556 Appendix to opinion of the Court "right to work" cannot guarantee anyone a job. It simply weakens the negotiating power of Unions by outlawing provisions in contracts for Union shops, agency shops, and modified Union shops. These laws do not improve wages or working conditions but just protect free riders. Free riders are people who take all the benefits of Unions without paying dues. They ride on the dues that members pay to build an organization to protect their rights and improve their way of life. At this time there is a very well organized and financed attempt to place the "right to work" law in our new state constitution. This drive is supported and financed by big business, namely, the National Right-To-Work Committee and the National Chamber of Commerce. If their attempt is successful, it will more than pay for itself by weakening Unions and improving the edge business has at the bargaining table. States that have no "right-to-work" law consistently have higher wages and better working conditions. Texas is well known for its weak laws concerning the working class and the "right-towork" law would only add insult to injury. If you fail to take action against the "right-to-work" law it may well show up in wages negotiated in the future. I urge every member to write their state congressman and senator in protest of the "right-towork" law being incorporated into the state constitution. Write your state representative and state senator and let the delegate know how you feel. POLITICS AND INFLATION The Minimum Wage Bill, HR 7935, was vetoed by President Nixon. The President termed the bill as inflationary. The bill would raise the present $1.60 to $2.00 per hour for most covered workers. It seems almost unbelievable that the President could term $2.00 per hour as inflationary and at the same time remain silent about oil companies profits ranging from 56% to 280%. It also seems disturbing, that after the price of gasoline has increased to over 50 cents a gallon, that the fuel crisis is beginning to disappear. If the price of gasoline ever reaches 70 cents a gallon you probably couldn't find a closed filling station or empty pump in the Northern Hemisphere. Congress is now pr[o]ceeding with a second minimum wage bill that hopefully the President will sign into law. At $1.60 per hour you could work 40 hours a week, 52 weeks a year and never earn enough money to support a family. As working men and women we must defeat our enemies and elect our friends. If you haven't registered to vote, please do so today. FOOD FOR THOUGHT In Union there is strength, justice, and moderation; In disunion, nothing but an alternating humility and insolence. COMING TOGETHER WAS A BEGINNING STAYING TOGETHER IS PROGRESS WORKING TOGETHER MEANS SUCCESS THE PERSON WHO STANDS NEUTRAL, STANDS MR. JUSTICE WHITE, concurring. As I understand the record in this case, the only issue before the Administrative Law Judge and before the Board was whether the activity engaged in here by the employees was the kind of activity protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act. The Administrative Law Judge held that the circulars were related to matters encompassed by § 7 and noted that there had been no attempt or evidence to show that even though the distributions were § 7 activity, there were nevertheless circumstances that permitted the employer to forbid the distributions on his property. The Board adopted the report of the Administrative Law Judge. I agree that the employees here were engaged in activity protected by § 7, at least in the sense that the employer could not discharge employees for propagandizing their fellow workers with materials concerning minimum wages and right-to 556 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting work laws, so long as the distribution takes place off the employer's property. I agree further that under current law and the facts and claims in this record, the distributions could take place on the employer's property. Accordingly, the Board was entitled to have its order enforced and I join the judgment and opinion of the Court. In doing so, I should say that it is not easy to explain why an employer need permit his property to be used for distributions about subjects unrelated to his relationship with his employees simply because it is convenient for the latter to use his property in this manner and simply because there is no interference with "management interests." Ownership of property normally confers the right to control the use of that property. Here there was no finding by the Board that the literature sought to be distributed was connected with the bargaining relationship; and I doubt that federal law requires the employer always to permit his property to be used for solicitations and distributions having § 7 protection, even by and among employees in nonworking areas and during nonworking times. Such distributions might concern goals and ends about which his work force, considered as a whole, as well as the public, may be deeply divided, with which he may have no sympathy whatsoever, or in connection with which he would not care to have it inferred that he supports one side or the other. All of these, if substantiated by the record, would appear to be substantial factors to be weighed in the balance when determining whether the employer has violated the Labor Act's strictures concerning his relationship with his employees. However this may be, on the record before us, I am content to affirm the judgment of the Court of Appeals. MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, with whom THE CHIEF JUSTICE joins, dissenting. It is not necessary to determine the scope of the "mutual aid or protection" language of § 7 of the National Labor Rela REHNQUIST, J., dissenting 437 U.S. tions Act to conclude that Congress never intended to require the opening of private property to the sort of political advocacy involved in this case. Petitioner's right as a property owner to prescribe the conditions under which strangers may enter its property is fully recognized under Texas law. "A licensee who goes beyond the rights and privileges granted by the license becomes a trespasser.' Burton Construction & Shipbuilding Co. v. Broussard, 154 Tex. 50, 58, 273 S. W. 2d 598, 603 (1954) (citation omitted). See also Brown v. Dellinger, 355 S. W. 2d 742 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962); 56 Tex. Jur. 2d, Trespass § 4 (1964). Thus, the employees' effort to distribute their leaflet in defiance of petitioner's wishes would clearly be a trespass infringing upon petitioner's property right. There is no indication that Texas takes so narrow a view of petitioner's rights that it may fairly be said that its "only cognizable property right in this respect is in preventing employees from bringing literature onto its property and distributing it there." Ante, at 573. So far as appears, a Texas property owner may admit certain leaflets onto his property and exclude others, as it pleases him. The Court can only mean that the Board need not take cognizance of any greater property right because the Congress has clearly and constitutionally said so. From its earliest cases construing the National Labor Relations Act the Court has recognized the weight of an employer's property rights, rights which are explicitly protected from federal interference by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court has not been quick to conclude in a given instance that Congress has authorized the displacement of those rights by the federally created rights of the employees. In NLRB v. Fansteel Metallurgical Corp., 306 U. S. 240 (1939), construing another section of the Act, this Court dealt with the Board's efforts to compel the reinstatement of employees who had been discharged after violating their 556 REHNQUIST, J., dissenting employer's property rights by engaging in a sitdown strike. Mr. Chief Justice Hughes wrote for the Court: "We are unable to conclude that Congress intended to compel employers to retain persons in their employ regardless of their unlawful conduct,-to invest those who go on strike with an immunity from discharge for acts of trespass or violence against the employer's property, which they would not have enjoyed had they remained at work. Apart from the question of the constitutional validity of an enactment of that sort, it is enough to say that such legislative intention should be found in some definite and unmistakable expression. We find no such expression in the cited provision." Id., at 255. See also id., at 265 (Stone, J., concurring in part). An employer's property rights must give way only where necessary to effectuate the central purposes of the Act: "to safeguard the rights of self-organization and collective bargaining, and thus by the promotion of industrial peace to remove obstructions to the free flow of commerce as defined in the Act." Id., at 257. Those rights of self-organization were again recognized six years later in Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945). There, the Court held that Congress had authorized the Board to displace the property rights of employers where necessary to accommodate the rights of employees to distribute union organizational literature and to wear union insignia. In NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), the Court recognized that nonemployees could also invoke this right to solicit union membership, but it held that the Board's authority to displace the employer's property rights in such circumstances was extremely limited. Later, 1 The Court's assertion to the contrary notwithstanding, both Babcock and Republic Aviation, like this case, involved a "trespass on the employer's property," ante, at 571, in that union members sought to over |