time into receiving basins. The drawings, figures 470 to 472, represent an eye crucible similar to the one represented by drawings, figures 464 to 466. It is provided with two tap-basins. The slag also passes through a basin, for the purpose of allowing the small particles of metal and matte mixed with it to settle. "(320) The drawings, figures 473 to 475, represent a sump furnace with a covered eye, in which the brasque (a mixture of fire-clay and coke dust) under the front wall divides the sump into two communicating vessels. The slag runs off continuously through the eye between the bottom of the front wall and the top of the brasque partition. This arrangement is used when it is desired to dip the clean metal with ladles from the forehearth instead of drawing it off into tap-basins. The drawings, figures 476 to 478, represent a sump furnace with an entirely open breast, in which the slag passes off immediately over the forehearth. The drawings, figures 479 and 480, represent a sump furnace with a covered eye, and with a tap-basin, into which the metal and matte are tapped from the forehearth. This furnace might be regarded as a channel furnace by simply considering the short canal or eye which connects the sump under the shaft with the forehearth, as a channel. But, by means of this short canal or eye, the sump and the forehearth stand in combination with each other as a pair of communicating tubes or vessels; consequently it is a sump, and not a channel, furnace. The slag may pass through the covered eye into the forehearth, or through an open eye above the forehearth, the latter eye being used exclusively for the slag. In smelting operations, where little or no slag is produced, the upper eye is dispensed with entirely. The following are Figs. 858-860, and their scale, from plate XLI. of Karsten's Atlas: 99 858 859 860 88. The defendants also introduced experts as witnesses, whose testimony tended to prove that, as stated by one of them, "the furnaces thus figured by Karsten are planned for withdrawing the reduced metal continuously, and as fast as possible, from the oxidizing action of the blast and the intensely heated part of the slag. So, the metal is made to flow constantly outward and upward through the open eye into the forehearth, which is made as high as the inner crucible; and, generally, the clean molten metal alone is passing through this bottom eye. When much slag is formed it is run off separately by another eye placed higher up. When very little slag is produced, it accumulates for a long time on the top of the molten metal in the inner crucible, and the clean metal in the forebay may be partially removed many times with. out allowing any of the slag to escape through the eye." One of the defendants, James Grant, was called to prove that he had constructed an experimental furnace of small size, according to the description and drawing of Fig. 860 of Karsten's publication, and worked it successfully. A model was exhibited, the proportions and features of which are shown in the following drawings: And his testimony was supported by that of others who had seen the furnace in operation. On the other hand, the plaintiffs, in rebuttal, called expert witnesses who testified that the plaintiffs' furnace, as described in the patent, differed materially from that described by Karsten, and from the model of the one made by the defendant Grant, and who pointed out in their evidence the particulars in which that difference consisted in the construction and arrangement of the furnace, in the principle of its operation, and in the results produced. All of the evidence on both sides having been given, the whole of which is set out in the bill of exceptions, the court, having refused to charge the jury as requested by the plaintiffs, instructed the jury to return a verdict for the defendants, which was done, and to this ruling exception was duly taken, and is now assigned for error. The judgment entered on the verdict rendered in favor of the defendants, in pursuance of the direction of the court, can be maintained only on the ground, either that the legal identity of the furnace described by Karsten with that covered by the plaintiffs' patent was manifest as a matter of law, or that it was established as a matter of fact so conclusively by the evidence that a verdict the other way could not be supported within the rule as stated in Randall v. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co., 109 U. S. 478; S. C. 3 Sup. Ct. Rep. 322. Clearly, it was not matter of law that the specification of the plaintiffs' patent, and the publication of Karsten, taken in connection with the drawings intended in illustration, described the same thing. The differences were obvious in the arrangement of the parts, and the relation of the basin in one, and the forehearth in the other, to the interior of the furnace, and the mode of connecting the one with the other, for the purpose of drawing the metal from the furnace. So that it certainly was not a matter of mere judicial knowledge that these differences were either not material in any degree to the result, or, if material at all, were only such as would not require the exercise of the faculty of invention, but would be suggested by the skill of an experienced workman employed to produce the best result in the application of the well-known arrangements of the furnace. It was claimed, on behalf of the plaintiffs, that the furnace described in the patent, and as used by them, embodied an idea not contained in or suggested by Karsten's publication. That idea consisted in the employment of a basin to receive the molten metal, located at a suitable elevation above the bottom of the furnace, and connected with the interior of the furnace by means of a tube, so that, instead of tapping a lead-smelting furnace by withdrawing the molten metal through a tap-hole near the bottom, it was proposed to allow the metal to flow upwards into the receiving basin under the operation of the familiar natural law that liquids will seek the same level in communicating vessels. The object to be attained by this arrangement was that clean metal, unaccompanied with slag or other impure products resulting from the operation of smelting lead ores, should after settling to the bottom of the furnace, by reason of its greater specific gravity, ascend through the connecting tube, as the mass of molten metal accumulates and rises within the furnace, into the receiving basin, and be dipped thence with a ladle. It was insisted by the patentees that no such arrangement and combination were to be found in Karsten's publication, or in the furnaces depicted in his figures, and that the improvement which they constituted was not the result of mere mechanical skill, but sprung from a genuine effort of invention; and this view was supported by the opinion of many experts skilled in the art. In our opinion, this was a question of fact, properly to be left for determination to the jury, under suitable instructions from the court upon the rules of law which should guide them to their verdict. And there was evidence upon both sides of the issue sufficient to require that it should be weighed and considered by the jury in the determination of the question, and this implies that, if it had been submitted to the jury, and the verdict had been for the plaintiffs, it would not have been the duty of the court to have set it aside as not supported by sufficient evidence. The court erred, we think, in withdrawing the case from the jury, as it did by directing a verdict for the defendants. For this error the judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded, with directions to grant a new trial; and it is so ordered. (118 U. S. 3) EMERSON, as Interpleader, v. SENTER and another, Partners, etc.1 1. ASSIGNMENt for Benefit OF CREDITORS-PARTNERSHIP ASSIGNMENT-DISSOLUTION BY DEATH-SURVIVOR'S RIGHTS. One of two partners dying, the survivor, an insolvent, executed a deed of trust for the benefit of the firm creditors, in which certain preferences as to payment were made. Held, that the surviving partner has power to execute such a deed. 2. SAME-OMISSION OF ASSETS. A deed of trust for creditors' benefit is not void because it does not convey all of the partership assets, some being fraudulently omitted. 18. C. 16 Fed. Rep. 206 ་ In Error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Arkansas. Butler and Moores constituted a mercantile firm doing business in the state of Arkansas under the name of A. Butler & Co. The former died on the seventeenth day of December, 1881, and thereafter, February 23, 1882, Moores, as surviving partner, executed a deed of assignment to Emerson, the plaintiff in error. The deed recited the death of Butler, the insufficiency of assets to discharge the partnership debts, and the desire of Moores, as surviving partner, to provide for their payment, so far as in his power, "by an assignment of all the property belonging to him as such surviving partner." The grantor, for the purposes named, and in consideration of one dollar paid by the grantee, transferred and assigned to Emerson, his successors and assigns, "all the stock in trade, goods, wares, and merchandise, debts, choses in action, property, and effects of every description, belonging to the said firm of A. Butler & Co.," or to the grantor, "as such surviving partner, mentioned, contained, or referred to in the schedule hereunto annexed." The conveyance was in trust that the assignee take possession of the property described, "sell the same as provided by law, and, with all reasonable dispatch," collect the debts and demands assigned, and apply the proceeds (1) to pay all the just and reasonable expenses, costs, and charges of executing the assignment, and carrying into effect the trust thereby created; (2) to pay in full, if the residue of the proceeds is sufficient for that purpose, all the debts and liabilities then due, or to become due, from Moores, as surviving partner, with interest thereon, to certain preferred creditors, among whom were the defendants in error, Senter & Co.; (3) to apply the balance to all other debts and liabilities of A. Butler & Co., or of Moores, as surviving partner; (4) to repay the latter, as surviving partner, whatever may remain after meeting the costs and expenses of the trust, and the amounts due respectively to other creditors. The deed invested the assignee with all the power and authority necessary to the full execution of the trust created by it. It was accepted by Emerson, and by some of the preferred creditors therein mentioned. The debts of the firm largely exceeded its assets, and Moores individually, as well as surviving partner, was insolvent when he made the assignment. In addition to the recitals in the deed of a desire to make an assignment of all the property in his hands as surviving partner, Moores represented to his ereditors that he had done so. Nevertheless, for the purpose of hindering and cheating his creditors, he omitted from his schedule $500 worth of goods which belonged to him as surviving partner; and, with like intent, left out of the schedule, and withheld from his assignee, $1,000 in cash and other property, which he held as surviving partner,-appropriating to his own use the property so omitted from the schedule. Neither the assignee nor the preferred creditors who accepted the deed had any knowledge of the alleged fraud of the grantor until after their acceptance of its provisions. Upon an issue formed between Emerson, asserting the validity of the deed, and Senter & Co., who, as creditors of the firm, attached the assigned effects as the property of the surviving partner, the deed of assignment was held to be void, and the claim of the assignee denied. U. M. Rose, for plaintiff in error. Thos. C. McRae, for defendant in er ror. Mr. Justice HARLAN, after stating the facts in the foregoing language, delivered the opinion of the court: The court below proceeded upon the ground, in part, that a sole surviving partner of an insolvent firm, who is himself insolvent, cannot make a valid assignment of partnership assets for the benefit of the joint creditors, with preference to some of them. We are unable to concur in this view. Some of the cases hold that one partner cannot, either during the continuance of |