"grue" might be tolerable for a few days and intolerably cruel for weeks or months.

The question before the trial court was whether past constitutional violations had been remedied. The court was entitled to consider the severity of those violations in assessing the constitutionality of conditions in the isolation cells. The court took note of the inmates' diet, the continued overcrowding, the rampant violence, the vandalized cells, and the "lack of professionalism and good judgment on the part of maximum security personnel." 410 F. Supp., at 277 and 278. The length of time each inmate spent in isolation was simply one consideration among many. We find no error in the court's conclusion that, taken as a whole, conditions in the isolation cells continued to violate the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.

In fashioning a remedy, the District Court had ample authority to go beyond earlier orders and to address each element contributing to the violation. The District Court had given the Department repeated opportunities to remedy the cruel and unusual conditions in the isolation cells. If petitioners had fully complied with the court's earlier orders, the present time limit might well have been unnecessary. But taking the long and unhappy history of the litigation into account, the court was justified in entering a comprehensive order to insure against the risk of inadequate compliance."

As we explained in Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U. S. 267, 281, state and local authorities have primary responsibility for curing constitutional violations. "If, however '[those] authorities fail in their affirmative obligations judicial authority may be invoked.' Swann [v. CharlotteMecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U. S. 1,] 15. Once invoked, 'the scope of a district court's equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable remedies.' Ibid. In this case, the District Court was not remedying the present effects of a violation in the past. It was seeking to bring an ongoing violation to an immediate halt. Cooperation on the part of Department officials and compliance with other aspects of the decree may justify elimi

The order is supported by the interdependence of the conditions producing the violation. The vandalized cells and the atmosphere of violence were attributable, in part, to overcrowding and to deep-seated enmities growing out of months of constant daily friction.10 The 30-day limit will help to correct these conditions." Moreover, the limit presents little danger of interference with prison administration, for the Commissioner of Correction himself stated that prisoners should not ordinarily be held in punitive isolation for more than 14 days. Id., at 278. Finally, the exercise of discretion in this case is entitled to special deference because of the trial judge's years of experience with the problem at hand and his recognition of the limits on a federal court's authority in a case of this kind." Like the Court of Appeals, we find no error in the inclusion of a 30-day limitation on sentences to punitive isolation as a part of the District Court's comprehensive remedy.

nation of this added safeguard in the future, but it is entirely appropriate for the District Court to postpone any such determination until the Department's progress can be evaluated.

10 The District Court noted "that as a class the inmates of the punitive cells hate those in charge of them, and that they may harbor particular hatreds against prison employees who have been in charge of the same inmates for a substantial period of time." 410 F. Supp., at 277.

11 As early as 1969, the District Court had identified shorter sentences as a possible remedy for overcrowding in the isolation cells. Holt I, 300 F. Supp., at 834. The limit imposed in 1976 was a mechanical-and therefore an easily enforced-method of minimizing overcrowding, with its attendant vandalism and unsanitary conditions.

12 See, e. g., Holt II, 309 F. Supp., at 369:

"The Court, however, is limited in its inquiry to the question of whether or not the constitutional rights of inmates are being invaded and with whether the Penitentiary itself is unconstitutional. The Court is not judicially concerned with questions which in the last analysis are addressed to legislative and administrative judgment. A practice that may be bad from the standpoint of penology may not necessarily be forbidden by the Constitution."

The Attorney General of Arkansas, whose office has represented petitioners throughout this litigation, contends that any award of fees is prohibited by the Eleventh Amendment. He also argues that the Court of Appeals incorrectly held that fees were authorized by the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. We hold that the District Court's award is adequately supported by its finding of bad faith and that the Act supports the additional award by the Court of Appeals. A. The District Court Award

Although the Attorney General argues that the finding of bad faith does not overcome the State's Eleventh Amendment protection, he does not question the accuracy of the finding made by the District Court and approved by the Court of Appeals.13 Nor does he question the settled rule that a losing litigant's bad faith may justify an allowance of fees to the prevailing party." He merely argues that the order requir

13 In affirming the award, the Court of Appeals relied chiefly on the Civil Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, but it also noted expressly that "the record fully supports the finding of the district court that the conduct of the state officials justified the award under the bad faith exception enumerated in Alyeska [Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240]." 548 F. 2d 740, 742 n. 6.

14 An equity court has the unquestioned power to award attorney's fees against a party who shows bad faith by delaying or disrupting the litigation or by hampering enforcement of a court order. Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, 421 U. S. 240, 258-259; Christiansburg Garment Co. v. EEOC, 434 U. S. 412; Straub v. Vaisman & Co., Inc., 540 F. 2d 591, 598-600 (CA3 1976); cf. Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 56 (g) (attorney's fees to be awarded against party filing summary judgment affidavits "in bad faith or solely for the purpose of delay"); Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 37 (a) (4) (motions to compel discovery; prevailing party may recover attorney's fees). The award vindicates judicial authority without resort to the more drastic sanctions available for contempt of court and makes the prevailing party whole for expenses caused by his opponent's obstinacy. Cf. First Nat. Bank v. Dunham, 471 F. 2d 712 (CA8 1973). Of course, fees can also be awarded as part of a civil contempt penalty. See, e. g., Toledo Scale Co.

ing that the fees be paid from public funds violates the Eleventh Amendment.

In the landmark decision in Ex parte Young, 209 U. S. 123, the Court held that, although prohibited from giving orders directly to a State, federal courts could enjoin state officials in their official capacities. And in Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U. S. 651, when the Court held that the Amendment grants the States an immunity from retroactive monetary relief, it reaffirmed the principle that state officers are not immune from prospective injunctive relief. Aware that the difference between retroactive and prospective relief "will not in many instances be that between day and night," id., at 667, the Court emphasized in Edelman that the distinction did not immunize the States from their obligation to obey costly federal-court orders. The cost of compliance is "ancillary" to the prospective order enforcing federal law. Id., at 668.15 The line between retroactive and prospective relief cannot be so rigid that it defeats the effective enforcement of prospective relief.

The present case requires application of that principle. In exercising their prospective powers under Ex parte Young and Edelman v. Jordan, federal courts are not reduced to issuing injunctions against state officers and hoping for compliance. Once issued, an injunction may be enforced. Many of the court's most effective enforcement weapons involve financial penalties. A criminal contempt prosecution for "resistance to [the court's] lawful... order" may result in a jail term or a fine. 18 U. S. C. § 401 (1976 ed.). Civil contempt proceedings may yield a conditional jail term or fine. United States v.

v. Computing Scale Co., 261 U. S. 399; Signal Delivery Service, Inc. v. Highway Truck Drivers, 68 F. R. D. 318 (ED Pa. 1975).

15 "Ancillary" costs may be very large indeed. Last Term, for example, this Court rejected an Eleventh Amendment defense and approved an injunction ordering a State to pay almost $6 million to help defray the costs of desegregating the Detroit school system. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S., at 293 (POWELL, J., concurring in judgment).

Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 305. Civil contempt may also be punished by a remedial fine, which compensates the party who won the injunction for the effects of his opponent's noncompliance. Id., at 304; Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. If a state agency refuses to adhere to a court order, a financial penalty may be the most effective means of insuring compliance. The principles of federalism that inform Eleventh Amendment doctrine surely do not require federal courts to enforce their decrees only by sending high state officials to jail. The less intrusive power to impose a fine is properly treated as ancillary to the federal court's power to impose injunctive relief.

16

In this case, the award of attorney's fees for bad faith served the same purpose as a remedial fine imposed for civil contempt. It vindicated the District Court's authority over a recalcitrant litigant. Compensation was not the sole motive for the award; in setting the amount of the fee, the court said that it would "make no effort to adequately compensate counsel for the work that they have done or for the time that they have spent on the case." 410 F. Supp., at 285. The court did allow a "substantial" fee, however, because "the allowance thereof may incline the Department to act in such a manner that further protracted litigation about the prisons will not be necessary." Ibid." We see no reason to distin

16 See Note, Attorneys' Fees and the Eleventh Amendment, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1875, 1892 (1975).

17 That the award had a compensatory effect does not in any event distinguish it from a fine for civil contempt, which also compensates a private party for the consequences of a contemnor's disobedience. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U. S. 418. Moreover, the Court has approved federal rulings requiring a State to support programs that compensate for past misdeeds, saying: "That the programs are also 'compensatory' in nature does not change the fact that they are part of a plan that operates prospectively to bring about the delayed benefits of a unitary school system. We therefore hold that such prospective relief is not barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Milliken v. Bradley, supra, at 290 (emphasis in original). The award of attorney's fees against a State disregarding a