diction for suits hereafter brought by or against any association established under any law providing for national banking associations, except suits between them and the United States, or its officers and agents, shall be the same as, and not other than, the jurisdiction for suits by or against banks not organized under any law of the United States, which do or might do banking business where such national banking associations may be doing business when such suits may be begun: and all laws and parts of laws of the United States inconsistent with this proviso be, and the same are hereby, repealed." There is nothing to this section enlarging the right of attachment against national banks. Before the passage of this section Circuit Courts of the United States had jurisdiction of suits against national banks because they were corporations of Federal origin. It was the purpose of this legislation to deprive such banks of the right to invoke the jurisdiction of the Federal courts simply upon the ground that they were created by and exercised their powers under the acts of Congress. Petri v. Commercial Bank, 142 U. S. 644; Continental National Bank v. Buford, 191 U. S. 119, 123. It regulated the jurisdiction of the courts to entertain such actions against corporations of this character, and had nothing to do with the kind and character of remedies which could be had against them. Certainly there is nothing in the act repealing the prior provisions of section 5242, above quoted. It is further insisted that whether or not the lien is absolute upon the property of the bank, jurisdiction is obtained of it by the issuing of the attachment; but we cannot take this view. There was no personal service in the court of original jurisdiction, and the attachment being without the power of the court by reason of the terms of the Federal statute, no jurisdiction was acquired in the case, either over the person or property of the defendant. We see no error in the judgment of the Court of Appeals of New York, and the same is Affirmed. GREAT WESTERN MINING AND MANUFACTURING COMPANY v. HARRIS. CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 217. Argued April 14, 17, 1905.-Decided May 29, 1905. A receiver is an officer of the court which appoints him, and in the absence of some conveyance or statute vesting the property of the debtor in him, he cannot sue in courts of a foreign jurisdiction upon the order of the court appointing him, to recover the property of the debtor. Booth v. Clark, 17 How. 338. A receiver's right to sue in a foreign jurisdiction is not recognized upon principles of comity, as every jurisdiction in which it is sought by means of a receiver to subject property to the control of the court, has the right and power to determine for itself who the receiver shall be, and to control the distribution of the funds realized within its own jurisdiction. Where the receiver can not maintain an action to recover property in a jurisdiction other than that in which he was appointed, jurisdiction is not established because the action is authorized to be instituted by the receiver in the name of the corporation, if it appears that in case of a recovery the property would be turned over to the receiver to be by him administered under the order of the court appointing him. THIS case was begun by bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Vermont in the name of the Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Company, a Kentucky corporation, by L. C. Black, its receiver, against B. D. Harris, a citizen of the State of Vermont. It is averred that the corporation was duly organized under the laws of the State of Kentucky. In substance the bill sets forth: That the Great Western Mining and Manufacturing Company was organized by the Kentucky legislature on January 19, 1856, for the purpose of owning and operating mining property and selling coal. On or about February 10, 1859, it became the owner of coal properties to the value of about $40,000, situated in Lawrence County, Kentucky. The capital stock of said company was $200,000, divided into 2,000 shares VOL CXCVIII-36 of $100 each. That previous to November 10, 1887, the capital stock of the company was owned as follows: B. D. Harris, the defendant herein, 600 shares, par George W. Carlisle, 300 shares, par value. 30,000 00 James C. Holden, 4 shares, par value. Loring Hinsdale, 4 shares, par value... 400 00 400 00 George S. Richardson, 52 shares, par value.. 5,200 00 On November 10, 1887, the stockholders increased the capital stock in the sum of $50,000, the same being distributed among the stockholders as follows: To B. D. Harris, 150 shares, par value.. To G. D. Harris, 150 shares, par value.. To John Carlisle, 110 shares, par value.. To George W. Carlisle, 75 shares, par value.. $15,000 00 15,000 00 11,000 00 7,500 00 1,300 00 100 00 100 00 [The record shows that this increase was in fact made on January 11, 1888, in pursuance of a meeting authorized to be called at that date in the meeting of November 10, 1887, and certificates issued January 14, 1888.] On April 22, 1889, a further increase of capital stock was had by adding 1,000 shares of $100 each, which was distributed as follows: To B. D. Harris, 300 shares, par value. $30,000 00 30,000 00 To John Carlisle, 220 shares, par value. 22,000 00 To George W. Carlisle, 150 shares, par value. 15,000 00 To George S. Richardson, 26 shares, par value. . . . 2,600 00 To James C. Holden, 2 shares, par value.. 200 00 To Loring Hinsdale, 2 shares, par value.. 200 00 The complainant avers that at the time the increases of capital stock were made and carried out the stockholders had formed a plan of issuing bonds and selling the same, and that the issues and distribution of said stock were made for the purpose of defrauding said company, and obtaining without consideration the aforesaid shares of capital stock, and for the purpose of selling the same to the company in connection with the said loan, and defrauding the company out of a part thereof. That said issues of capital stock were made by the shareholders and board of directors, of whom the defendant was one, ostensibly in consideration of alleged betterments of said mining property, which betterments, it was pretended, were made and paid for out of the net earnings of the company, which it was represented had increased the value of the property belonging to the stockholders. Complainant alleges that no such betterments had been made, and if made they were paid for out of money borrowed upon the credit of the company, for which an indebtedness then existed and still exists. That in fact there had been no net earnings which had been put into betterments by the company, and that the issue of said stock was without consideration, illegal and void, and a breach of duty upon the part of the stockholders and the directors of the corporation to its creditors. That said stock so issued still remains outstanding in the names of the parties to whom it was issued or their assignees. That on May 13, 1889, the directors of the company, of whom the defendant Harris was one, and who were also stockholders in the company, for the purpose of defrauding said company and abstracting the assets of the company for their own use and benefit, the corporation then being insolvent, without means to pay its floating indebtedness, which then amounted to $100,000, or more, agreed that they would obtain a loan of $300,000 for said company, said loan to be evidenced by bonds to the number of 300 in the denomination of $1,000 each, to be secured by mortgage upon the property of the company. That the issues of stock had been made upon the consideration that certain betterments Statement of the Case. 198 U. S. had been added to the property, and had been paid for out of the profits of the operation thereof, which profits would otherwise belong to the stockholders, when in truth and fact the said company was largely insolvent and had a mortgage debt of about $60,000 upon it and a floating debt of $100,000 or more. In fact, said company had not made any net profits whatever, and said betterments had not been made at all, or, if made, had been paid for out of the earnings of the company, and no consideration except that herein stated was ever paid by the stockholders for the stock issued to them. That it was for the purpose of carrying out the scheme of abstracting from the company money arising from the sale of the bonds, and for that purpose only, that said stock was issued to the defendant Harris and others. That said bonds were sold at a price of eighty-five cents on the dollar, including a bonus of fifty per cent of the par value of said bonds in the stock of the company; that is, a purchaser of a $1,000 bond was entitled to have with said bond $500 of the capital stock of the company. That in pursuance of the combination aforesaid the said directors and stockholders furnishing said bonus stock were paid for the same from the proceeds of the sale of the bonds. The stock was furnished as follows in pursuance of the said arrangement: By B. D. Harris, 450 shares, par value.. G. D. Harris, 450 shares, par value.. John Carlisle, 336 shares, par value.. George W. Carlisle, 225 shares, par value.. George S. Richardson, 39 shares, par value.... $45,000 00 45,000 00 33,600 00 22,500 00 3,900 00 That out of the proceeds of the sale of the bonds the sum of $75,000 was distributed among the parties, as follows: |