to subject these lands to a sale, and to apply their proceeds to the sat isfaction of the claim of Mann. From April, 1899, when this duty was imposed upon her, until September, 1901, the administratrix neglected it, and then in reply to a written demand she refused to commence the suit, and the complainant pleaded these and other facts in his bill and besought the court below to subject these lands to a sale. The court granted a decree for the relief he sought.

Counsel for the appellants assail this decree on the grounds (1) that the court below had no jurisdiction of the proceeding because it is a suit to enforce the judgment of the state court and there is no diversity of citizenship or federal question, and because the complainant had an adequate remedy at law by a procedure in the county court; (2) that the suit is barred by laches; (3) that the lands are exempt from liability for the claim of the appellee; (4) that the federal court has no jurisdiction to sell the lands because the administration of the estate is still pending and the lands and the water rights appertaining thereto are in the legal custody of the county court; and (5) that the court below erred in its treatment of the claim of Brun for a widow's allowance and for expenses of administration.

Diversity of citizenship and the amount in controversy conferred jurisdiction upon the United States Circuit Court to render the original judgment against Tillett for his wrongful seizure and conversion of the cattle. Plenary power to enforce this judgment and to determine every controversy between the parties thereto and their successors in interest which conditioned that enforcement inhered in, and was a necessary part of, this jurisdiction. No state legislation may take away from the national courts the power to enforce their adjudications, because that power is derived from the supreme law of the land, from the Constitution and the statutes of the United States. "The courts of the United States are bound to proceed to judgment and to afford redress to suitors before them in every case to which their jurisdiction extends. They cannot abdicate their authority or duty in any case in favor of another jurisdiction." Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U. S. 529, 533, 534, 13 Sup. Ct. 695, 37 L. Ed. 546; Barber Asphalt Pav. Co. v. Morris, 66 C. C. A. 55, 59, 60, 132 Fed. 945, 949, 950, 67 L. R. A. 761; Act Aug. 13, 1888, c. 866, § 1, 25 Stat. 433, 434 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 508]; Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221, 21 L. Ed. 447; Ex parte McNiel, 13 Wall. 236, 20 L. Ed. 624; Cowley v. Railroad Co., 159 U. S. 569, 583, 16 Sup. Ct. 127, 40 L. Ed. 263; Cummings v. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157, 25 L. Ed. 903; Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 20, 23 L. Ed. 524; Railway Co. v. Whitton, 13 Wall. 270, 278, 287, 20 L. Ed. 571; Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 520, 22 L. Ed. 599; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 348, 10 Sup. Ct. 554, 33 L. Ed. 909; Darragh v. H. Wetter Mfg. Co., 78 Fed. 7, 14, 23 C. C. A. 609, 616; Richardson v. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 571, 578, 61 Fed. 423, 429, 435; National Surety Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 Fed. 593, 56 C. C. A. 657;1 Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223, 227, 58 C. C. A. 587, 591. The only limit upon this power of the national courts to execute their judgments and decrees is that they may not seize or take from another court property in its exclusive legal custody. Williams v. Benedict, 161 L. R. A. 394.

8 How. 107, 12 L. Ed. 1007; Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. Ed. 536; Freeman v. Howe, 24 How. 450, 16 L. Ed. 749.

When, therefore, the controversy over the exemption of these lands arose and conditioned the execution of that portion of this judgment which had been revived and the complainant invoked the jurisdiction of the court which rendered it, the power was conferred and the duty which it might not lawfully renounce was imposed upon that court to hear and decide by its own independent judgment the question thus presented.

Nor was the right of the complainant to invoke this jurisdiction conditioned by the existence of a federal question or of diversity of citizenship or of the amount in controversy. A bill in equity dependent upon a former action of which the federal court had jurisdiction may be maintained in the absence of either of these attributes (1) to aid, enjoin, or regulate the original suit; (2) to restrain, avoid, explain, or enforce the judgment or decree therein; or (3) to enforce or obtain an adjudication of liens upon, or claims to property in the custody of the court in the original suit. Such a dependent suit is but a continuation in a court of equity of the original suit, to the end that more complete justice may be done. Campbell v. Golden Cyc. Min. Co., 141 Fed. 610, 613, 73 C. C. A. 260; Guardian Trust Co. v. Kansas City Southern Railway Company (C. C. A., 8th Circuit) 146 Fed. 337; Dewey v. West Fairmount Gas Coal Co., 123 U. S. 329, 8 Sup. Ct. 148, 31 L. Ed. 179; Minnesota Co. v. St. Paul Co., 2 Wall. 609, 17 L. Ed. 886; Logan v. Patrick, 5 Cranch, 288, 3 L. Ed. 103; Dunn v. Clarke, 8 Pet. 1, 8 L. Ed. 845; Cortes v. Thannhauser (C. C.) 9 Fed. 226; Johnson v. Christian, 125 U. S. 642, 8 Sup. Ct. 989, 31 L. Ed. 820; Aldrich v. Campbell, 97 Fed. 663, 38 C. C. A. 347; Wehrman v. Conklin, 155 U. S. 314, 15 Sup. Ct. 129, 39 L. Ed. 167. This is a suit to enforce the execution of the judgment of revivor rendered in the federal court. It is not, as counsel claim, a proceeding to enforce the allowance or the judgment of allowance of the complainant's claim in the county court. That allowance was complete in itself and functus officio when made. It adjudged no recovery by the complainant, no sale for his benefit, no further relief. The judgment of revivor in the federal court granted to the complainant the right to recover $19,718.56 of the estate of Tillett, and this suit was instituted to enforce that right and to determine the controversy over the exemp tion of the lands which conditions it. It has every element of a dependent suit in equity in the federal courts.

Did the pendency of the administration of the estate in the county court and the fact that the statutes of Colorado empowered the administratrix to conduct the proceeding for the sale of the lands in the county court or in the district court of the state deprive the federal court of jurisdiction of this suit and of the controversy it presented? A federal court has no jurisdiction of, and no power to draw to itself, the administration of an estate as such, but it has plenary authority over every controversy in such an administration which involves the enforcement of its judgments, and over every other controversy therein of which jurisdiction is conferred upon it by the

acts of Congress. Its adjudications of these issues prevail over the statutes of the státes and the decisions of its courts. Otherwise the judgments and decisions of the federal courts would be subject to nullification by the rulings of state courts and the acts of state Legislatures. Foreign creditors may establish their debts in the courts of the United States, and the adjudications of those courts prevail notwithstanding the fact that the laws of the states limit the right to prove such demands to proceedings in the probate courts of the states where the administrations are pending. Union Bank of Tennessee v. Jolly's Adm'rs, 18 How. 503, 15 L. Ed. 472; Lawrence v. Nelson, 143 U. S. 215, 12 Sup. Ct. 440, 36 L. Ed. 130; Suydam v. Broadnax, 14 Pet. 67, 74, 10 L. Ed. 357; Borer v. Chapman, 119 U. S. 587, 588, 589, 7 Sup. Ct. 342, 30 L. Ed. 532; Payne v. Hook, 7 Wall. 425, 430, 19 L. Ed. 260; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86, 98, 9 Sup. Ct. 237, 32 L. Ed. 630; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640, 667, 4 Sup. Ct. 619, 28 L. Ed. 547; Hayes v. Pratt, 147 U. S. 557, 570, 13 Sup. Ct. 503, 37 L. Ed. 279; Security Trust Co. v. Black River National Bank, 187 U. S. 211, 227, 23 Sup. Ct. 52, 47 L. Ed. 147. Foreign distributees may establish and enforce by decrees in the federal courts their rights in the estates of deceased persons during the pendency of administration in the courts of the states. Byers v. McAuley, 149 U. S. 610, 618, 620, 621, 622, 13 Sup. Ct. 906, 37 L. Ed. 867. And, where the courts of general jurisdiction of a state are empowered by its statutes. to determine the validity of wills, the federal courts have like jurisdiction in cases in which the necessary diversity of citizenship and amount in controversy or other jurisdictional facts exist. Gaines v. Fuentes, 92 U. S. 10, 20, 23 L. Ed. 524; Richardson v. Green, 9 C. C. A. 565, 571, 578, 61 Fed. 423, 429, 435; Ellis v. Davis, 109 U. S. 485, 497, 3 Sup. Ct. 327, 27 L. Ed. 1006; Sawyer v. White, 122 Fed. 223, 227, 58 C. C. A. 587, 591. The exclusive grant of jurisdiction of estates of deceased persons to the county courts by the statutes of the state of Colorado, therefore, did not deprive the federal court of jurisdiction of this suit or of the controversy it involves.

Not only this, but the federal court sitting in equity has jurisdiction by virtue of the statutes of Colorado themselves to entertain a suit in equity to subject the real estate of this decedent to the payment of the claim allowed against his estate pending the administration in the county court. The district court of that state is a court of general original jurisdiction. The jurisdiction of the county court is limited to the probate of wills, the administration of the estates of decedents, and other specified subjects. The statutes of Colorado provide that, when the personal property of an estate is insufficient to pay the claims allowed against it, the administrator shall present to the county court, or to the district court, a petition for the sale of the real estate of the decedent to which the widow or husband and the heirs at law, and, if any of the real estate be devised, the devisees shall be defendants (Mills' Ann. St. § 4751); that a summons shall issue upon the petition and shall be served upon the defendants (sections 4752, 4753, 4754, 4755, 4756, 4757); that the form of the proceeding shall conform to the proceedings in courts of chancery and there shall

1

be no trial by jury (section 4758); that any person interested in the estate as creditor or otherwise and not made defendant may appear and answer to the petition (section 4760); that the court may render a decree for the sale of the land (sections 4761-4765), and may receive and approve a report of the sale and direct a conveyance (sections 4766-4769). Thus jurisdiction is conferred upon courts of general jurisdiction of the state of Colorado to entertain suits in chancery for, and to decree sales of, the real estate of decedents while administration is pending in the county courts. But "a party by going into a national court does not lose any right or appropriate remedy of which he might have availed himself in the state courts of the same locality." Davis v. Gray, 16 Wall. 203, 221, 21 L. Ed. 447. Rights created and remedies provided by the statutes of the states to be pursued in the state courts of general jurisdiction may be enforced and administered in the national courts either at law, in equity, or in admiralty as the nature of the rights and remedies may require. Darragh v. H. Wetter Mfg. Co., 23 C. C. A. 609, 615, 616, 78 Fed. 7, 13, 14; National Surety Co. v. State Bank, 56 C. C. A. 657, 666, 120 Fed. 593, 612;2 Cummings v. Bank, 101 U. S. 153, 157, 25 L. Ed. 903; Broderick's Will, 21 Wall. 503, 520, 22 L. Ed. 599; Gormley v. Clark, 134 U. S. 338, 348, 10 Sup. Ct. 554, 33 L. Ed. 909; Cowley v. Railroad Co., 159 U. S. 569, 582, 16 Sup. Ct. 127, 40 L. Ed. 263. The federal court sitting in equity had as complete jurisdiction to entertain a suit and to render a decree in an appropriate case for the sale of the real estate of this estate to satisfy a judgment which it rendered against the deceased in his lifetime, or a just claim of a foreign creditor as was conferred upon the district court of the state.

And here, too, is the answer to the contention of counsel for the appellants that the decree of sale of the lands and of the water rights appurtenant thereto was in excess of the jurisdiction of the court below because they were in the legal custody of the county court. The court which first acquires jurisdiction of specific property in a suit or proceeding to enforce a lien upon it or to subject it to sale in a case in which it may find it necessary or convenient to take possession of, or dominion. over it, is entitled to retain that jurisdiction until the suit is at an end or until ample time for its termination has elapsed. Williams v. Neely, 67 C. C. A. 171, 185, 134 Fed. 1, 15, 69 L. R. A. 232; Gates v. Bucki, 4 C. C. A. 116, 128, 129, 53 Fed. 961, 969; Memphis Sav. Bank v. Houchens, 115 Fed. 96, 110, 52 C. C. A. 176, 190, 191; Zimmerman v. So Relle, 25 C. C. A. 518, 521, 80 Fed. 417, 420. If a proceeding had been instituted in the county court under the statute to subject this real property to sale, and a summons had been issued and served therein before this suit in the federal court was instituted, the custody and dominion of the state court would have been exclusive and the national court must have stayed its hand until the termination of the proceeding in the state court or the lapse of ample time for its conclusion. It is conceded, but it is not considered or decided, that this real estate was in the legal custody of the county court until the suit in the court below was commenced. The custody of the county court, however, was a legal custody, a custody authorized and limited by the law. It was for the purposes, to the extent and subject to the limitations

2 61 L. R. A. 394.

fixed by the law of the land and by the statutes of the state. One of the express limitations of its jurisdiction and dominion was prescribed by the statutes which have been recited. It was that its legal custody was subject to the jurisdiction and power of the district court of the state and of the federal court of the district to take the jurisdiction and the custody of the land and of the appurtenant water rights for the purpose of selling them and of applying their proceeds to the payment of the allowed claims against the estate whenever an appropriate proceeding for that relief was first commenced in one of those courts. If such a suit had been instituted in the district court of the state, the jurisdiction and legal custody of the property in controversy for the purpose of its sale and conveyance would have passed immediately to that court by virtue of these express provisions of the statutes. Since a party loses no right or remedy by going into a national court, plenary jurisdiction and dominion of this property for the purposes of the sale and conveyance which the complainant here seeks was divested from the county court and vested in the court below by virtue of the statutes and the law the moment the service of the summons in the suit here pending was effected. The result is that the United States Circuit Court had full jurisdiction of the subject-matter of this suit to enforce its own judgment and to determine a controversy which conditioned the only redress the complainant could obtain thereunder and the decree of sale and conveyance of the lands and the appurtenant water rights was not in excess of its jurisdiction, and did not deprive the county court of any custody or dominion of the property to which it was lawfully entitled under the statutes.

But it is said that the complainant had no legal capacity to sue because the statutes of the state require the administrator or the executor to institute the proceedings for the sale of the real property of an estate. The answer is that the complainant had the right to invoke the independent judgment of the federal court upon the issues in this suit regardless of the proceeding authorized by the Colorado statute, and he could accomplish this result only by a suit instituted by himself dependent upon his former judgment in the circuit court. There is another answer. The administratrix, after a written demand, refused to institute the proceeding for a sale of the real estate prescribed by the statutes of Colorado. She was the legal representative of the complainant. When a legal representative or a trustee refuses after due demand to commence a suit or to take a legal proceeding for the benefit of his constituent or cestui que trust which it is his duty to begin or to take, the constituent or the cestui que trust may institute it in his own name and make the representative or the trustee a defendant. The complainant had lawful capacity to institute this suit.

The next objection to the bill is that the complainant had an adequate remedy at law, in that he might have applied to the county court for an order upon the administratrix to file the petition for the sale or for her removal and the appointment of a successor by that court.

is an absence of an adequate remedy at law in the national courts and that alone which conditions jurisdiction in equity in those courts, and the complainant had no such remedy. Yonley v. Lavender, 21 Wall. 276, 22 L. Ed. 536. The fact that he had a remedy at law in the state