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With this historical sketch as background, we turn to the jurisdictional issues presented by Smith John's case.

III

In order to determine whether there is federal jurisdiction over the offense with which Smith John was charged (alleged in the federal indictment to have been committed "on and within the Choctaw Indian Reservation and on land within the Indian country under the jurisdiction of the United States of America"), we first look to the terms of the statute upon which the United States relies, that is, the Major Crimes Act, 18 U. S. C. § 1153. This Act, as codified at the time of the alleged offense, provided: "Any Indian who commits . . assault with intent to kill . . . within the Indian country, shall be subject to the same laws and penalties as all other persons committing any [such offense], within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." The definition of "Indian country" as used here and elsewhere in chapter 53 of Title 18 is provided in § 1151.16 Both the Mississippi Supreme Court

16 As originally enacted, the Major Crimes Act made no reference to "Indian country" but, instead, referred to any "reservation" within the States and the Territories. See n. 22, infra. The legislation retained this general form when it was re-enacted as § 328 of the Criminal Code of 1909, 35 Stat. 1151 (codified from 1926 to 1948 as 18 U. S. C. § 548), and amended, 47 Stat. 336 (1932) (adding incest to the list of crimes covered, deleting the reference to the Territories, and providing expressly that rights of way running through a reservation were to be included as part of the reservation).

In the 1948 revision of Title 18, however, the express reference to "reservation" was deleted in favor of the use of the term "Indian country," which was used in most of the other special statutes referring to Indians, and as defined in § 1151. See Reviser's Note, and n. 18, infra.

The Act has since been amended four times, 63 Stat. 94 (1949) (relating to the punishment for the crime of rape); 80 Stat. 1100 (1966) (adding carnal knowledge and assault with intent to rape); 82 Stat. 80 (1968) (adding assault resulting in serious bodily injury); 90 Stat. 585 (1976) (see n. 2, supra), but its form has not been changed substantially.

Opinion of the Court

437 U.S. and the Court of Appeals concluded that the situs of the alleged offense did not constitute "Indian country," and that therefore § 1153 did not afford a basis for the prosecution of Smith John in federal court. We do not agree.

With certain exceptions not pertinent here, § 1151 includes within the term "Indian country" three categories of land. The first, with which we are here concerned," is "all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent." This language first appeared in the Code in 1948 as a part of the general revision of Title 18. The Reviser's Notes indicate that this definition was based on several decisions of this Court interpreting the term as it was used in various criminal statutes relating to Indians. In one of these cases, United States v. McGowan, 302 U. S. 535 (1938), the Court held that the Reno Indian Colony, consisting of 28.38 acres within the State of Nevada, purchased out of federal funds appropriated in 1917 and 1926 and occupied by several hundred Indians theretofore scattered throughout Nevada, was "Indian country" for the purposes of what was then 25 U. S. C. § 247. (the predecessor of 18 U. S. C. § 3618 (1976 ed.)), providing for the forfeiture of a vehicle used to transport intoxicants into the Indian country. The Court noted that the "fundamental consideration of both Congress and the Department of the Interior in establishing this colony has been the protection of a dependent people." 302 U. S., at 538. The principal test applied was drawn from

17 The second category for inclusion within the definition of "Indian country" is "all dependent Indian communities within the borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a State." The third category is "all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through the same." Inasmuch as we find in the first category a sufficient basis for the exercise of federal jurisdiction in this case, we need not consider the second and third categories.

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an earlier case, United States v. Pelican, 232 U. S. 442 (1914), and was whether the land in question "had been validly set apart for the use of the Indians as such, under the superintendence of the Government." Id., at 449; 302 U. S., at 539.18

The Mississippi lands in question here were declared by Congress to be held in trust by the Federal Government for the benefit of the Mississippi Choctaw Indians who were at that time under federal supervision. There is no apparent reason why these lands, which had been purchased in previous years for the aid of those Indians, did not become a "reservation," at least for the purposes of federal criminal jurisdiction at that particular time. See United States v. Celestine, 215 U. S. 278, 285 (1909). But if there were any doubt about the matter in 1939 when, as hereinabove described, Congress declared that title to lands previously purchased for the Mississippi Choctaws would be held in trust, the situation was completely clarified by the proclamation in 1944 of a reservation and the subsequent approval of the constitution and bylaws adopted by the Mississippi Band.

The Court of Appeals and the Mississippi Supreme Court held, and the State now argues, that the 1944 proclamation had no effect because the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 was not intended to apply to the Mississippi Choctaws. Assuming for the moment that authority for the proclamation

18 Some earlier cases had suggested a more technical and limited definition of "Indian country." See, e. g., Bates v. Clark, 95 U. S. 204 (1877). Throughout most of the 19th century, apparently the only statutory definition was that in § 1 of the Act of June 30, 1834, 4 Stat. 729. But this definition was dropped in the compilation of the Revised Statutes. See Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556 (1883). This Court was left with little choice but to continue to apply the principles established under the earlier statutory language and to develop them according to changing conditions. See, e. g., Donnelly v. United States, 228 U. S. 243 (1913). It is the more expansive scope of the term that was incorporated in the 1948 revision of Title 18.

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can be found only in the 1934 Act, we find this argument unpersuasive. The 1934 Act defined "Indians" not only as "all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized [in 1934] tribe now under Federal jurisdiction," and their descendants who then were residing on any Indian reservation, but also as "all other persons of one-half or more Indian blood." 48 Stat. 988, 25 U. S. C. § 479 (1976 ed.). There is no doubt that persons of this description lived in Mississippi, and were recognized as such by Congress and by the Department of the Interior, at the time the Act was passed." The references to the Mississippi Choctaws in the legislative history of the Act, see supra, at 645-646, confirm our view that the Mississippi Choctaws were not to be excepted from the general operation of the 1934 Act.20

19 A report completed just after the passage of the Act recounts:

"After all the years of living in and among both white and colored race, it is indeed surprising to find that approximately 85 percent of this group are full bloods. Their racial integrity is intact in spite of the absence of permanent holdings or any sort of community life. Many of the older Choctaws do not speak English." E. Groves, Notes on the Choctaw Indians, Feb. 20-Mar. 20, 1936, p. 1 (Bureau of Indian Affairs).

20 The State of Mississippi makes much of a sentence contained in an unpublished memorandum dated August 31, 1936, of the Solicitor for the Department of the Interior. It reads: "They [the Indians remaining in Mississippi] cannot now be regarded as a tribe." See F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 273 (1941). A reading of the entire memorandum, however, convinces us that it supports the position of the United States in this case. The memorandum was concerned only with the proper description of the Indians in the deeds relating to lands purchased according to the provisions of the Indian Reorganization Act. At least one deed had been prepared designating the grantee as "the United States in trust for the Choctaw tribe of Mississippi." The memorandum recommended that, because the Indians could not be regarded as a tribe at that time, the deeds be written designating the grantee as "[t]he United States in trust for such Choctaw Indians of one-half or more Indian blood, resident in Mississippi, as shall be designated by the Secretary of the Interior, until such time as the Choctaw Indians of Mississippi shall be organized as an Indian tribe pursuant to the act of June 18, 1934 (48 Stat. 984) [the

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Mississippi appears to concede, Brief for Appellee in No. 77-575, p. 44, that if § 1153 provides a basis for the prosecution of Smith John for the offense charged, the State has no similar jurisdiction. This concession, based on the assumption that § 1153 ordinarily is pre-emptive of state jurisdiction when it applies, seems to us to be correct." It was a necessary premise of at least one of our earlier decisions. Seymour v. Superintendent, 368 U. S. 351 (1962). See also Williams v. Lee, 358 U. S. 217, 220, and n. 5 (1959); Rice v. Olson, 324 U. S. 786 (1945); In re Carmen's Petition, 165 F. Supp. 942 (ND Cal. 1958), aff'd sub nom. Dickson v. Carmen, 270 F. 2d 809 (CA9 1959), cert. denied, 361 U. S. 934 (1960)."

Indian Reorganization Act], and then in trust for such organized tribe." Surely this is evidence that although there was no legal entity known as "the Choctaw tribe of Mississippi," the Department of the Interior anticipated that a more formal legal entity, a tribe for the purposes of federal Indian law, soon would exist.

21 We do not consider here the more disputed question whether § 1153 also was intended to pre-empt tribal jurisdiction. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U. S. 191, 203-204, n. 14 (1978); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U. S. 313, 325 n. 22 (1978).

22 There is much in the legislative history to support this view. The Major Crimes Act was approved on March 3, 1885, 23 Stat. 385, in part in response to the decision of this Court in Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U. S. 556 (1883). See United States v. Kagama, 118 U. S. 375, 382-383 (1886). As originally proposed in the House, the bill provided that Indians committing the specified crimes "within any Territory of the United States, and either within or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws of such Territory relating to said crimes," and, similarly, that Indians committing the same crimes "within the boundaries of any State of the United States, and either within or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject to the same laws... as are all other persons committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction of the United States." 16 Cong. Rec. 934 (1885).

It became apparent in conference on the bill that this language would have a far broader effect than originally intended, for the language proposed would "take away from State courts, whether there be a reservation in the

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