jurisdiction of the United States, in force at the date of the passage of this act, shall remain in force, except in so far as the same are inconsistent with, or are replaced by, some provision of this code."

In conclusion of this branch of the case it may be said that any construction of the law which would preclude the extradition to the District of Columbia of offenders who are arrested elsewhere would be attended by such abhorrent consequences that nothing but the clearest language would authorize such construction. It certainly could never have been intended that persons guilty of offenses against the laws of the United States should escape punishment simply by crossing the Potomac River, nor upon the other hand that this District should become an Alsatia for the refuge of criminals from every part of the country.

3. Appellant makes further objection to a removal to the District of Columbia upon the ground that the offense, if any, was committed in California, and that under the Constitution he is entitled to a trial in that jurisdiction.

The objection does not appear upon the face of the indictment, which charges the offense to have been committed within this District, but from the testimony of one of those clerks it seems that the money was received by him in certain letters mailed to him from San Francisco and received in Washington. Without intimating whether the question of jurisdiction can be raised in this way, the case clearly falls within that of In re Palliser, 136 U. S. 257, in which it was held that where an offense is begun by the mailing of a letter in one District and completed by the receipt of a letter in another District, the offender may be punished in the latter District, although it may be that he could also be punished in the former. A large number of authorities are collated by Mr. Justice Gray in the opinion, and the case is treated as covered by sec. 731, providing that when an offense is begun in one District and completed in another it shall be deemed to have been committed in either, and be tried in either, as though it had been

Day, White, PECKHAM and MCKENNA, JJ., concurring. 198 U. S.

wholly committed therein. In addition to this, however, it is conceded that some of the offenses charged in the various counts were committed in Washington.

There was no error in the action of the court below, and its judgment is

Affirmed.

MR. JUSTICE DAY, with whom were MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM and MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA, concurring.

MR. JUSTICE WHITE, MR. JUSTICE PECKHAM, MR. JUSTICE MCKENNA and the writer agree in the conclusion just announced and in the main with the reasoning of the opinion. But we are unable to concur in the view that where the Commissioner may be of opinion that the indictment charges no offense against the laws of the United States, and there is no other proof of probable cause before him, the order of arrest may be made, remitting to the court where the indictment was found all questions of the sufficiency of the indictment. We agree that upon the hearing before the Commissioner the indictment is prima facie to be taken as good, and that no technical objection should prevail against it; its ultimate sufficiency being matter for determination of the court wherein it was returned against the accused, subject to review in the appellate courts. Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. 249. But the order of removal involves judicial rather than mere ministerial action, and must be issued by the judge of the District when the case made warrants it. Sec. 1014, Rev. Stat.; Beavers v. Henkel, 194 U. S. 73, 83. And whether found in the indictment, or as the result of other testimony, the order to remove the accused can only be issued upon a showing of probable cause. Greene v. Henkel, 183 U. S. supra.

In this case the argument chiefly relied upon against the right to issue the order of arrest, and subsequently of removal, rested upon the alleged insufficiency of the indictment to charge any offense within the terms of the statute, because the

reports which it was alleged the accused had been bribed to reveal were not then on file and might never be filed in the Department. It is said that the Commissioner was not required to determine for himself whether the statute applied to such reports, but such objections must be remitted for determination to the court in which the indictment was found. In other words, the order of arrest and commitment may be made, although the Commissioner be of opinion that the indictment, in a particular vital to the prosecution of the offense, and which cannot be supplied by other proof, is fatally defective, and the accused is charged with no offense against the laws of the United States. In our opinion, the Commissioner, when the case is thus presented, must pass upon the sufficiency of the indictment. It is his duty to decide whether an offense is charged, with a view to making or withholding the order of arrest, which when made, becomes the basis of an order of removal of a citizen to the place of trial, which may be many miles distant from his home. Such order is proper only in cases wherein probable cause has been shown to believe the accused guilty of an offense cognizable by the laws of the United States in the proceeding pending against him, and for which he is to answer at the place of indictment.

PABST BREWING COMPANY v. CRENSHAW.

APPEAL FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF MISSOURI.

No. 85. Argued December 8, 1904.-Decided April 17, 1905.

The malt liquor inspection law of Missouri provides for the inspection of malt liquors manufactured within the State and also for those manufactured without and held for sale and consumption within the State. The Supreme Court of the State sustained the law deciding among other things that the act does not affect liquors shipped into the State and held there for reshipment without the State, that it does not discriminate in favor of beer manufactured in the State, and that it is not a revenue, but an inspection law. The constitutionality of the law was attacked VOL. CXCVIII-2

Argument for Appellant.

198 U.S.

by a manufacturer of malt liquors without the State as an interference with interstate commerce, and also on the ground that as the amount of the inspection charge far exceeds the expense of inspection it is a revenue, and not an inspection law, and therefore does not fall under permissive provisions of the Wilson Act. Held:

A state statute which operates upon beer and malt liquors shipped from other States after their arrival and while held for sale and consumption within the State, is not an interference with interstate commerce in view of the provisions of the Wilson Act.

The regulation of the sale of liquor is essentially a police power of the State, and a provision in a state law, tending to determine the purity of malt liquors sold in the State, is an exercise of the same power. The purpose of the Wilson Act is to make liquor, after its arrival in a State, a domestic product, and to confer power on the States to deal with it accordingly. The police power is, hence, to be measured by the right of the State to control or regulate domestic products and this creates a state and not a Federal question as respects the commerce clause of the Constitution; and this court cannot review the determination of the state court that the statute involved in this case was not a revenue but an inspection measure.

A state regulation, valid under the Wilson Act, as to liquors shipped from another State after delivery at destination is not an interference with interstate commerce because it affects traffic in, and deters shipments of, the article into that State.

The rule that state inspection laws, which do not provide adequate inspection and impose a burden beyond the cost of inspection, are repugnant to the commerce clause of the Constitution does not apply to liquors after they have ceased to be articles of interstate commerce under the provisions of the Wilson Act.

THE facts are stated in the opinion.

Mr. Clifford Histed, with whom Mr. James H. Harkless, Mr. Charles S. Crysler and Mr. Francis C. Downey were on the brief, for appellant:

The business is interstate commerce.

United States v. Swift

& Co., 122 Fed. Rep. 529; Schollenberger v. Pennsylvania, 171 U. S. 1; Robbins v. Taxing District, 120 U. S. 489; Stockard v. Morgan, 185 U. S. 27; New York v. Roberts, 171 U. S. 658. Brewing Co. v. Brister, 179 U. S. 445, distinguished.

The statute is not within the police power of the State. The fees bear no just relation to the expense. The fees do not go to the inspectors but to the State which separately appropriates for the inspectors' salaries. The receipts are

198 U. S.

Argument for Appellant.

$350,000 and the expenses about $12,500. It was introduced and regarded as a revenue measure, and afterwards disguised as an inspection law. House Journal, Missouri Legislation, 1899, 190, 278, 452; Sen. Journal, 386, 610, 620; Session Acts, 1901, 226. The act does not regulate the sale of beer. As to being subject to inspection fees, malt liquors stand on the same footing as other merchandise under the commerce clause of the Constitution. License Cases, 5 How. 599; Bowman v. Chicago Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, and cases cited; Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 110; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 58, 91.

As intoxicating liquors are subjects of lawful commerce in Missouri, the State, in imposing an inspection fee under its police power, is bound by the rule that the charge bears a reasonable and just relation to the cost of inspection. Hopkins v. United States, 171 U.S. 578, 597; Express Co. v. Ohio, 166 U. S. 185, 218; W. U. Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 187 U. S. 419; Telegraph Co. v. Philadelphia, 190 U. S. 160; Postal Tel. Co. v. New Hope, 192 U. S. 55; Postal Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64.

No practical inspection is punished by the act, nor under it have the inspectors any power to make an actual inspection. The statute cannot be sustained as a police regulation because, in its practical workings, it has no relation whatever to the public health. Vance v. Vandercook Co., 170 U. S. 438, 456; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 661; Scott v. Donald, 165 U. S. 93; Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 150.

This court is not bound by the declaration of the state Supreme Court that the act is an inspection law. This court will determine that for itself, as interstate commerce is involved. Brennan v. Titusville, 153 U. S. 289; Postal Tel. Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64; People v. Compagnie Générale, 107 U. S. 59, 63; Minnesota v. Barber, 136 U. S. 313.

The tax is not authorized by the Wilson Law. The act is an unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and is not within the police power as it is a pure revenue measure and does not come within the provisions of the Wilson Bill. The Missouri state court held that it did come within the provisions of that