1. Contracts-Impairment of obligation by taxation, exemption from which
claimed thereunder.
Where none of the expressions in a contract between a street railway com-
pany and the municipality in regard to the extension of company's
tracks for the better advantage of, and affording more facilities to, the
public, import any exemption from taxation, the subsequent imposi-
tion of a tax, otherwise valid, is not invalid under the impairment of
obligation clause of the Constitution. Savannah, Thunderbolt &c. Ry.
v. Savannah, 392.
2. Contracts-Purchase and sale of labor-Unconstitutionality of New York
labor law, section 110.
The general right to make a contract in relation to his business is part of
the liberty protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, and this includes
the right to purchase and sell labor, except as controlled by the State
in the legitimate exercise of its police power. Liberty of contract re-
lating to labor includes both parties to it; the one has as much right
to purchase as the other to sell labor. There is no reasonable ground,
on the score of health, for interfering with the liberty of the person or
the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor, in the occu-
pation of a baker. Nor can a law limiting such hours be justified as a
health law to safeguard the public health, or the health of the individ-
uals following that occupation. Section 110 of the labor law of the State
of New York, providing that no employés shall be required or permitted
to work in bakeries more than sixty hours in a week, or ten hours a day,
is not a legitimate exercise of the police power of the State, but an
unreasonable, unnecessary and arbitrary interference with the right and
liberty of the individual to contract, in relation to labor, and as such it
is in conflict with, and void under, the Federal Constitution. Lochner
v. New York, 45.
3 Due process of law does not require judicial trial of right to enter country.
Even though the Fifth Amendment does apply to one seeking entrance to
this country, and to deny him admission may deprive him of liberty,
due process of law does not necessarily require a judicial trial and Con-
gress may entrust the decision of his right to enter to an executive
officer. United States v. Ju Toy, 253.
4. Due process of law-Deprivation of property—What is public use—Validity
of Utah ditch law.
Whether the statute of a State permitting condemnation by an individual
for the purpose of obtaining water for his land or for mining, is or is not
a condemnation for public use and, therefore, a valid enactment under
the Constitution, depends upon considerations relating to the situation
of the State and its possibilities for agricultural and mining industries.
The rights of a riparian owner in and to the use of water flowing by his
land, are not the same in the arid and mountainous western States as
they are in the eastern States. This court recognizes the difference of
climate and soil, which render necessary different laws in different
sections of the country, and what is a public use largely depends upon
the facts surrounding the subject, and with which the people and the
courts of the State must be more familiar than a stranger to the soil.
While private property may not in all cases be taken to promote public
interest and tend to develop the natural resources of the State, in view
of the peculiar conditions existing in the State of Utah, and as the facts
appear in this record, the statute of that State permitting individuals
to enlarge the ditch of another and thereby obtain water for his own
land, is within the legislative power of the State, and does not in any
way violate the Federal Constitution. Clark v. Nash, 361.
5. Due process of law-Validity of Pennsylvania statute of 1885 relative to
administration of estates of absentees.
That the Fourteenth Amendment does not deprive the States of their police
power over subjects within their jurisdiction is elementary; and, in de-
termining the validity of a statute, the question before the court is not
the wisdom of the statute but whether it is so beyond the scope of the
municipal government as to amount to a want of due process of law
The right to regulate concerning the estate or property of absentees is an
attribute, which in its very essence belongs to all governments, to the
end that they may be able to perform the purpose for which govern-
ment exists, and in the absence of restrictions, in its own constitution,
none of which exists in the State of Pennsylvania, is within the scope of
a state government nor does the exercise of this power violate the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving the absentee of his property
without due process of law in case he is alive when the proceedings are
initiated. Where the provisions of a state statute for administration
on the assets of an absentee are reasonable as to the period of absence
necessary to create the presumption of death, and create proper safe-
guards for the protection of his interests in case the absentee should re-
turn, it does not violate the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, because it deprives the absentee of his property without
notice. The Pennsylvania statute of 1885, Public Laws, p. 155, pro-
viding for the administration of property of persons absent, and un-
heard of, for over seven or more years, is a valid enactment and is not
repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment because it deprives the
absentee of his property without due process of law. Cunnius v. Read-
ing School District, 458.
6. Equal protection of laws-Due process of law-Classification for taxation.
A classification which distinguishes between an ordinary street railway,
and a steam railroad, making an extra charge for local deliveries of
freight brought over its road from outside the city, held, under the facts
of this case, not to be such a classification as to make the tax void
under the Fourteenth Amendment because it denies the street rail-
way the equal protection of the law, or deprives it of its property with-
out due process of law. Savannah, Thunderbolt &c. Ry. v. Savannah,
392.
7. Equal protection of laws-Discrimination in enforcement; sufficiency of
showing.
Where the petitioner contends that a criminal law of the State is uncon-
stitutional because it denies a class to which he belongs the equal pro-
tection of the law, not on the ground that it is unconstitutional on its
face, or discriminatory in tendency and ultimate actual operation, but
because it is made so by the manner of its administration, in being
enforced exclusively against such class, it is a matter of proof and no
latitude of intention will be indulged, and it is not sufficient to simply
allege such exclusive enforcement but it must also appear that the con-
ditions to which the law was directed do not exclusively exist among
that class and that there are other offenders against whom the law is
not enforced. Ah Sin v. Wittman, 500.
8. Full faith and credit clause; judgment not affected by method of obtaining
service of process.
Service of a writ, in Ohio, upon a party who came into the State for the
purpose of being present at the taking of a deposition, which was taken
according to the notice, if it would have been good otherwise, is not made
bad by the fact that the notice was given for the sole purpose of inducing
the party to come into the State. Refusal by the court of the other
State to treat the judgment based on such service as binding is a failure
to give it due faith and credit as required by Article IV, § 1, of the
Constitution of the United States. Jaster v. Currie, 144.
9. Full faith and credit denied to judgment entered on consent, having same
force as one entered in invitum.
Pursuant to the statutes of Illinois, a wife living apart from her husband,
both being citizens of Illinois, sued for separate maintenance alleging
that she was so living on account of the husband's cruelty and adultery
and without any fault on her part. The suit was contested, and, after
much evidence had been taken, the husband filed a paper admitting
that the evidence sustained the wife's contention, and consenting to
a decree providing for separation and support on certain terms; and
the wife filed a paper accepting the terms offered by the husband if
the decree found that her living apart from her husband was without
fault on her part. Such a decree was entered. Subsequently the hus-
band removed to California and commenced a suit for divorce on the
ground of desertion. The wife contested and pleaded the Illinois judg-
ment as an estoppel, but the California court declined to recognize it
on the ground that the issues were not the same, and also because it
was entered on consent. The wife then defended on the merits and
judgment was entered in favor of the husband. Reversed on writ of
error and held that under the circumstances the wife did not waive
her right to assert the estoppel of the judgment by defending on the
merits. The issues involved in the Illinois case and the California case
were practically the same and under the full faith and credit clause
of the Constitution the California court should have held that the
Illinois judgment was an estoppel against the assertion of the husband
that the wife's living apart from him was through any fault on her
part or amounted to desertion. As under the Illinois statutes the judg-
ment entered in favor of the wife was necessarily based on a judicial
finding that her living apart was not through her fault the papers filed
were to be regarded as consents that the testimony be construed as
sustaining the wife's contention and not as mere consents for entry
of judgment. As a judgment in Illinois entered on consent has the
same force as a judgment entered in invitum, and is entitled to similar
faith and credit in the courts of another State. Harding v. Harding,
317.
10. Trial-Constitutional provision applied to removal from one jurisdiction
to another.
The constitutional right of a defendant to a speedy trial and by a jury of
the district where the offense was committed, relates to the time and
not to the place of trial, and cannot be invoked by a defendant, in-
dicted in more than one district, to prevent his removal from the dis-
trict in which he happens to be to the other in which the Government
properly elects to try him. Beavers v. Haubert, 77.
11. Waiver of constitutional rights.
The rule reiterated that persons may by their acts, or omissions to act,
waive rights which they might otherwise have under the Constitution
and laws of the United States; and the question whether they have or
have not lost such rights by their failure to act, or by their action, is not
a Federal question. The judgment in this case rested on grounds broad
enough to sustain it independent of any Federal question. Leonard
v. Vicksburg, S. & P. R. R. Co., 416.
OF RELEASE. See Release and Discharge;
OF STATUTES. See Interstate Commerce;
OF TREATIES. See Treaties. Statute, A.
Insurance-Lex loci contractus-Impairment of obligation-Practice as to
construction of state statute.
A certificate of insurance on the life of a member residing in New York in
a mutual association was executed by the officers in Illinois; it provided
that it should first take effect as a binding obligation when accepted
by the member, and the member accepted it in New York. It con-
tained a provision that it was to be null and void in case of suicide of
insured and also one waiving all right to prevent physicians from testi-
fying as to knowledge derived professionally. After the insured died
the association defended an action brought in New York on the ground
of suicide and claimed that §§ 834, 836, N. Y. Code Civil Procedure,
under which the court excluded testimony of physicians in regard to
condition of deceased, were inapplicable because the policy was an
Illinois contract and also because in view of the waiver in the certificate
their enforcement impaired the obligation of the contract. Held, that
the general rule is that all matters respecting the remedy and the ad-
missibility of evidence depend upon the law of the State where the suit
is brought. Under the circumstances of this case the contract was a
New York contract and not an Illinois contract. As §§ 834, 836, of
the N. Y. Code of Civil Procedure, were enacted prior to the execution
of the contract involved, they could not impair its obligation. In
cases of this nature this court accepts the construction given by the
courts of the State to its statutes, and even if under § 709, Rev. Stat.,
this court could review all questions presented by the record, the judg-
ment should be affirmed. Knights of Pythias v. Meyer, 508.
Sufficient compliance with law of Mississippi to constitute corporation capable
of suing in Federal court.
The charter of a corporation in Mississippi provided that the incorporators
"are hereby created a body politic and corporate," and also that "as
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