will probably be the means of bringing a new freedom, from the letter that killeth. It is amusing to run through the prophesies on codification of the last generation and find practically nothing of these problems that teaching, writing and jurisprudence have encountered. The favorite theme of the prophets is the anticipated effect on law-making. But law-making processes, contrary to the warnings of the opponents of codification and the frank confession of most of its friends, do not, when codification is erected like "a dam in the stream of progress," cease to flow-they simply seek other channels. There is, of course, a natural hesitancy about deliberately changing a code by piecemeal legislation, especially a code established in the name of uniformity. And, in passing, it may be noted how frequently the desire for uniformity has been made the occasion for codification. The inconvenience of changing one's law as frequently as he changed horses was a factor in pre-Napoleonic France. Uniformity was a very important factor in the German movement for codification. Of the ancient codes it has been suggested that the principal motive behind them was to force upon newly conquered territory the laws of the conquering kingdom. It is not to be supposed, of course, that uniformity and codification are inseparable ideas. Before the days of easy access to legislatures, Kent and Story made their contributions. to the uniformity of American Law by supplying standard textbooks and also (unlike Shaw and Gibson) by casting their national influence as judges in its favor. And the great national law schools of the country are still carrying on their work by means of teaching the "better rule," the very thing which Mr. Williston has happily remarked is sought to be codified in the uniform codes. And perhaps the Commissioners may even find it possible to supplement their work of true codification by supplying a clause that can be inserted in our rapidly multiplying general codes or official texts of compiled statutes to authorize courts to give due consideration to the ideals of uniformity in all statutory interpretation-or why not in all adjudication? But just at present the external form of our law invites codification of details of substantive law as the most obvious means to the attainment of uniformity. And thus, in the codes before us there is a treaty-like element, an inter-state feature, which strengthens the disinclination of lazy human nature to tamper with what has once been officially finished. Consequently we must look for onward movements in side channels. One of the non-legislative methods of development in Continental Europe has been through administrative regulation, behind the thin pretense, or fiction, that such regulation did not affect private law. Such a fictitious mode of dealing with the matter is most useful in periods of glossation and prepares the way through executive justice for a later period in which rough general principles or equity are the predominant features in legal development. I merely throw out as to the codes before me the suggestion, that since the sales code was drafted some old ideas. have been revived, giving a peculiar status to the common vendor and even looking toward a justum pretium in business. There is no need of tampering with our code in this experimental work— we can accomplish whatever is necessary through the administrative. It is not inconceivable that the Federal Trade Board will tighten up the law of representations by advertising. The postal authorities have already done so in response to a general raising of the standards of business honesty throughout the country. Much that the Negotiable Instruments Law leaves unsaid about checks or undefined with reference to ordinary negotiable instruments—business hours, for example is conceivably within the power of banking commissioners or the Federal Reserve Board to regulate. Business men may aid in the process of passing beyond the barrier of the code by making their own carefully drawn blanks for their ordinary contracts, and by cultivating their own fictions. Thus the fiction involved in the "post dated " check, is becoming very popular in certain businesses, in which it would hardly have been considered respectable when the Negotiable Instruments Law was written." It is not necessary to talk here of such stretching of words as the Interstate Commerce clause in the Constitution has suffered to meet the needs of modern life, or to discuss the sins and acts of benevolence committed by the courts in the name of interpretation. Spurious interpretation is now pretty well understood," and though exposed, it still thrives. In 19 N. I. L. Section 12 is only permissive. Cf. note on postdated checks in Yale Law Journal, Jan., 1920. 20 Cf. Roscoe Pound, Spurious Interpretation, 7 Col. L. Rev. 379. a word, codification may block legislation, but it cannot stop law-making. Yet, notwithstanding the insinuations of the New York judge with the "average lay mind," the chief business of lawyers is not to evade the law, nor except in periods of aggravated glossation, to make burdens too grievous to be borne, with their fine distinctions. There comes a time in the history of every code that endures, when its meaning becomes established, when verbal quibbling is practically ended, when the incidence of the law is shifted like that of an old tax to the shoulders that must bear it, when it is understood or at least generally acted upon, even by those who have made no special study of it, when in short, it becomes an integral part of the civilization of the land. Even its arbitrary provisions at such a time cease to be matters of indifference. One need only think of those European countries where keeping to the left became the fashion instead of keeping to the right. To change the rule today would involve a rebuilding of cars and busses, railway stations and switches, the substitution of leftdrive automobiles for right-drives and most important of all a complete change in the habits of the people. So far as the codes represent no departure from the old law, this process of integration may be very rapid; it may be nearly accomplished at the very outset. It can never be fully accomplished in a dynamic society; but as this condition is approached, men-of-law readily turn their attention from the words and become students of principles. They look behind the words to realities-to the social meaning to living facts-to the spirit that giveth life-to purposes-it is all the same. The Glossators have been followed by Commentators not only in the history of Justinian's code in the Middle Ages, but also under slightly different guises in the application of practically every code from our Bible to our Constitutions." Commentaries are, however, a new season's planting. The threshing has reached to the next sowing time-but we have passed beyond the aftermath of codification. "The Law" and the Law of Change, 65 U. of Pa. Law Rev. 665, PROCEEDINGS OF THE NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF ATTORNEYSGENERAL The Thirteenth Annual Meeting of the National Association of Attorneys-General was held at the Hotel Statler, St. Louis, Mo., opening on Monday, August 23, 1920 at 2.00 P. M.; sessions also were held on Tuesday morning and afternoon following. Clifford L. Hilton of Minnesota, President of the Association, was in the Chair. Lawrence McDaniel, Circuit Attorney, St. Louis, extended a welcome to which a response was made by the Chairman. During the sessions, addresses were delivered as follows: Judge William M. Hargest of Harrisburg, Pa., on “The Pennsylvania Constabulary." James E. Markham, Assistant Attorney-General of Minnesota, on "The Argument in the Decision." Richard J. Hopkins, Attorney-General of Kansas, on "The Industrial Court." John Quincy Smith, Attorney-General of Alabama, on "Within the Law-Prophets and Profiteers." Dan B. Shields, Attorney-General of Utah, on "One Way to Restrain the Profiteer." Frank W. McAllister, Attorney-General of Missouri, on "The Missouri View of it." Officers were elected for the ensuing year as follows: President, John Quincy Smith, Attorney-General of Alabama; Vice-President, Byron S. Payne, Attorney-General of South Dakota; Secretary-Treasurer, Richard J. Hopkins, Attorney-General of Kansas; Executive Committee, Clifford L. Hilton, of Minnesota, Chairman; Dan B. Shields, of Utah; Samuel M. Wolfe, of South Carolina. (The president and secretary-treasurer are ex-officio members of this committee.) PROCEEDINGS OF THE THIRTIETH ANNUAL MEETING OF The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws HELD AT ST. LOUIS, MISSOURI, August 19-24, 1920. AND INFORMATION CONCERNING THE CONFERENCE AND ITS WORK. ORIGIN, NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws is composed of Commissioners from each of the states, the District of Columbia, Alaska, Hawaii, Porto Rico, and the Philippine Islands. In thirty-three of these jurisdictions the Commissioners are appointed by the chief executive acting under express legislative authority. In the other jurisdictions the appointments are made by general executive authority. There are usually three representatives from each jurisdiction. The term of appointment varies, but three years is the usual period. The Commissioners are chosen from the legal profession, being lawyers and judges of standing and experience, and teachers of law in some of the leading law schools. They serve without compensation, and in most instances pay their own expenses. They are united in a permanent organization, under a constitution and by-laws, and annually elect a president, a vice-president, a secretary, and a treasurer. The Commissioners meet in annual |