings, the degree of proof is not that necessary upon the trial, and where defendant makes a statement and under the law of the State claims exemption from, and refuses to submit to, cross- examination, the deficiencies of his statement may be urged against him, and, unless the testimony removes all reasonable ground of the presumptions raised by the indictment, this court will consider the commissioner's finding of probable cause was justified. Beavers v. Haubert, 77.
6. Sufficiency of indictment as evidence of probable cause.
In proceedings before an extradition Commissioner, if the indictment pro-
duced as evidence of probable cause in proceedings for removal is framed in the language of the statute, with ordinary averments of time
and place, and sets out the substance of the offense in language suffi- cient to apprise the accused of the nature of the charge against him, it is sufficient to justify removal, even though it may be open to motion to quash, or in arrest of judgment in the court in which it was originally found. Benson v. Henkel, 1.
7. Commissioner-Question for trial court and not for Commissioner. Whether § 5451, Rev. Stat., punishing bribery of officers of the United States, applies to bribery for acts to be committed in the future, in case a certain contingency which may never occur does occur, is a matter for the trial court to determine and not for the extradition Commissioner Ib.
8. Removal for trial to District of Columbia. The District of Columbia is a District of the United States to which a per- son, under indictment for a crime or offense against the United States, may be removed for trial within the meaning, and under the provision, of § 1014, Rev. Stat. Benson v. Henkel, 1; Beavers v. Haubert, 77. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 10;
RESIDENCE.
See JURISDICTION, C 1.
RES JUDICATA.
See JURISDICTION, A 1.
Contracts with telegraph companies for dissemination of quotations of prices to certain persons and to exclusion of others. Contracts under which the Board of Trade furnishes telegraph companies with its quotations, which it could refrain from communicating at all, on condition that they will only be distributed to persons in contractual relations with, and approved by, the Board, and not to what are known as bucket shops, are not void and against public policy as being in re- straint of trade either at common law or under the Anti-Trust Act of July 2, 1890. Board of Trade v. Christie Grain & Stock Co., 236.
STATUTES.
A. CONSTRUCTION OF.
State statute of exemptions not to be limited.
Courts will not read into a broadly expressed state statute of exemption limitations which do not exist therein because they do exist in similar statutes of other States or because they deem the limitations equitable. To do so could not be construction of the statute but legislation; and the broad terms of the statute shows an intention of the legislature of the State to adopt broader and more comprehensive exemptions than those adopted by the other States. Holden v. Stratton, 202.
See CONTRACTS;
INTERSTATE COMMERCE;
PUBLIC LANDS, 3.
B. OF THE UNITED STATES.
See ACTS OF CONGRESS.
C. OF THE STATES AND TERRITORIES.
1. Capital stock of corporation represents property in which capital invested —Exclusion from assessment, of property sent out of State-Illegality of taxation of capital stock on value arising from value of property out of State.
A tax on the value of the capital stock of a corporation is a tax on the property in which that capital is invested, and therefore no tax can be levied upon the corporation issuing the stock which includes property that is otherwise exempt. The same rule that requires the exclusion from the assessment of valuation of capital stock of tangible personal property permanently situated out of the State applies to property sent out of the State to be sold and which is actually out of the State when the assessment is made. As a State cannot directly tax tangible property permanently outside the State and having no situs within the State, it cannot attain the same end by taxing the enhanced value of the capital stock of a corporation which arises from the value of property beyond its jurisdiction. While an appraisement of value is in general a decision on a question of fact and final, where it is arrived at by in- cluding property not within the jurisdiction of the State, it is absolutely illegal as made without jurisdiction. The collection of a tax on a cor- poration on its capital stock based on a valuation which includes property situated out of the State would amount to the taking of property without due process of law and can be restrained by the Federal courts. In assessing the value of the capital stock of a corpo-
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