amounted only to a release by the defendant of its right, if any, to the one-half of the claim occupied by the military, and for damages for the loss or destruction of property, which is not even an admission by the United States, to whom the release was made, that the releasor, the defendant, ever had any right to either, but only that it asserted some kind of claim thereto, which it was deemed expedient to satisfy and extinguish. Bright v. Rochester, 7 Wheat. 548; Watkins ▼Holman, 15 Pet. 53; Croxall v. Shered, 5 Wall. 287; Merryman v. Bourne, 9 Wall. 600.

Besides this, one of the plaintiffs and Bigelow, under whom the others claim, had already acquired rights in the premises under the town-site and donation acts, which congress could not deprive them of, even if they had been parties to this proceeding which resulted in the payment to the defendant. Congress has the power to dispose of the public lands, and to make compensation for private propert taken for public uses, but it has not judicial power, and therefore cannot finally determine conflicting claims to land, although arising under its own grants or laws.

But, since this payment to the defendant of $20,000, there is no longer any cause for regarding it as even morally entitled to anything from the public on account of its missionary operations at The Dalles. In 1847, when the place was abandoned by the defendant, it had no market value, because, there being no white people east of the Cascade mountains, except a few Presbyterian and Roman Catholic missionaries, there were no other purchasers for it; and, rather than let it fall into the hands of the latter, it was disposed of to Dr. Whitman for $600. And it appears that e was induced to make the purchase, even at that figure, as much to prevent the "priests" from getting hold of the pos tion as anything else. In 1850, when the claim was taken by the military, it probably could not have been sold with good title for $1,000; and even as late as 1854-5, when the town had commenced to grow, the sum paid the defenda 11₺ by the United States for the one-half of it was probably more than double the value of the whole of it.

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The conclusion of the court is that the defendant did not occupy the premises on August 14, 1848, as a missionary sta-tion or otherwise, either by itself or the American Board, and that it was not deterred from so doing by the danger from Indian hostilities, but voluntarily abandoned the same before September 10, 1847, without any intention or expectation of re-occupying it under any circumstances, and therefore the patent therefor to the defendant was wrongfully issued; and the decree of the court will be that the defendant be declared a trustee for the several plaintiffs herein, for so much of the premises described in the patent as is claimed by them in their several suits, and that the defendant, within 90 days, by a sufficient conveyance or conveyances, containing proper covenants against its own acts, to be approved by the master of this court, release to the said plaintiffs, accordingly, all right and title to said premises, and that it pay the plaintiffs their costs and expenses of suit.

UNITED STATES V. BIXBY.

(District Court, D. Indiana. April 4, 1881.)

1. EMBEZZLEMENT ASSIGNEE IN BANKRUPTCY-REV. ST. § 5504.

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While an assignee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court, he is not an officer within the purview of section 5504, Rev. St., defining the offence of embezzlement by court officers, and there seems to be no other statute embracing assignees in bankruptcy for the specific offence of embezzlement.

Indictment for embezzlement by assignee in bankruptcy. Motion to quash.

C. L. Holstein, U. S. Att'y, and L. H. Richardson, Ass't, for the United States.

Gordon, Lamb & Shepherd, for defendant.

GRESHAM, D. J. The defendant is indicted for embezzling funds which came into his hands as assignee of several estates in bankruptcy. The indictment is based upon section 5504 of the Revised Statutes, which reads as follows:

"Every clerk or other officer of a court of the United States, who fails forthwith to deposit any money belonging in the registry of the court, or thereafter paid into court, or received by the officers thereof, with the treasurer, assistant treasurer, or a designated depositary of the United States, in the name and to the credit of such court, or who retains or converts to his own use, or to the use of another, any such money, is guilty of embezzlement," etc.

It is only such moneys as are required to be deposited with the treasurer, assistant treasurer, or a designated depositary of the United States, in the name and to the credit of the court, that an officer can be guilty of embezzling under this section. An assignee in bankruptcy is an officer of the court, but the funds of the estate which come into his hands are not required to be deposited in any of the places designated in this section, in the name of the court and to its credit.

It is provided in section 5059 of the Revised Statutes that the assignee shall, as soon as may be after receiving any money belonging to the estate, deposit the same in some bank, in his name as assignee, or otherwise keep it distinct from all other money in his possession. The acts charged i the indictment are not covered by section 5504, Rev. St., there seems to be no other statute making it embezzlement for an assignee in bankruptcy to convert to his own use trust funds which come into his hands. The motion to quash is sustained.

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YALE LOCK MANUF'G Co. and others v. NORWICH NAT. BANK.

SAME V. NEW HAVEN SAVINGS BANK.

(Circuit Court, D. Connecticut. March 29, 1881.)

1. RE-ISSUE No. 8,550-IMPROVEMENTS IN TIME LOCKS-NOVELTY. Re-issued letters patent No. 8,550, for improvements in "time locks," by which the multiple bolt-work of a safe or vault door could be automatically both dogged or locked and unlocked at predetermined times, the dogging and releasing being caused by the operation of the time mechanism, and the time for locking or unlocking being capable of alteration at the will of the operator, without disturbance of the clock-work,-contained, inter alia, the following claims:

"(1) The combination of independent multiple bolt-work with the time mechanism and locking or dogging mechanism of a time lock, automatically both dogging and releasing the bolt-work at predetermined times, substantially as described."

"(7) In a time lock the combination, substantially as above set forth, of the time movements and two adjustable devices, one for determining the time of locking and the other of unlocking."

Held, that the language of the seventh claim was not to be extended so as to include time movements which were used for any obstructing purposes whatever, but was to be considered as referring to the time lock of the specification only.

2. SAME-SAME-SAME.

Held, therefore, that such claim was not anticipated by a patent for a structure containing two similar adjusting devices, which were operated to open and close a gas-cock much after the plan of the patented lock.

3. SAME-INVENTION.

Held, further, that the changes necessary to transform old time locks which unlocked at predetermined times into structures which should also lock at predetermined times, required the exercise of inventive power.

4. SAME-SAME.

Held, further, that the application to safe doors of chronometric mechanism for automatic locking and unlocking at predetermined times involved invention.

5. SAME-INFRINGEMENT.

Held, further, that where a lock has two adjustable devices for locking and unlocking automatically at predetermined times, which are the equivalents of the mechanism of the patented lock, infringement is not avoided by the mere fact that the infringing lock can also be used as an instant locker.

6. SAME-SAME.

Held, further, that the mere use of such infringing lock constitutes an infringement, although it has only been used as an instant locker.

7. PATENT No. 173,366 — IMPROVEMENT IN TIME LOCKS-MECHANICAL DEVICE.

Letters patent No. 173,366, for improvement in "time locks," by isolating the adjusting devices from the winding devices, and by excluding from the adjusting devices the person who winds the clocks, except when he is allowed the use of the key to the supplemental clock by which the adjusting devices are secured, contained, inter alíez, the following claim: "In combination with the case of a chronometric lock, having a lid or door for covering the devices which control the hours of locking or unlocking, one or more winding devices, whereby, the lock being attached to the safe door, the time mechanism can be wound from the exterior of the case while the safe door is open, but is inaccessible when said door is closed." Held that, so far as this clai was concerned, the alleged invention consists in simply securing the door of a time lock with a key, and in providing such door with an aperture through which the clock could be wound, and that in view of the Rutherford clock, the watchman's time detector, and even the clocks and watches in common use, the improvement did not invol invention, and could only be regarded as mechanical.

8. RE-ISSUE No. 7,947-APPLICATION OF TIME AND COMBINATION LOCK ING MECHANISM TO THE BOLT-Work of a Safe Door-COMBINATIO -PATENTABLE RESULT.

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Re-issued letters patent No. 7,947, for an improvement in a com bined time lock, combination lock, and bolt-work for safe and vau It doors, claimed, inter alia, "the combination with the bolt-work of safe or vault door of a combination or key lock, controllable mecha ically from the exterior of the said door, with the time lock, havin a lock bolt or obstruction for locking and unlocking, controllable from the interior of the door, both of said locks being arranged so a to rest against, or connect with, the bolt-work-the time lock bein automatically unlocked by the operation of the time movement; bot of the said locks being independent of each other, and arranged O control the locking and unlocking of the bolt-work, so that said safe or vault door cannot be opened when locked until both of said lock= have been unlocked, or have released their dogging action to enable the door to be opened, substantially as described." Held, that this combination produced a new result, and was therefore patentable.

9. RE-ISSUE-ABANDONED CLAIM.-Leggett v. Avery, 101 U. S. 256.

Held, further, under the circumstances of this case, that this clai was not within the scope of the language employed in Leggett v. Aver 3, 101 U. S. 256, in relation to the invalidity of a claim in a re-issue which had been abandoned, or rejected with the acquiescence of the patentee, upon the original application for letters patent.-[ED,