soon as ten thousand dollars of stock is subscribed and paid for said
corporation shall have power to commence business." The ten thou-
sand dollars was not paid in, but the corporation after doing business
commenced an action against a citizen of another State in the Circuit
Court of the United States for North Carolina for goods sold; defendant
denied any knowledge or information sufficient to form a belief as to
plaintiff's corporate capacity. Plaintiff recovered in the Circuit Court
but the Circuit Court of Appeals held that owing to the failure to pay
in the amount specified in the charter, plaintiff was not a corporation
and a citizen of Mississippi, and that the jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
did not affirmatively appear. Held, error that the denial of defendant
was sufficient under the practice of North Carolina to put the question
of plaintiff's corporate capacity to sue in issue. That for purposes of
suing and being sued in the courts of the United States the members
of a corporation are to be deemed citizens of the State by whose laws
it was created. That plaintiff became in law a corporation when its
charter was approved and the Great Seal of the State affixed thereto,
and as such was entitled to sue in the United States Circuit Court as a
citizen of Mississippi, and the subscription of payment of the required
amount of capital stock was not such a condition precedent that the
corporation did not exist until it was paid. If the organization of the
company as a corporation was tainted with fraud it was for the State
by appropriate proceedings to annul the charter.
Wells Company v.
Gastonia Company, 177.
See JURISDICTION, F 3;
TAXATION, 1;
WRIT AND PROCESS.
1. Federal tribunals not moot courts.
Federal tribunals are not moot courts, and parties having substantial rights
must, when brought before those tribunals, present those rights or they
may lose them. Riverdale Mills v. Manufacturing Co., 188.
2. Weight to be given by Federal court to judgment of state court.
A Federal court is not required to give a judgment in a state court any
greater weight than is awarded to it in the courts of the State in which
it was rendered. As it is the settled rule in Kentucky that an adjudica-
tion in a suit for taxes is not an estoppel between the parties as to taxes
of any other year, even though such adjudication involves the finding
of an exemption by contract, not only as to taxes involved in the suit
but also as to all taxes that might be levied under the contract, the
Federal courts will not enjoin the collection of taxes for subsequent
years on the ground that their invalidity was adjudicated by such a
judgment. Covington v. First National Bank, 100.
See IMMIGRATION;
JURISDICTION, F 4;
RECEIVERS;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES;
STATUTES, A;
COURT OF CLAIMS.
See JURISDICTION, D.
Venue, where offense committed through the mails.
Where an offense is begun by the mailing of a letter in one district and
completed by the receipt of a letter in another district, the offender may
be punished in the latter district even though he could also be punished
in the other. (Re Pallister, 136 U. S. 257.) Benson v. Henkel, 1.
See JURISDICTION, A 10;
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
See RELEASE AND DISCHARGE.
DELIVERY.
See WAREHOUSEMEN.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 8 (Benson v. Henkel, 1; Beavers v. Haubert, 77).
DIVERSE CITIZENSHIP.
See JURISDICTION.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9.
DUE PROCESS OF LAW.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
TAXATION, 1.
Rule as to recovery on strength of own title not affected by defendant's cross-
petition for equitable relief.
The guardian of an Indian minor appointed in a county of Kansas, other
than that in which the land was situated, gave a deed to his ward's
property; the grantees did not take possession or exercise any act of
ownership for thirty years, when the original owner took possession of
the land which was still vacant and unimproved, and for the first time
asserted the invalidity of the guardian's deed; thereupon the grantees
under the guardian's deed brought ejectment; the defendant answered
by general denial and also by cross-petition asked for equitable relief
quieting the title and declaring his guardian's deed void; the state court
held the deed void but awarded possession to the grantees thereunder
on the ground of the ward's laches. Held, error; that in an action of
ejectment plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and
not on the weakness of defendant, and that the rule is not affected in
that the defendants, by cross-petition, had asked
Dunbar v. Green, 166.
Liability, at suit of original creditor, of one satisfying judgment against him
as garnishee in another State-Sufficiency of jurisdiction of person--
Voluntary payment—Effect of failure by garnishee to give creditor notice
of attachment.
A citizen of North Carolina who owed money to another citizen of that
State, was, while temporarily in Maryland, garnished by a creditor of
the man to whom he owed the money. Judgment was duly entered
according to Maryland practice and paid. Thereafter the garnishee
was sued in North Carolina by the original creditor and set up the
garnishee judgment and payment, but the North Carolina courts held
that as the situs of the debt was in North Carolina the Maryland judg-
ment was not a bar and awarded judgment against him. Held, error
and that: As under the laws of Maryland the garnishee could have been
sued by his creditor in the courts of that State he was subject to gar-
nishee process if found and served in the State even though only there
temporarily, no matter where the situs of the debt was originally.
Attachment is the creature of the local law, and power over the person
of the garnishee confers jurisdiction on the courts of the State where
the writ issues. A judgment against a garnishee, properly obtained
according to the law of the State, and paid, must, under the full faith
and credit clause of the Federal Constitution, be recognized as a pay-
ment of the original debt, by the courts of another State, in an action
brought against the garnishee by the original creditor. Where there
is absolutely no defense and the plaintiff is entitled to recover, there
is no reason why the garnishee should not consent to a judgment im-
pounding the debt, and his doing so does not amount to such a vol-
untary payment that he is not protected thereby under the full faith
and credit clause of the Constitution. While it is the object of the
courts to prevent the payment of any debt twice over, the failure on
the part of the garnishee to give proper notice to his creditor, of the
levying of the attachment, would be such neglect of duty to his creditor,
as would prevent him from availing of the garnishee judgment as a
bar to the suit of the creditor, and thus oblige him to pay the debt
twice. Harris v. Balk, 215.
Objection to selection of grand jurors; waiver by failure to except to.
Although a motion in arrest of judgment, based on the ground that the
grand jury was not properly impaneled by reason of the deputy clerk
acting in place of the clerk, was made in time, and the court below may
have erred in its interpretation of the statute, the accused cannot avail
of that even in this court unless the record shows that an exception was
properly taken. The accused could have waived such an objection to
the grand jury and by not excepting to the ruling he must be held to
have acquiesced in the ruling and waived his objection. Rodriguez
v. United States, 156.
HEALTH REGULATIONS.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 2.
Power of Congress to entrust decision as to citizenship to executive officer and
conclusiveness of decision so made-Constitutional right to judicial de-
cision.
Even though the Fifth Amendment does apply to one seeking entrance to
this country, and to deny him admission may deprive him of liberty,
due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial trial and Con-
gress may entrust the decision of his right to enter to an executive
officer. Under the Chinese exclusion, and the immigration, laws,
where a person of Chinese descent asks admission to the United States,
claiming that he is a native born citizen thereof, and the lawfully
designated officers find that he is not, and upon appeal that finding is
approved by the Secretary of Commerce and Labor, and it does not
appear that there was any abuse of discretion, such finding and action
of the executive officers should be treated by the courts as having been
made by a competent tribunal, with due process of law, and as final
and conclusive; and in habeas corpus proceedings, commenced there-
after, and based solely on the ground of the applicant's alleged citi-
zenship, the court should dismiss the writ and not direct new and fur-
ther evidence as to the question of citizenship. A person whose right
to enter the United States is questioned under the immigration laws
is to be regarded as if he had stopped at the limit of its jurisdiction,
although physically he may be within its boundaries. United States v.
Ju Toy, 253.
INDICTMENT.
See REMOVAL OF CAUSES, 6.
INJUNCTION.
See COURTS, 2;
PROPERTY;
TRADE NAME.
INSOLVENCY.
See NATIONAL BANKS, 2.
INSURANCE.
See BANKRUPTCY, 2;
CONTRACTS;
LOCAL LAW (WASH.).
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