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Opinion of REHNQUIST, J.

Id., at 111. Similarly, in the instant case, the prior intrusions occasioned by the shooting and the police's response thereto may legitimize a search under some exigencies that in tamer circumstances might not permit a search.


The Court in Part II of its opinion advises the Arizona courts on the admissibility of certain statements made by Mincey that are relevant only to the murder charge. Because Mincey's murder conviction was reversed by the Arizona Supreme Court, and it is not certain that there will be a retrial, I would not reach this issue. Since the Court addresses the issue, however, I must register my disagreement with its conclusion.

Before trial, Mincey moved to suppress as involuntary certain statements that he had made while confined in an intensive care unit some hours after the shooting. As the Court acknowledges, the trial court found “'with unmistakable clarity' ” that the statements were voluntary, ante, at 397 n. 12, and the Supreme Court of Arizona unanimously affirmed. 115 Ariz., at 479_480, 566 P. 2d, at 280–281. This Court now disagrees and holds that "Mincey's statements were not 'the product of his free and rational choice' ” and therefore "cannot be used in any way against [him) at his trial.” Ante, at 401, 402. Because I believe that the Court both has failed to accord the state-court finding the deference that the Court has always found such findings due and also misapplied our past precedents, I dissent.

As the Court notes, ante, at 398, past cases of this Court hold that a state-court finding as to voluntariness which is "not fairly supported by the record cannot be conclusive of federal rights." Townsend v. Sain, 372 U. S. 293, 316 (1963) (emphasis added). Instead, these cases require the Court to “make an independent determination on the undisputed facts.Stroble v. California, 343 U. S. 181, 190 (1952) (emphasis added);

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437 U.S.

Malinski v. New York, 324 U. S. 401, 404 (1945). It is well established that, “for purposes of review in this Court, the determination of the trial judge or of the jury will ordinarily be taken to resolve evidentiary conflicts and may be entitled to some weight even with respect to the ultimate conclusion on the crucial issue of voluntariness.Haynes v. Washington, 373 U. S. 503, 515 (1963). See Lisenba v. California, 314 U. S. 219, 238 (1941); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U. S. 199, 205, and n. 5 (1960). Such deference, particularly on the resolution of evidentiary conflicts, “is particularly apposite because the trial judge and jury are closest to the trial scene and thus afforded the best opportunity to evaluate contradictory testimony.Haynes, supra, at 516.

The Court in this case, however, ignores entirely some evidence of voluntariness and distinguishes away yet other testimony. There can be no discounting that Mincey was seriously wounded and laden down with medical equipment. Mincey was certainly not able to move about and, because of the breathing tube in his mouth, had to answer Detective Hust's questions on paper. But the trial court was certainly not required to find, as the Court would imply, that Mincey was "a seriously and painfully wounded man on the edge of consciousness." Ante, at 401. Nor is it accurate to conclude that Detective Hust “ceased the interrogation only during intervals when Mincey lost consciousness or received medical treatment, and after each such interruption returned relentlessly to his task.Ibid.

As the Arizona Supreme Court observed in affirming the trial court's finding of voluntariness, Mincey's nurse

"testified that she had not given (Mincey) any medication and that [he] was alert and able to understand the officer's questions. . .. She said that (Mincey) was in moderate pain but was very cooperative with everyone. The interrogating officer also testified that (Mincey) did not appear to be under the influence of drugs and that


Opinion of REHNQUIST, J.

[his] answers were generally responsive to the questions."

115 Ariz., at 480, 566 P. 2d, at 281. See App. 50–51 (testimony of Detective Hust), 63 and 66 (testimony of Nurse Graham). The uncontradicted testimony of Detective Hust also reveals a questioning that was far from "relentless." While the interviews took place over a three-hour time span, the interviews were not "very long; probably not more than an hour total for everything." Id., at 59. Hust would leave the room whenever Mincey received medical treatment "or if it looked like he was getting a little bit exhausted.Ibid. According to Detective Hust, Mincey never "los[t] consciousness at any time.” Id., at 58.

As the Court openly concedes, there were in this case none of the "gross abuses that have led the Court in other cases to find confessions involuntary, such as beatings

.. or 'truth serums.' Ante, at 401. Neither is this a case, however, where the defendant's will was “simply overborne” by “mental coercion.” Cf. Blackburn v. Alabama, supra, at 206; Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U. S. 737, 741 (1966); Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U. S. 519, 521 (1968). As the Supreme Court of Arizona observed, it was the testimony of both Detective Hust and Nurse Graham "that neither mental or physical force nor abuse was used on (Mincey] ... Nor were any promises made." 115 Ariz., at 480, 566 P. 2d, at 281. See App. 58–59 (testimony of Detective Hust) and 63 (testimony of Nurse Graham). According to Mincey's own testimony, he wanted

1 The Supreme Court of Arizona also emphasized "the fact that [Mincey] was able to write his answers in a legible and fairly sensible fashion.” 115 Ariz., at 480 n. 3, 566 P. 2d, at 281 n. 3. The Court concedes that “Mincey's answers seem relatively responsive to the questions,ante, at 400 n. 16, but chooses to ignore this evidence on the ground that the “reliability of Hust's report is uncertain.” Ibid. Despite the contrary impression given by the Court, ibid., the Arizona Supreme Court's opinion casts no doubt on the testimony or report of Detective Hust. The Court is thus left solely with its own conclusion as to the reliability of various witnesses based on a re-examination of the record on appeal.

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to help Hust “the best I could” and tried to answer each question “to the best of my recollection at the time that this was going on.Id., at 86. Mincey did not claim that he felt compelled by Detective Hust to answer the questions propounded. Cf. Greenwald, supra, at 521.

By all of these standards enunciated in our previous cases, I think the Court today goes too far in substituting its own judgment for the judgment of a trial court and the highest court of a State, both of which decided these disputed issues differently than does this Court, and both of which were a good deal closer to the factual occurrences than is this Court. Admittedly we may not abdicate our duty to decide questions of constitutional law under the guise of wholly remitting to state courts the function of factfinding which is a necessary ingredient of the process of constitutional decision. But the authorities previously cited likewise counsel us against going to the other extreme, and attempting to extract from a cold record bits and pieces of evidence which we then treat as the "facts” of the case. I believe that the trial court was entitled to conclude that, notwithstanding Mincey's medical condition, his statements in the intensive care unit were admissible. The fact that the same court might have been equally entitled to reach the opposite conclusion does not justify this Court's adopting the opposite conclusion.

I therefore dissent from Part II of the Court's opinion.

. While Mincey asked at several points to see a lawyer, he also expressed his willingness to continue talking to Detective Hust even without a lawyer. See ante, at 399 400, n. 16. As the Court notes, since Mincey's statements were not used as part of the prosecution's case in chief but only in impeachment, any violation of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U. S. 436 (1966), was irrelevant. See Harris v. New York, 401 U. S. 222 (1971); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U. S. 714 (1975).






No. 76–1121. Argued December 5, 1977-Reargued March 20, 1978

Decided June 21, 1978*

Respondent union, which represents persons hired to perform writing

functions for motion picture and television films (hereinafter respondent), had collective-bargaining contracts with a producers association (petitioner in No. 76–1153) and three television networks (petitioners in No. 76–1121). Among respondent's members are a large number of persons (so-called "hyphenates") who are engaged by petitioners primarily to perform executive and supervisory functions. Though the hyphenates, who include various categories of producers, directors, and story editors, have minor writing tasks, these are not covered in the collective-bargaining contracts; only if the hyphenates are employed to perform additional writing services are the rates therefor governed by those contracts. In connection with their regular, primary duties many of the hyphenates are represented by unions other than respondent. In anticipation of an economic strike upon expiration of its contracts with petitioners, respondent distributed strike rules to its members, including the hyphenates (to whom the rules were made expressly applicable). The rules included a prohibition against crossing a picket line established by respondent at any entrance of a struck premise. After the strike began, petitioners informed the hyphenates that they were expected to continue their regular supervisory functions, though they would not be asked to perform writing duties covered by the union contract. Thereafter respondent notified a large number of the hyphenates who had returned to work that they had violated one or more of the strike rules, including in many instances the ban on crossing a picket line. After ensuing disciplinary proceedings (at which there was no proof that hyphenates had performed any work covered by the recently expired

*Together with No. 76-1153, Association of Motion Picture & Television Producers, Inc. v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al.; and No. 76–1162, National Labor Relations Board v. Writers Guild of America, West, Inc., et al., also on certiorari to the same court.

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