198 U.S. Argument for Defendant in Error. and this comes within the definition of jurisdiction to hear and determine a cause as declared by this court in United States v. Arredondo, 6 Pet. 709; Cooper v. Reynolds, 10 Wall. 316; and differentiates it from Allen v. Dundas, 3 T. R. 129; Griffith v. Frazier, 8 Cr. 9, 23, as shown in Roderigas v. Savings Institution, 63 N. Y. 460; Plume v. Savings Institution, 17 Vroom, 211. For cases stating as a mere obiter dictum, that administration upon the estate of the living is a nullity see Day v. Floyd, 130 Massachusetts, 488, 489; Andrews v. Avory, 14 Gratt. 229, 236; Moore v. Smith, 11 Rich. 569; Withers v. Patterson, 27 Texas, 491, 497; Johnson v. Beazley, 65 Missouri, 250, 264; Perry v. St. Joseph & Western Railroad, 29 Kansas, 420, 423; Fish v. Nowell, 9 Texas, 13, 18; Morgan v. Dodge, 44 N. H. 255, 259; Quidort's Adm. v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472; Martin v. Robinson, 67 Texas, 368; Waters v. Stickney, 12 Allen, 1, 13; Hamilton v. Brown, 161 U. S. 256, 267. For those where the question was directly in issue, see French v. Frazier, 7 J. J. Marsh, 425, 427; State v. White, 7 Ired. 116; Duncan v. Stewart, 25 Alabama, 408; Melia v. Simmons, 45 Wisconsin, 334; Thomas v. People, 107 Illinois, 517; Jochumsen v. Suffolk Savings Bank, 3 Allen, 87, 96; Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 273; Burns v. Van Loan, 29 La. Ann. 560, 563; Springer v. Shavender, 118 N. Car. 33; Schleicher v. Gutbrod, 34 S. W. Rep. 550; Stevenson v. Superior Court, 62 California, 65; Scott v. McNeal, 154 U. S. 34. All of these were decided in the absence of any local statute similar to the act of 1885. There are some other authorities which refer directly to the existence of such local statute as a circumstance which might alter the case. 2 Wharton on Evidence, § 810; D'Arusment v. Jones, 4 Lea, 251. The legislature can make a valid grant of jurisdiction to its courts over any legitimate subject matter, provided the subsequent steps be according to law. Such a grant of authority the Pennsylvania assembly directly conveyed by the act of 1885. It is an elementary principle that statutes are VOL, CXCVIII-30 Argument for Defendant in Error. 198 U.S. to be construed according to the intention of the legislature. The intention of the legislature to confer jurisdiction over the subject matter is clear beyond a peradventure. The former practice was for the register to grant letters upon the common law presumption of death after seven years' absence. But this method was rendered worthless by the opinion in Devlin v. Commonwealth, 101 Pa. St. 272, delivered in November, 1882, which held such administration absolutely void. The law was thus left in chaotic condition, for if a resident of the State disappeared, there was no way of settling his estate. This predicament occasioned the almost immediate passage of the act of 1885. The grant to a court of jurisdiction over the estates of those who by reason of long absence are probably dead would seem a highly beneficial, and, if the process were proper, a legal and rational, exercise of legislative discretion. As to legislative grants of a generally similar jurisdiction which have been passed upon by Federal courts see Arndt v. Griggs, 134 U. S. 316; Boswell v. Ohio, 9 How. 336; Bennett v. Fenton, involving 18 Stat. 472, 41 Fed. Rep. 283; Roller v. Holley, 176 U. S. 398. And see also Shepperd v. Ware, 48 N. W. Rep. 773; Gray v. Galis, 37 Wisconsin, 614. The orphans' court having authority over the estates of absentees presumed to be dead, who have left property within the jurisdiction of the court, the proceedings thereon are adapted to like cases of administration upon actual decedents, follow such precedents as closely as possible, and are, therefore, substantially proceedings in rem. Kinselman v. Stine, 192 Pa. St. 462; Shaupe v. Shaupe, 12 S. & R. 9; Schalls' App., 40 Pa. St. 170; Furness v. Smith, 30 Pa. St. 520; State Tax on Foreign-held Bonds, 15 Wall. 300, distinguished. See Savings Society v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133; Wyman v. Halstead, 109 U. S. 654. Proceedings under the act of 1885, being adapted to like cases of administration upon the estates of the dead, are sub stantially proceedings in rem and constructive notice, if reasonable, is sufficient. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U. S. 727; Woodruff v. Taylor, 20 Vermont, 73; Freeman on Judgments, § 607; Black on Judgments, $793, 808; Freeman v. Alderson, 119 U. S. 185; Heidritter v. Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S. 294, 302; Herman on Estoppel, § 327; Runyan's Appeal, 27 Pa. St. 121; Quidort's Adm. v. Pergeaux, 18 N. J. Eq. 472, 477; Vanderpool v. Van Valkenburgh, 6 N. Y. 190; Storey v. Storey, 120 Illinois, 244. MR. JUSTICE WHITE, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court. In their ultimate aspect the assignments of error and the propositions based on them all rest on the assumption that the State of Pennsylvania had no jurisdiction over the person or property of the absentee, and therefore the proceedings for the appointment of the administrator and all acts done by him were void and subject to collateral attack. But to uphold this contention, in a broad sense, would be to deny the possession by the various States of powers which they obviously have the right to exert. That the debt due the absentee by the School District, resulting from the establishment of her dower, was within the jurisdiction of the state authority, is clear. It would undoubtedly have been subject to administration under the laws of Pennsylvania had the absentee been in fact dead. Wyman v. Halsted, Administrator, 109 U. S. 654, 656; Sayre v. Helme, 61 Pa. St. 299; Mansfield v. McFarland, 202 Pa. St. 173, 174. The debt was certainly subject to taxation, and, being so subject, had it been taxed, the State would have had power to provide remedial process for the collection of the tax. Savings Society v. Multnomah County 169 U. S. 421, 428; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133. Moreover it would have been in the power of the State to subject the debt to attachment at the instance of a creditor of the absentee. Harris v. Balk, 198 U. S. 215. And that the law of Pennsylvania would have authorized such an attachment is also clear. Furness v. Smith, 30 Pa. St. 520, 522. It may not also be doubted that the State of Pennsylvania had authority to enact an applicable statute of limitations. Shrinking from the conclusion to which the assertion of the want of jurisdiction in the State over the debt logically leads, the foregoing propositions are not seriously disputed. It is, however, insisted that they are not determinative of the power of the State to provide for the administration of the property of a person who, having been domiciled in the State, has absented himself for an unreasonable time, leaving no trace of his whereabouts. The contentions on this subject are thus stated in the brief of counsel: "In a word, the case before the court is one in which the private property of one person was, without her knowledge or consent, transferred to another who in reality had no shadow of a right to it, by virtue of an ex parte proceeding of which the owner had no lawful notice. Is it possible that such a manifest infringement of the fundamental and inherent rights which belong to every person in the use and enjoyment of his private property can be construed to be due process of law?" Again: "If the plaintiff's departure from Pennsylvania and her omission to demand her arrearages for the period of eleven years, work an injury to any one, it was to herself alone and not to any public right such as would bring this case within the police power of the State. Plaintiff was under no legal obligation to remain in Reading." It will be observed that the propositions challenge the authority of the State to enact the statute which formed the basis of the proceedings, not only because it is insisted that there was a complete want of power to do so, but also because, even if the State had power, the method of procedure which the statute authorized was so wanting in notice as not to constitute due process of law. We shall consider these objections separately: 1st. Was the state statute providing for the administration of the property of an absentee under the circumstances contemplated by the statute so beyond the scope of the State's authority as to constitute a want of due process of law within the intendment of the Fourteenth Amendment? That the Amendment does not deprive the States of their police power over subjects within their jurisdiction is elementary. The question then is, not the wisdom of the statute, but whether it was so beyond the scope of municipal government as to amount to a want of due process of law. The solution of this inquiry leads us therefore to consider the general power of government to provide for the administration of the estates of absentees under the conditions enumerated in the Pennsylvania law. We do not pause to demonstrate, by original reasoning, that the right to regulate concerning the estate or property of absentees is an attribute, which, in its very essence, must belong to all governments, to the end that they may be able to perform the purposes for which government exists. This is not done, because we propose rather to test the question by ascertaining how far such authority has been deemed a proper governmental attribute in all times and under all conditions. If it be found that an authority of that character has ever been treated as belonging to government and embraced in the right to protect and foster the well-being and order of society, it must follow that that which has at all times been conceded to be within the power of government, cannot, in reason, be said to be so beyond the scope of governmental authority that the exertion of such a power must be held to be a want of due process of law, even although there is no constitutional limitation affecting the exercise of the power. Whilst it may be that under the Roman Law there was no complete and coherent system provided for the administration of the estate of an absentee, Toullier, title 1, No. 379; Duranton, title 1, No. 384, it is nevertheless certain that absence, without being heard from for a given length of time, authorized the appointment of a curator to protect and administer an |