It did so and its action in

it had power to reopen the matter. that respect is not open to question here. However stringent may be the practice in refusing to reconsider what has been done, it still is but practice, not want of jurisdiction, that makes the rule.

The plaintiff in error does not argue the merits of the order of the Circuit Court. Assuming that they, as well as the jurisdiction of the court to make the order, are open here, we see no sufficient reason for disturbing the decision. The Circuit Court was warranted by the affidavits before it in finding that the defendant was doing no business and had no property in the State of New York, and that the service on a director casually within the State for a few days was bad. Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406; Geer v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 428. The arguments do not seem to us to need to be noticed in greater detail.

Judgment affirmed.

COVINGTON v. FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF
COVINGTON.

FIRST NATIONAL BANK OF COVINGTON v.
COVINGTON.

APPEALS FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY,

Nos. 113, 114. Argued January 5, 1905.-Decided April 17, 1905.

A Federal court is not required to give a judgment in a state court any greater weight than is awarded to it in the courts of the State in which it was rendered. As it is the settled rule in Kentucky that an adjudication in a suit for taxes is not an estoppel between the parties as to taxes of any other year, even though such adjudication involves the finding of an exemption by contract, not only as to taxes involved in the suit but also as to all taxes that might be levied under the contract, the

Federal courts will not enjoin the collection of taxes for subsequent years on the ground that their invalidity was adjudicated by such a judgment.

The statute of Kentucky of March 21, 1900, taxing shares of national banks, from the years 1893 to 1900 and thereafter held, void and in conflict with § 5219, Rev. Stat., as to those portions which are retroactive as imposing a burden on the bank not borne by other moneyed corporations of the State, and valid and not in conflict with § 5219 as to taxes imposed thereafter.

A difference in methods in assessing shares of national banks from that of taxing state banks does not necessarily amount to a discrimination, rendering the act invalid under § 5219, and justify the judicial interference of courts for the protection of the shareholders, unless it appears that the difference in method actually results in imposing a greater burden on the national banks than is imposed on other moneyed capital in the State.

THIS case was here upon a former appeal, which was dismissed for want of final decree in the court below. Covington v. Covington First National Bank, 185 U. S. 270.

The original action was brought to enjoin the assessment or collection of taxes on certain shares of capital stock of the First National Bank of Covington for the years from 1893 to 1900, inclusive, and to enjoin the arrest of the president and cashier of the bank for not listing such shares, and for a decree adjudicating the same not liable to taxation up to the time of the expiration of the charter of the bank on November 17, 1904.

The principal grounds alleged and relied upon are that by reason of the acceptance of the terms of the act of the general assembly of Kentucky, passed in 1886, known as the Hewitt law, an irrevocable contract had been made between the bank and the State, whereby the former was to pay to the State taxes at a certain rate on its stock, surplus and undivided profits, which, when paid, were to be in full of all other State, county or municipal taxes, except those levied on the bank's real estate. It was averred that complainant had regularly paid such taxes up to and including those due July 1, 1900. That the fact that the bank had such irrevocable contract had been adjudicated and finally determined by a decision in the

Court of Appeals of Kentucky in a litigation wherein the State and the city of Covington and the bank were parties. The bill further set up that an attempt was being made to compel the complainant to list for taxation its shares of stock under an act of the State of Kentucky, passed March 21, 1900 (Session Acts 1900, p. 65). The act under which the taxes were assessed is given in the margin of the opinion in the case of Covington v. Covington First National Bank, 185 U. S. supra, and for convenience of reference is also inserted in the margin here.1 It was also averred in the bill that the act of March 21,

"An act relating to the taxation of the shares of stock of national banks: "Whereas, the Supreme Court of the United States has lately decided that article three (3), chapter one hundred and three (103), of the acts of eighteen hundred and ninety-one, eighteen hundred and ninety-two, and eighteen hundred and ninety-three is void and of no effect in so far as the same provides for the taxation of the franchise of national banks, in consequence of which decision there is not now and has not been since adoption of said article in eighteen hundred and ninety-two any adequate mode of taxing national banks, while state banks are now, and have been ever since eighteen hundred and ninety-two, taxable for all purposes, State and local; therefore:

'Be it enacted by the General Assembly of the Commonwealth of Kentucky: "SECTION 1. That the shares of stock in each national bank of this State shall be subject to taxation for all state purposes, and shall be subject to taxation for the purposes of each county, city, town and taxing district in which the bank is located.

"SEC. 2. For purposes of the taxation provided for by the next preceding section, it shall be the duty of the president and cashier of the bank to list the said shares of stock with the assessing officers authorized to assess real estate for taxation, and the bank shall be and remain liable to the State, county, city, town and district for the taxes upon said shares of stock.

"SEC. 3. When any of said shares of stock have not been listed for taxation for any of said purposes under levy or levies of any year or years since the adoption of the revenue law of eighteen hundred and ninety-two, it shall be the duty of the president and cashier to list the same for taxation under said levy or levies: Provided, That where any national bank has heretofore, for any year or years, paid taxes upon its franchise as provided in article three (3) of the revenue law of eighteen hundred and ninety-two, said bank shall be excepted from the operation of this section as to said year or years: And provided further, That where any national bank has heretofore, for any year or years, paid state taxes under the Hewitt bill in excess of the state taxes required by this act for the same year or years, said bank shall be entitled to credit by said excess upon its state taxes required by this act.

1900, which undertakes to impose taxes for the years 1893 and following, is unconstitutional and void, and operates to discriminate against the complainant, in violation of section 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United States. The defendants having filed a plea to the jurisdiction and a general demurrer to the bill, upon motion for a temporary injunction, attempts to enforce taxes levied or assessed upon the shares of capital stock at any time previous to March 21, 1900, were enjoined. 103 Fed. Rep. 523.

December 17, 1900, a decree was entered, but not being final the writ of error was dismissed. 185 U. S. supra. After the case was sent back to the Cireuit Court the prior decision in that court was followed, and it was further held that the judgment of the state court was not a bar to the right to collect taxes for other years than the year directly involved in the judgment set up, and that as the Hewitt law and its acceptance by the bank had been conclusively held not to constitute an irrevocable contract as to taxes between the State and the complainant, and as the law was valid as to future taxation the injunction could not be granted as to taxes assessed under the law of March 21, 1900, after its passage. A decree was, therefore, entered, dismissing the complainant's bill as to taxes levied after said date, and permitting the former

"SEC. 4. All assessments of shares of stock contemplated by this act shall be entered upon the assessor's books, certified and reported by the assessing officers as assessments of real estate are entered, certified and reported, and the same shall be certified to the proper collecting officers for collection as assessments of real estate are certified for collection of taxes thereon.

"SEC. 5. The assessments of said shares of stock and collection of taxes thereon, as contemplated by this act, may be enforced as assessments of real estate and collection of taxes thereon may be enforced.

"SEC. 6. The purpose of this act is to place national banks of this State, with respect to taxation, upon the same footing as state banks as nearly as may be consistently with said article three (3) of the revenue law and said decision of the Supreme Court.

"SEC. 7. Whereas, it is important that state banks and national banks should be taxed equally for all purposes, an emergency exists, and this act shall take effect and be in force from and after its passage."

Approved March 21, 1900.

Argument for the City of Covington.

198 U. S.

decree enjoining the assessment and levying of taxes before the passage of the law to stand. 129 Fed. Rep. 792.

From so much of the decree as enjoined the taxes assessed prior to March 21, 1900, the city appealed; from so much thereof as refused the injunction and dismissed the bill as to taxes assessed after that date, the bank appealed. Both appeals are now before this court.

Mr. J. H. Hazelrigg, with whom Mr. F. J. Hanlon and Mr. Ira Julian were on the brief, for the City of Covington: The act of March 21, 1900, providing for taxation of shares of national banks is not repugnant to $5219, Rev. Stat., because of its retroactive provision. Kentucky Stat., Ch. 108; Nat. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 664; Board of Councilmen v. Mason & Foard Co., 100 Kentucky, 48; Blackwell on Tax Titles, 5th ed., § 324; Kentucky Statutes, §§ 3176-3375, 4020, 4022, 4090, 4241; Constitution of Kentucky, §§ 170-174; Scobee v. Bean, 22 Ky. L. R. 1076; Chester v. Black, 6 L. R. A. 802; Butler v. Toledo, 5 Ohio St. 225; Mills v. Charleston, 29 Wisconsin, 400; Marion Co. v. L. & N. R. R. Co., 91 Kentucky, 388; In re Van Antwerp, 56 N. Y. 261; L. & N. R. R. Co. v. Commonwealth, 1 Bush. 250; Long v. Kiende, 27 Hun, 66; Mattingly v. Dist. Columbia, 97 U. S. 687; Plummer v. Marathon Co., 46 Wisconsin, 104; Florida &c. R. R. v. Reynolds, 183 U. S. 471; Cooley on Taxation, 291, 309; Mercantile Nat. Bank v. New York, 121 U. S. 138; Lou. & Jeff. Ferry Co. v. Commonwealth, 22 Ky. L. R. 446; Commonwealth v. Citizens' Nat. Bank and Citizens' Nat. Bank v. Commonwealth, 25 Ky. L. R. 2254; London v. Hope, 26 Ky. L. R. 112.

The act in controversy is not unconstitutional by reason of any conflict whatever with section 5219 Rev. Stat. Adams v. Nashville, 95 U. S. 22; Bank v. Commonwealth, 9 Wall. 362; Nat. Bank v. Davenport &c., 123 U. S. 83; Van Slyke v. Wisconsin, 154 U. S. 581; First Nat. Bank v. Ayres, 160 U. S. 660; Aberdeen Bank v. Chehalis Co., 166 U. S. 440; Merchants' Bank v. Pennsylvania, 167 U. S. 461; Lander v.