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origin in the Fourth Article of the Articles of Confederation 16 and their shared vision of federalism, see Baldwin v. Montana Fish and Game Comm'n, 436 U.S., at 379-380—renders several Commerce Clause decisions appropriate support for our conclusion. West v. Kansas Natural Gas, 221 U. S. 229 (1911), struck down an Oklahoma statutory scheme that completely prohibited the out-of-state shipment of natural gas found within the State. The Court reasoned that if a State could so prefer its own economic well-being to that of the Nation as a whole, “Pennsylvania might keep its coal, the Northwest its timber, [and] the mining States their minerals,” so that "embargo may be retaliated by embargo" with the result that "commerce (would) be halted at state lines.” Id., at 255. West was held to be controlling in Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, 262 U. S. 553 (1923), where a West Virginia statute that effectively required natural gas companies within the State to satisfy all fuel needs of West Virginia residents before transporting any natural gas out of the State was held to violate the Commerce Clause. West and Pennsylvania v. West Virginia thus established that the location in a given State of a resource bound for interstate commerce is an insufficient basis for preserving the benefits of the resource exclusively or even
16 That Article provided: “The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and intercourse among the people of the different states in this union, the free inhabitants of each of these states, paupers, vagabonds and fugitives from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immunities of free citizens in the several states; and the people of each State shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to the same duties, impositions, and restrictions, as the inhabitants thereof respectively; provided, that such restrictions shall not extend so far as to prevent the removal of property, imported into any State, to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant; provided, also that no imposition, duties or restriction, shall be laid by any State on the property of the United States, or either of them.” 9 Journal of the Continental Congress 908-909 (1777) (Library of Congress ed., 1907).
principally for that State's residents. Foster Packing Co. v. Haydel, 278 U. S. 1 (1928), went one step further; it limited the extent to which a State's purported ownership of certain resources could serve as a justification for the State's economic discrimination in favor of residents. There, in the face of Louisiana's claim that the State owned all shrimp within state waters, the Court invalidated a Louisiana law that required the local processing of shrimp taken from Louisiana marshes as a prerequisite to their out-of-state shipment. The Court observed that “by permitting its shrimp to be taken and all the products thereof to be shipped and sold in interstate commerce, the State necessarily releases its hold and, as to the shrimp so taken, definitely terminates its control.” Id., at 13.
West, Pennsylvania v. West Virginia, and Foster Packing thus establish that the Commerce Clause circumscribes a State's ability to prefer its own citizens in the utilization of natural resources found within its borders, but destined for interstate commerce. Like Louisiana's shrimp in Foster Packing, Alaska's oil and gas here are bound for out-of-state consumption. Indeed, the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, on which project appellants' nonresidency has prevented them from working, was undertaken expressly to accomplish this end." Although the fact that a state-owned resource is destined for interstate commerce does not, of itself, disable the State from preferring its own citizens in the utilization of that resource, it does inform analysis under the Privileges and Immunities Clause as to the permissibility of the discrimination the State visits upon nonresidents based on its ownership of the resource. Here, the oil and gas upon
17 In authorizing the construction of the Trans-Alaska Pipeline, Congress expressly found that "[t]he early development and delivery of oil and gas from Alaska's North Slope to domestic markets is in the national interest because of growing domestic shortages and increasing dependence upon insecure foreign sources.” 43 U. S. C. § 1651 (a) (1970 ed., Supp. V) (emphasis added).
which Alaska hinges its discrimination against nonresidents are of profound national importance.18 On the other hand, the breadth of the discrimination mandated by Alaska Hire goes far beyond the degree of resident bias Alaska's ownership of the oil and gas can justifiably support. The confluence of these realities points to but one conclusion: Alaska Hire cannot withstand constitutional scrutiny. As Mr. Justice Cardozo observed in Baldwin v. G. A. F. Seelig, Inc., 294 U. S. 511, 523 (1935), the Constitution "was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or swim together, and that in the long run prosperity and salvation are in union and not division." 19
18 In enacting the Alaska Natural Gas Transportation Act of 1976, 15 U. S. C. $ 719 et seq. (1976 ed.) Congress declared:
"(1) a natural gas supply shortage exists in the contiguous States of the United States;
“(2) large reserves of natural gas in the State of Alaska could help significantly to alleviate this supply shortage;
"(3) the expeditious construction of a viable natural gas transportation system for delivery of Alaska natural gas to United States markets is in the national interest; and
“(4) the determinations whether to authorize a transportation system for delivery of Alaska natural gas to the contiguous States and, if so, which system to select, involve questions of the utmost importance respecting national energy policy, international relations, national security, and economic and environmental impact, and therefore should appropriately be addressed by the Congress and the President in addition to those Federal officers and agencies assigned functions under law pertaining to the selection, construction, and initial operation of such a system.” 15 U.S. C. 8 719 (1976 ed.). See n. 17, supra.
19 In light of our conclusion that Alaska Hire is invalid under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Art. IV, $ 2, we have no occasion to address appellants' challenges to the Act under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
WISE, MAYOR OF DALLAS, ET AL. v. LIPSCOMB ET AL.
CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
No. 77–529. Argued April 26, 1978-Decided June 22, 1978
Respondents, Negro and Mexican-American residents of Dallas, Tex.,
brought this action for injunctive and declaratory relief against petitioners, the Mayor and members of the Dallas City Council, alleging that the City Charter's at-large system of electing council members unconstitutionally diluted the vote of racial minorities. After an evidentiary hearing, the District Court orally declared that system unconstitutional and then "afforded the city an opportunity as a legislative body for the City of Dallas to prepare a plan which would be constitutional.” The City Council then passed a resolution expressing its intention to enact an ordinance that would provide for eight council members to be elected from single-member districts and for the three remaining members, including the Mayor, to be elected at large. After an extensive remedy hearing, the District Court approved the plan, which the City Council thereafter formally enacted as an ordinance. The District Court later issued a memorandum opinion that sustained the plan as a valid legislative Act. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the District Court had erred in evaluating the plan only under constitutional standards without also applying the teaching of East Carroll Parish School Bd. v. Marshall, 424 U. S. 636, which held that, absent exceptional circumstances, judicially imposed reapportionment plans should use only single-member districts. Held: The judg
ment is reversed and the case is remanded. Pp. 539–547; 547–549. 551 F. 2d 1043, reversed and remanded.
MR. JUSTICE WHITE, joined by MR. JUSTICE STEWART, concluded:
1. Federal courts, absent special circumstances, must employ singlemember districts when they impose remedial reapportionment plans. That standard, however, is more stringent than the constitutional standard that is applicable when the reapportionment is accomplished by the legislature. Here, after the District Court had invalidated the Dallas at-large election scheme in the City Charter, the city discharged its duty to devise a substitute by enacting the eight/three ordinance, which the District Court reviewed as a legislatively enacted plan and held constitutional despite the use of at-large voting for three council seats. Pp. 539–543.
2. The eight/three ordinance was properly considered to be a legislative plan and the Court of Appeals erred in evaluating it under principles applicable to judicially devised reapportionment plans. Pp. 543–546.
(a) No special reason for not applying the standard applicable to a legislatively devised plan can be found in the provisions of Texas law that specify that a city charter can be amended only by a vote of the people, for the City Council in enacting the plan did not purport to amend the Charter but only to exercise its legislative powers after the Charter provision had been declared unconstitutional. P. 544.
(b) East Carroll Parish School Bd., supra, does not support the conclusion of the Court of Appeals that the plan presented by the city must be viewed as judicial and therefore as subject to a level of scrutiny more stringent than that required by the Constitution, rather than legislative. In reaching the conclusion that singe-member districts are to be preferred, the Court emphasized that the bodies that submitted the plans did not purport to reapportion themselves and could not legally do so under federal law because state legislation providing them with such powers had been disapproved under $5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965. On the facts of the instant case, however, unlike the situation in East Carroll Parish School Bd., the Dallas City Council validly met its responsibility of replacing the invalid apportionment provision with one that could withstand constitutional scrutiny. Pp. 545-546.
3. Though it has been urged that $5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which became applicable to Texas while this case was pending on appeal, barred effectuation of the challenged ordinance absent the clearance mandated by $5, that issue was not dealt with by the Court of Appeals and should more appropriately be considered by that court on remand. Pp. 546–547.
MR. JUSTICE POWELL, joined by THE CHIEF JUSTICE, MR. JUSTICE BLACKMUN, and MR. JUSTICE REHNQUIST, while agreeing that the eight/three ordinance was a "legislative plan" for purposes of federalcourt review, concluded that the instant case is controlled by Burns v. Richardson, 384 U. S. 73. By analogy to the reasoning of that case the eight/three plan must be considered legislative, even if the Council had no power to apportion itself, a Charter amendment being necessary to that end. Under the Burns rule whereby "a State's freedom of choice to devise substitutes for an apportionment plan found unconstitutional ... should not be restricted beyond the clear commands of the Equal Protection Clause," plans proposed by the local body must be regarded as “legislative" even if, as in that case, the Court's examination of state law suggests that the local body lacks authority to reapportion