under paragraph 3, covering chemical compounds, etc., or under section 6 as an unenumerated manufactured article. "Butter" is thus described in the Encyclopedia Britannica (9th Ed.) vol. IV, p. 590: "Butter is the fatty portion of the milk of mammalian animals. The milk of all mammals contains such fatty constituents; and butter from the milk of goats, sheep, and other animals has been, and may be used; but that yielded by cows' milk is the most savory, and it alone really constitutes the butter of commerce." "Ghee" is defined by the Standard Dictionary as follows: "Butter clarified by boiling or heating and skimming or straining until it becomes a liquid or semisolid oil, capable of being kept for many years; largely used in India, in cookery and medicines, and in religious rites." We do not think the article can be said to be tallow, which is usually composed of harder and less fusible animal fats, nor lard, which is made from hogs' fat. That it is not a chemical compound within the meaning of paragraph 3 is too clear for argument. If it be assumed that the article is neither the butter, tallow, nor lard of commerce, we think it must be found that it resembles butter more closely, and in more particulars than either of the other substances, and that this resemblance in material, quality and use is sufficiently substantial to make operative the provisions of the similitude clause contained in section 7 of the act. The testimony, it is true, shows that the article is used for cooking, as is lard and some other vegetable and animal oils or fats. But in this regard it also resembles butter, in so far as butter is so used. An analysis of the commodity shows, however, that it resembles butter most closely in its component elements or material; and this is corroborated by the description given in the testimony of its origin and process of manufacture. It appears to be composed of the fatty portion of the sheep's milk, and it would seem that it might be described with aptness as sheep's-milk butter. We are of the opinion that it is dutiable by similitude, if not directly, at the rate prescribed by paragraph 236. The protest is overruled, and the collector's decision affirmed. Comstock & Washburn (Albert H. Washburn, of counsel), for importers. D. Frank Lloyd, Asst. U. S. Atty. HAZEL, District Judge. The merchandise involved in this appeal was invoiced as "salted butter" and is described by the importer in his testimony as "ghee." The collector assessed duty upon the merchandise at 6 cents per pound as "butter, and substitutes therefor," under Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule G, par. 236, 30 Stat. 170 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1649]. It is claimed by the importer in his protest to be dutiable at three-fourths of 1 cent per pound as "tallow," or at 2 cents per pound as "lard" under paragraphs 279 and 277, respectively, of said act, or at 20 per cent. as a nonenumerated manufactured article under section 6 of the same act. On the trial importers' counsel abandoned his claims under paragraphs 277 and 279, and relied only upon the provisions of section 6. I think there is a substantial similarity between the article in question and butter of commerce. I have considered the evidence as well as the decision rendered by the Board of Appraisers, with which I concur. The decision of the Board of Appraisers is therefore affirmed. UNITED STATES v. C. NEWMAN WIRE CO. (Circuit Court, S. D. New York. January 28, 1907.) No. 4,130. CUSTOMS DUTIES-CLASSIFICATION-STEEL PLATES-DRAWPLATES-WORTLES. Drawplates and wortles, which are practically completed articles manufactured from steel bars or plates and having a purpose distinct from that of the original product, are not within the provision for plates in Tariff Act July 24, 1897, c. 11, § 1, Schedule C, par. 135, 30 Stat. 161 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1638], relating to "plates and steel in all forms and shapes." This provision was not intended to include plates manufactured into some other completed article. On Application for Review of a Decision of the Board of United States General Appraisers. For decision below, see G. A. 6,157 (T. D. 26,731), reversing the assessment of duty by the collector of customs at the port of New York. J. Osgood Nichols, Asst. U. S. Atty. Everit Brown, for importers. * ** HAZEL, District Judge. The merchandise in question, consisting of drawplates and wortles, was returned by the appraiser as manufactures of metal. Duty was accordingly assessed thereon by the collector at 45 per cent. ad valorem, under paragraph 193 of the tariff act approved July 24, 1897 (chapter 11, § 1, Schedule C, 30 Stat. 167 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 1645]), which provides for "articles or wares not specially provided for in this act, composed wholly or in part of * steel." The importers protested, urging before the Board, among other things, that the merchandise was dutiable under paragraph 135 as plates or steel in all forms and shapes. The Board overruled the classification of the collector and held the merchandise dutiable, as claimed, under paragraph 135, upon the authorities of Buehne v. United States (C. C.) 140 Fed. 772, Morris v. United States (C. C.) 140 Fed. 774, and the ruling of the Board in F. L. Schmidt & Co., G. A. 5,682 (T. D. 25,296). The government has appealed to this court for a review of the decision of the Board. The single claim now urged by the importers is that the articles are dutiable under paragraph 135, as steel plates, at the rate per pound therein specified; the earlier claim urged before the Board, that the drawplates and wortles relate to steel "in all forms or shapes," having been abandoned. The government contends that the drawplates and wortles are manufactured from bars of steel, that the term "plate" as applied to the article is a misnomer; it having originated in shop phraseology, and particularly that paragraph 135 contemplates the payment of a duty upon steel in its crude and unfinished forms and shapes only, and not upon finished articles manufactured therefrom. The evidence before this court shows that the merchandise in question is manufactured from steel bars; that a drawplate used in making steel wire ordinarily consists of a piece of steel about 6 inches wide, 10 or 12 inches long, and 14 inches thick, one of the ends being elongated or drawn out to form a handle; and a series of holes correspon ing in size to the wire to be drawn through them are drilled into the plates by hand or machinery. The wortles are bars of steel of different lengths, about 11 inches wide and 1 inches deep, having holes suitable for wire drawing. The decision of Judge Lacombe, in United States v. Meier, 136 Fed. 764, 69 C. C. A. 421, cited in the opinion of General Appraiser Fischer, in G. A. 6,406 (T. D. 27,536), would seem to be applicable to the case under consideration. I quote: "Although its component materials are unchanged, processes of manufacture have produced a completed commercial article known and recognized in trade not as composition metal but as flitters, and which is designed and adapted for a particular use, to which the composition metal of trade could not be put until it had first been subjected to such additional processes of manufacture." The drawplates, as said, are manufactures of steel bars or plates. but they are no longer the plates specifically enumerated in paragraph 135; but, by a process of manufacture, the bars or plates have become articles practically completed in manufacture and with a purpose distinct from that of the original product. But it is contended by the importers that the term "plates," as used in paragraph 135, has heretofore been held by this court, in Morris v. United States, supra, to include a steel table which was attached to a frame that could be moved on wheels, and that such case is a precedent here. In that case the decision evidently was based upon the case of Buehne v. United States, supra; the court holding that the article came within the provision for "plates and steel in all forms and shapes." These citations are thought inapt; for in the record it is stipulated by the importers that they do not rely on that part of paragraph 135 which relates to "steel in all forms and shapes." Conceding, however, an analogy between the articles under consideration and the steel table in the Morris Case, I am, nevertheless, constrained by the evidence and reasoning of counsel for the government to now hold that Congress primarily intended by paragraph 135 to simply include steel plates that have not been manufactured into some other completed commercial article. The decision of the Board is overruled, and the classification of the collector is affirmed. In re WALDER. (District Court, D. Connecticut. March 7, 1907.) No. 1,388. 1. BANKRUPTCY-DISCHARGE-HEARING BEFORE SPECIAL MASTER. A special master, on the hearing of objections to a bankrupt's discharge, must be governed solely and entirely by such legal evidence as may be admissible under the specifications. 2. SAME BURDEN OF PROOF. On the hearing of an application for the discharge of a bankrupt, the burden of proof to sustain the specifications of objection is upon the creditors who filed the same, and that burden never shifts. 3. SAME EVIDENCE. A referee, acting as special master in hearing objections to a bankrupt's discharge, has no legal right to consider any evidence which has been pre viously offered before him as referee, or to refuse to recommend a discharge upon the ground that, at some former hearing before him as referee, he, as such referee, may have formed some opinion upon some fact which would be sufficient to bar a discharge, unless such fact is legally established by proper evidence under the specifications. In Bankruptcy. On report of special master on petition for discharge. See 142 Fed. 784. William A. Wright, for trustee. Benjamin Slade, for bankrupt. PLATT, District Judge. On June 15, 1905, the bankrupt filed in this court a petition asking for a discharge from all his debts in bankruptcy, which was in due course referred to Henry G. Newton, referee, as special master, to report thereon. Creditors were duly notified by the special master, and at the time appointed certain ones appeared, and, on July 7, 1905, filed specifications of objection to such discharge. Continuances were had until December 17, 1906, at 4 p. m., which time was definitely set for a hearing on said specifications of objection. Mr. William A. Wright, counsel for the objecting creditors, then appeared, and stated that his clients did not wish to proceed in the matter, and that he should not do anything more in relation to the opposition to the discharge. From the report before me it positively appears that nothing further was done by him or by his clients in support of said specifications. Not a scintilla of testimony was presented to the special master, bearing upon or in any way affecting the specifications. In fact, no witness was called and sworn before him for any purpose whatsoever. In that situation the duty of the special master was plain. It was supposed that, after the lessons contained in my opinion in 138 Fed. 473, In re Hendrick, supplemented as they are by final action in the same case (143 Fed. 647), there would be a clear understanding among the referees as to the way to act when petitions for discharge should be referred to them as special masters. I recommend a careful examination of the two opinions cited, and cannot believe that, after such study, any one can entertain a reasonable doubt as to the course which he must pursue in such matters. Counsel for bankrupt made certain claims of law before the special master which were inferentially overruled by the special master. They express sound law, and, although the Hendrick Case may be enough, some of these are so tersely and forcibly stated that I am impelled to insert them: (a) That the special master must be governed solely and entirely by such legal evidence as may be admissible under the specifications." "(c) That the burden of proof to sustain the alleged specifications is upon the creditors that filed the same, and that burden never shifts." "(f) That the special master, before whom these specifications are pending, has no legal right to refuse to recommend such discharge upon the ground that. at some former hearing before him as referee, he, as such referee, may have formed some opinion upon some fact which would be sufficient to bar a discharge, unless such fact or facts were legally established by proper evidence upon the specifications. "(g) That such special master is by law prohibited from considering any evidence that has been offered before him as referee, and is further prohibit ed from concluding upon such evidence, or through any source whatever, that any of the facts mentioned in the specifications were legally established, in the absence of proper evidence duly admitted upon the hearing before him as special master upon the petition for a discharge, and the alleged specifications." The court sympathizes with the special master, and is pained to feel that the bankrupt must go scot free. His case is a bad one; but, if the creditors do not care to press matters, no one can rightfully lay any blame upon either the court or the referee. To sustain the specifications in the way proposed would clearly deprive the bankrupt of his "day in court," and cannot be tolerated. The recommendation submitted with the report is therefore rejected, but sufficient facts appear in the report to warrant an order of discharge. Let the same be entered. In re ELDRED. (District Court, E. D. New York. March 20, 1907.) BANKRUPTCY-APPLICATION FOR DISCHARGE-REFERENCE. Under rule 41 in the Eastern district of New York, it is the duty of objecting creditors to see that the objections to a bankrupt's application for discharge are referred to a referee as special master and to arrange for the hearing thereon. In Bankruptcy. On motion to dismiss application for discharge. CHATFIELD, District Judge. This motion to dismiss the bankrupt's application for discharge was made by the objecting creditors, who filed specifications on the 15th day of January, 1907. Thirty days have elapsed since that time, and neither the objecting creditors nor the bankrupt have taken any steps to have the issues referred to a special master or brought on before the court. The Bankruptcy Law of July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 14, 30 Stat. 550 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3427], provides: subse "a. Any person may, after the expiration of one month quent to being adjudged a bankrupt, file an application for a discharge in the court * * *" etc. "b. The judge shall hear the application for a discharge, and such proofs and pleas as may be made in opposition thereto by parties in interest, at such time as will give parties in interest a reasonable opportunity to be fully heard, and investigate the merits of the application and discharge the applicant unless etc. Under this section of the bankruptcy law it would seem to be necessary to have a calendar for issues raised by objections to applications for discharge, and to have some calendar practice as to the bringing on of these issues for trial. In the Southern district of New York, it being impossible for the court to dispose of such a calendar, the matters are referred as of course to the referee, who has acted in the proceeding, as special master, and it is then the duty of the bankrupt, inasmuch |