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Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), articulated the broad legal principle which must govern the Board's enforcement of this right in the myriad factual situations in which it is sought to be exercised:

"[The Board must adjust] the undisputed right of self-organization assured to employees under the Wagner Act and the equally undisputed right of employers to maintain discipline in their establishments. Like so many others, these rights are not unlimited in the sense that they can be exercised without regard to any duty which the existence of rights in others may place upon employer or employee." Id., at 797-798.

That principle was further developed in NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U. S. 105 (1956), where the Court stated:

"Accommodation between [employee-organization rights and employer-property rights] must be obtained with as little destruction of one as is consistent with the maintenance of the other." Id., at 112.

Based on its experience in enforcing the Act, the Board developed legal rules applying the principle of accommodation. The effect of these rules is to make particular restrictions on employee solicitation and distribution presumptively lawful or unlawful under § 8 (a) (1) subject to the introduction of evidence sufficient to overcome the presumption. Thus, the Board has held that restrictions on employee solicitation during nonworking time, and on distribution during nonworking time in nonworking areas, are violative of § 8 (a)(1) unless the employer justifies them by a showing of special circum

effectiveness depends in some measure on the ability of employees to learn the advantages and disadvantages of organization from others. Early in the history of the administration of the Act the Board recognized the importance of freedom of communication to the free exercise of organization rights." Id., at 542-543 (citation omitted).

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stances which make the rule necessary to maintain production or discipline.10 In the case of retail marketing establishments, including public restaurants, however, the Board has held that solicitation and distribution may be prohibited on the selling floor at all times.11

Republic Aviation Corp., supra, sustained the Board's general approach to adjudication of §8 (a)(1) charges. There we held that the Board is free to adopt, in light of its experience, a rule that, absent special circumstances, a particular employer restriction is presumptively an unreasonable interference with §7 rights constituting an unfair labor practice under § 8 (a)(1), without the necessity of proving the underlying generic facts which persuaded it to reach that conclusion. The validity of such a rule "[1]ike a statutory presumption or one established by regulation, perhaps in varying degree, depends upon the rationality between what is proved and what is inferred." Republic Aviation, supra, at 804-805 (footnote omitted). The Board here relied on, and petitioner challenges, the fashioning of a similar presumption applicable to hospitals.

...

10 The Board's solicitation rule was first announced in Peyton Packing Co., 49 N. L. R. B. 828, 843 (1943). The Board's decision in LeTourneau Co. of Ga., 54 N. L. R. B. 1253 (1944), which applied the presumption to a no-distribution rule enforced against employee organizers distributing literature in the employer's parking lot, was affirmed with Republic Aviation Corp. v. NLRB, 324 U. S. 793 (1945), without separate discussion. In Stoddard Quirk Mfg. Co., 138 N. L. R. B. 615 (1962), however, the Board established the distinction between distribution and solicitation, limiting the presumption as applicable to distribution only in nonworking areas. For purposes of that rule, the Board considers the distribution of signature cards to be solicitation and not distribution. See id., at 620 n. 6. 11 See Marriott Corp. (Children's Inn), 223 N. L. R. B. 978 (1976); Bankers Club, Inc., 218 N. L. R. B. 22 (1975); McDonald's Corp., 205 N. L. R. B. 404 (1973); Marshall Field & Co., 98 N. L. R. B. 88 (1952), enf'd, 200 F. 2d 375 (CA7 1953); Goldblatt Bros., Inc., 77 N. L. R. B. 1262 (1948); May Dept. Stores Co., 59 N. L. R. B. 976 (1944), enf'd as modified, 154 F. 2d 533 (CA8 1946).

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Although, prior to the 1974 amendments, the Board had considered the validity of no-solicitation and no-distribution rules in the context of proprietary hospitals, no clear rule emerged from its decisions. In Summit Nursing & Convalescent Home, Inc., 196 N. L. R. B. 769 (1972), enf. denied, 472 F. 2d 1380 (CA6 1973), a divided panel, reversing the Administrative Law Judge, held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation or distribution "at any time in the patient or public area within the [nursing] home, or in the nurses' stations." Another divided panel, in Guyan Valley Hospital, Inc., 198 N. L. R. B. 107 (1972), affirming the Trial Examiner, held lawful a rule prohibiting "soliciting in working areas during working hours." In Guyan Valley the Trial Examiner noted that the employer's rule did not interfere with "solicitation... in the waiting room, the employees' dining room, and the parking lot." Id., at 111. The Board apparently relied upon this fact to distinguish it from Summit Nursing, supra. See 198 N. L. R. B., at 107 n. 2. Finally, in Bellaire General Hospital, 203 N. L. R. B. 1105 (1973), the panel which had split in Summit Nursing, unanimously held unlawful a rule prohibiting solicitation and distribution "by employees while off duty or during working hours." 203 N. L. R. B., at 1108.

This series of somewhat inconclusive decisions was the background against which, after the 1974 amendments, the full Board considered development of a rule establishing the permissible reach of employer rules prohibiting solicitation and distribution in all health-care institutions. In a unanimous opinion, in St. John's Hospital & School of Nursing, Inc., 222 N. L. R. B. 1150 (1976), the Board concluded that the special characteristics of hospitals justify a rule different from that which the Board generally applies to other employers. On the basis of evidence and aided by the briefs amici curiae filed by the American Hospital Association and District 1199

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of the National Union of Hospital and Health Care Employees, the Board found:

"that the primary function of a hospital is patient care and that a tranquil atmosphere is essential to the carrying out of that function. In order to provide this atmosphere, hospitals may be justified in imposing somewhat more stringent prohibitions on solicitation than are generally permitted. For example, a hospital may be warranted in prohibiting solicitation even on nonworking time in strictly patient care areas, such as the patients' rooms, operating rooms, and places where patients receive treatment, such as x-ray and therapy areas. Solicitation at any time in those areas might be unsettling to the patients particularly those who are seriously ill and thus need quiet and peace of mind." Ibid. (emphasis added). The Board concluded that prohibiting solicitation in such situations was justified and required striking the balance against employees' interests in organizational activity. The Board determined, however, that the balance should be struck against the prohibition in areas other than immediate patientcare areas such as lounges and cafeterias absent a showing that disruption to patient care would necessarily result if solicitation and distribution were permitted in those areas. The Board concluded, on a record devoid of evidence which contradicted that assessment, that the possibility of disruption to patient care in those areas must be deemed remote.

III

Petitioner challenges the qualified extension of the rule affirmed in Republic Aviation to hospitals on several grounds: First, it argues that the Board's decision conflicts with the congressional policy evinced in the 1974 hospital amendments that the "self-organizational activities of health care employees not be allowed to 'disrupt the continuity of patient care.' Brief for Petitioner 10. Second, it argues that the basis for

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that rule, the principle of limited judicial review of agency action, is inapposite here because the Board is acting outside of its area of expertise. Third, it argues that the Board's decision is unsupported by evidence and is irrational. Finally, it argues that it is irrational to distinguish between the nonemployee-access cafeteria involved here and the public-access restaurants in which the Board has upheld solicitation bans.

A

Contrary to petitioner's assertion, nothing in the legislative history of the 1974 amendments indicates a congressional policy inconsistent with the Board's general approach to enforcement of § 7 self-organizational rights in the hospital context. First, there is no reason to believe, as petitioner asserts, that Congress intended either to prohibit solicitation entirely in the health-care industry or to limit it to the extent the Board had required at the time the 1974 amendments were enacted. In extending coverage of the Act to nonprofit hospitals, Congress enacted special provisions for strike notice and mediation, applicable solely to the health-care industry, intended to avoid disruptions of patient care caused by strikes."2

12 Section 1 (b) of the 1974 Act, 88 Stat. 395, amended § 2 of the NLRA by adding a definition of "health care institution" to which the special provisions would be applicable. Section 1 (d), 88 Stat. 396, amended the notice provisions of § 8 (d) of the NLRA by requiring, with respect to health-care institutions, 90-day notice of termination or expiration of a contract, 60-day notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service (FMCS) of contract termination or expiration, and 30-day notice to FMCS with respect to initial contract negotiation disputes arising after recognition, and by requiring that the health-care institution and the labor organization participate in mediation at the direction of the FMCS. Section 1 (e), 88 Stat. 396, added a new §8 (g) to the NLRA, requiring labor organizations to give a 10-day written notice to the health-care institution and to FMCS before engaging in picketing, strikes, or other concerted refusals to work. Section 2 of the 1974 Act added a new § 213 to the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, 29 U. S. C. § 183 (1970 ed., Supp. V), which authorizes upon certain conditions the constitution of a

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