itself. To the extent that East Carroll Parish School Bd. implies anything further about the principle established in Burns, the latter must be held to control. Pp. 547-549.

WHITE, J., announced the Court's judgment and delivered an opinion, in which STEWART, J., joined. POWELL, J., filed an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment, in which BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., joined, post, p. 547. REHNQUIST, J., filed a separate opinion, in which BURGER, C. J., and STEWART and POWELL, JJ., joined, post, p. 549. MARSHALL, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which BRENNAN and STEVENS, JJ., joined, post, p. 550.

Joseph G. Werner argued the cause for petitioners. With him on the brief was Lee E. Holt.

James A. Johnston argued the cause for respondents. With him on the brief were Edward B. Cloutman III and Walter L. Irvin. Joaquin G. Avila, Vilma S. Martinez, and Morris J. Baller filed a brief for respondents Callejo et al.

Peter Buscemi argued the cause pro hac vice for the United States as amicus curiae urging affirmance. With him on the brief were Solicitor General McCree, Assistant Attorney General Days, Brian K. Landsberg, and Robert J. Reinstein.*

MR. JUSTICE WHITE announced the judgment of the Court and delivered an opinion in which MR. JUSTICE STEWART joined.

This case involves the recurring issue of distinguishing between legislatively enacted and judicially imposed reapportionments of state legislative bodies.

I

In 1971 respondents, Negro and Mexican-American residents of Dallas, Tex., filed suit in the United States District

*Charles A. Bane, Thomas D. Barr, Armand Derfner, Norman Redlich, Frank R. Parker, Thomas J. Ginger, Robert A. Murphy, Norman J. Chachkin, and William E. Caldwell filed a brief for the Lawyers Committee for Civil Rights Under Law as amicus curiae urging affirmance.

Court for the Northern District of Texas against petitioners, the Mayor and members of the City Council of Dallas, the city's legislative body, alleging that the at-large system of electing council members unconstitutionally diluted the vote of racial minorities. They sought a declaratory judgment to this effect and an injunction requiring the election of councilmen from single-member districts. The complaint was dismissed for failure to state a claim, but the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit disagreed and remanded. Lipscomb v. Jonsson, 459 F. 2d 335 (1972).

On January 17, 1975, after certifying a plaintiff class consisting of all Negro citizens of the city of Dallas1 and following an evidentiary hearing, the District Court orally declared that the system of at-large elections to the Dallas City Council unconstitutionally diluted the voting strength of Negro citizens. The District Court then "afforded the city an opportunity as a legislative body for the City of Dallas to prepare a plan which would be constitutional." App. 29.

On January 20, 1975, the City Council passed a resolution which stated that the Council intended to enact an ordinance which would provide for eight Council members to be elected from single-member districts and for the three remaining members, including the Mayor, to be elected at-large. This plan was submitted to the District Court on January 24, 1975. The court then conducted a remedy hearing "to determine the constitutionality of the new proposed plan by the City of Dallas." Ibid. After an extensive hearing, the court announced in an oral opinion delivered on February 8, 1975, that the city's plan met constitutional guidelines and was ac

1 Several plaintiffs, including all of the Mexican-American plaintiffs, were dismissed from the case for failure to respond to interrogatories. Two Mexican-Americans subsequently attempted to intervene. The District Court denied their application but later permitted several MexicanAmericans to participate in the remedy hearing held after the at-large election system was declared unconstitutional.

2 Petitioners did not appeal this ruling and do not question it here.

ceptable and that it would issue a written opinion in the near future. Two days later, the City Council formally enacted the promised ordinance, and on March 25, the court issued a memorandum opinion containing its findings of fact and conclusions of law and again sustaining the city plan as a valid legislative Act. 399 F. Supp. 782 (1975).3

The Court of Appeals reversed. 551 F. 2d 1043 (1977). It held that the District Court erred by evaluating the city's actions only under constitutional standards rather than also applying the teaching of East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636 (1976), that, absent exceptional circumstances, judicially imposed reapportionment plans should employ only single-member districts. It concluded that no considerations existed in this case which justified a departure from this preference and remanded with instructions that the District Court require the city to reapportion itself into an appropriate number of single-member districts. We granted certiorari, 434 U. S. 1008 (1978), and reverse on the grounds that the Court of Appeals misapprehended East Carroll Parish School Bd. and its predecessors.

II

The Court has repeatedly held that redistricting and reapportioning legislative bodies is a legislative task which the federal courts should make every effort not to pre-empt. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 414-415 (1977); Chapman v. Meier, 420 U. S. 1, 27 (1975); Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U. S. 735, 749 (1973); Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73, 84-85

3 On April 1, 1975, the Dallas City Council election was held under the eight/three plan. During the pendency of the appeal the electorate approved this plan in a referendum conducted in April 1976, thus incorporating it into the City Charter.

*The court stated that the city may provide for the election of the Mayor by general citywide election if it desired. MR. JUSTICE POWELL stayed the Court of Appeals' judgment pending disposition by this Court. 434 U. S. 1329 (1977).

(1966). When a federal court declares an existing apportionment scheme unconstitutional, it is therefore, appropriate, whenever practicable, to afford a reasonable opportunity for the legislature to meet constitutional requirements by adopting a substitute measure rather than for the federal court to devise and order into effect its own plan. The new legislative plan, if forthcoming, will then be the governing law unless it, too, is challenged and found to violate the Constitution. “[A] State's freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional, either as a whole or in part, should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause." Id., at 85.

Legislative bodies should not leave their reapportionment tasks to the federal courts; but when those with legislative responsibilities do not respond, or the imminence of a state election makes it impractical for them to do so, it becomes the "unwelcome obligation," Connor v. Finch, supra, at 415, of the federal court to devise and impose a reapportionment plan pending later legislative action. In discharging this duty, the district courts "will be held to stricter standards. . . than will a state legislature . . . ." 431 U. S., at 414. Among other requirements, a court-drawn plan should prefer singlemember districts over multimember districts, absent persuasive justification to the contrary. Connor v. Johnson, 402 U. S. 690, 692 (1971). We have repeatedly reaffirmed this remedial principle. Connor v. Williams, 404 U. S. 549, 551 (1972); Mahan v. Howell, 410 U. S. 315, 333 (1973); Chapman v. Meier, supra, at 18; East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, supra, at 639.

The requirement that federal courts, absent special circumstances, employ single-member districts when they impose remedial plans, reflects recognition of the fact that "the practice of multimember districting can contribute to voter confusion, make legislative representatives more remote from their constituents, and tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent electoral majorities Connor v.

Finch, supra, at 415. See also Chapman v. Meier, supra, at 15-16. Despite these dangers, this Court has declined to hold that state multimember districts are per se unconstitutional. See, for example, Whitcomb v. Chavis, 403 U. S. 124 (1971); Fortson v. Dorsey, 379 U. S. 433 (1965); Burns v. Richardson, supra; Chapman v. Meier, supra, at 15. A more stringent standard is applied to judicial reapportionments, however, because a federal court, "lacking the political authoritativeness that the legislature can bring to the task," must act "circumspectly, and in a manner 'free from any taint of arbitrariness or discrimination.'" Connor v. Finch, supra, at 415, quoting from Roman v. Sincock, 377 U. S. 695, 710 (1964).5

The foregoing principles, worked out in the course of reconciling the requirements of the Constitution with the goals. of state political policy, are useful guidelines and serve to decide many cases. But, as is true in this case, their application to the facts presented is not always immediately obvious. Furthermore, the distinctive impact of § 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, as amended, 89 Stat. 404, 42 U. S. C. § 1973c (1970 ed., Supp. V), upon the power of the

5 The numerous cases in which this Court has required the use of singlemember districts in court-ordered reapportionment plans have all involved apportionment schemes which, unlike the one in this case, were held unconstitutional because they departed from the one-person, one-vote rule of Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U. S. 533 (1964), and its progeny. We are fully persuaded, however, that the same considerations which have induced this Court to express a preference for single-member districts in court-ordered reapportionment plans designed to remedy violations of the one-person, one-vote rule compel a similar rule with regard to court-imposed reapportionments designed to cure the dilution of the voting strength of racial minorities resulting from unconstitutional racial discrimination. Indeed, the Court has justified the preference for single-member districts in judicially imposed reapportionments on the ground that multimember districts "tend to submerge electoral minorities and overrepresent electoral majorities ," which is the source of the very violation which the court is seeking to eliminate in racial dilution cases. Connor v. Finch, 431 U. S. 407, 415 (1977). See White v. Regester, 412 U. S. 755, 765-770 (1973).