point is not necessary to the decision of those cases; but the whole discussion, and the distinctions taken in them, were unnecessary unless the law was so; and it is so announced by the chief justice. Before these decisions were published I had occasion to examine the question, and came to the conclusion that, within the reasoning of the case of The Sewing Machine Companies, 18 Wall. 553, and of earlier cases, this must be the construction. Tremain v. Amory, June, 1879 (MSS.) and see Donahoe v. Mariposa Co. 5 Sawy. 163; Ruckman v. Palisade Co. 1 FED. REP. 367; Bailey v. N. Y. Sav. Bank, 2 FED. REP. 14; Ruble v. Hyde, 3 FED. REP. 330.

It unfortunately is the case that congress has not seen fit to entrust the circuit courts with power to proceed by attachment of property against an absent defendant unless he is an inhabitant of the district where the suit is brought. Toland v. Sprague, 12 Pet. 300. A recent statute gives these courts jurisdiction to enforce a lien upon or claim to, or remove an encumbrance or lien or cloud upon the title to, real or personal property within the district, though the defendants, or some of them, may not be either inhabitants thereof or found therein, first giving notice to the absent defendants. St. 1875, c. 137, § 8; 18 St. 472. But this means a, lien or title existing anterior to the suit, and not one caused by the institution of the suit itself. These courts, therefore, have a very limited jurisdiction by foreign attachment: an important process, which derives its very name from the absence of the defendant, and which the state courts make use of with advantage to plaintiffs and without injustice to defendants. If, then, a corporation is a necessary party to a suit for collecting moneys due for unpaid assessments of its stock, or, which is very similar, for capital once paid in, but afterwards improperly divided, this bridge company, which is incorporated by the state of Missouri, of which state the plaintiff is a citizen, cannot be summoned in as a defendant in the district of Massachusetts.

Under the two recent decisions first above cited, the company, if it could be brought before the court in some way,

might, by its pleading, or its conduct, show that there was no actual controversy between it and the plaintiff, and then the court would not lose its jurisdiction. But it is not here, and cannot be required to come here.

That a corporation is a necessary party to such a suit was decided by Judge Nelson, in this court, in September, 1879, (First Nat. Bank of Hannibal v. Smith, supra, 215;) and this bill, in effect, asks for a review of that decision. The present proceeding is a creditor's bill to enforce a sort of equitable garnishment. Now, I have never seen a case of a creditor's bill, or a garnishment, when brought under the ordinary practice of either law or equity, in which the principal debtor was not made a party defendant when it was possible. Of course, the defendant may be absent, or out of reach; and, as I said before, one of the most important uses of a garnishment is to apply the property of an absent debtor to the payment of his debts within the territorial jurisdiction of the court; but the usages or the statutes by which the courts work out this result give them a jurisdiction in rem which the statutes of the United States deny to the circuit courts, in suits at law or in equity, excepting as above mentioned. This distinction must be kept in mind in examining the cases. In a court of general jurisdiction, the presence of the debtor is admitted to be necessary, but an artificial or constructive presence, or a supposed contumacy, is substituted for actual presence; and this is what the circuit courts cannot effect.

The corporation is a necessary party, actual or constructive, because it will not else be bound by the decree, and the other defendants may be twice vexed. It has also the right to show that the judgments against it have been satisfied, or that it has the means for satisfying them without further assessment. As a rule in equity it may be stated more broadly that the suit is one which, if the allegations of the bill are true, the corporation was bound to institute; and if it fails to do so, it is a necessary party on one side or the other of the suit, in order that its rights in its own assets may be properly cared for. See Cunningham v. Pell, 5 Paige,

607; Spear v. Grant, 16 Mass. 9; Wood v. Dummer, 3 Mason, 308; Davenport v. Dows, 18 Wall. 626; Lyman v. Bonney, 101 Mass. 562; Deerfield v. Nims, 110 Mass. 115; Mann v. Pentz, 3 N. Y. 422.

The three cases cited by the plaintiff were all decided under a code which expressly makes it discretionary with the judge to order notice to the principal defendant or not. The only possible question, therefore, was of the constitutionality of the statute. Gibson v. Haggerty, 37 N. Y. 555; Bishop v. Garcia, 14 Abb. Pr. (N. S.) 70; Lynch v. Johnson, 48 N. Y. 27. The case of Hatch v. Dana, 101 U. S. 205, did not turn. upon this point. It appears that the corporation was made a party and afterwards dropped; but no question was raised about it. The corporation may have made no issue with the plaintiff, or all parties may have agreed to the dismissal. The question argued and decided was whether all stockhold ers must be parties.

I cannot see how it is possible, consistently with the decis ions and the uniform practice, to decide this case in the absence of the corporation. If it had been actually dissolved, the case might be different. There are allegations which come as near to that as truth will permit, I suppose that it has ceased to do business; that its bridge has been sold under a foreclosure; and that it is defunct "to all intents and purposes." I do not understand this to mean that it is ro longer capable of suing and being sued, but that it is dead for all useful purposes as a bridge-owner. If it remains subject to process, the facts alleged appear to be immaterial. I infer, from the facts which are stated, that it is sc liable at present.

Demurrer sustained.

CITY OF ST. LOUIS v. THE KNAPP, STOUT & Co. COMPANY.

A court of equity will not enjoin the erection of a runaway for logs, upon the ground that it will divert the course of a navigable river, unless it appears that the threatened structure will be a nuisance per se.

2 NUISANCE-RIVER.

A structure in the channel of a river will not necessarily be held subject to abatement as a nuisance.

Pennsylvania v. Wheeling Bridge Co. 13 How. 518.

3. INJUNCTION-NUISANCE-PARTY TO BILL.

It seems to be well settled that a bill in equity to enjoin or abate a public nuisance must be filed by one who has sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, special damages.-[ED.

On Demurrer to Bill.

Leverett Bell, for plaintiff.

George M. Stewart and C. H. Krum, for defendant.

MCCRARY, C. J. The bill avers that the eastern boundary of the city of St. Louis is and always has been the middle of the main channel of the Mississippi river, and that complainant is the proprietor of the bed of the river within the city limits, and that by its charter the complainant is authorized to construct all needful improvements in the harbor, to control, guide, or deflect the current of the river, and to erect, repair, and regulate public wharves and docks; that by proper ordinance the lines of the wharf have been laid down and established upon a certain piece of real estate in the northern part of the city, particularly described in the bill.

It is further averred that defendant is erecting a saw-mill on its property, and that, for the purposes of hauling logs from the river into its mill, the defendant is erecting a runway for logs, which will extend some hundred feet from the western edge of the water of the river, and is driving piles, as a foundation for the runway, into the bed of the river east of the eastern line of the wharf as established by the city under the ordinance aforesaid; that north and south of the defend

ant's premises portions of the wharf have been completed, and are being used as landings for boats running on the river; that the effect of driving the piles in the bed of the river and constructing the runway as aforesaid will be to divert the navigable water of the Mississippi river from its natural course, and to throw it east of its natural location, and from along the river bank north and south of said runway and piling.

It is further averred that the construction of said runway will create in front of and upon plaintiff's improved wharf, as aforesaid, a deposit of mud and sediment, so that it will be impossible for boats and vessels engaged in the navigation of the Mississippi river to land at the improved wharf aforesaid, north and south of the defendant's said premises.

The prayer of the bill is that defendant, its agents and servants be forever enjoined from driving piles and constructing its runway east of the western water's edge, in front of defendant's premises; and that it be ordered to remove such piles as it has already driven there, and all portion of said runway already constructed there by it; and that the plaintiff have such other and further relief in the premises as it may be entitled to, etc.

The respondents demur to the bill, and by their demurrer they raise the following questions: First, whether the bill, upon its face, shows that the construction of the runway in question will intrude upon plaintiff's rights, and cause special damage; second, whether, upon the allegations contained in the bill, complainant is entitled to decree in advance of the construction of the runway, and to prevent its completion.

It will not be necessary, upon the consideration of this demurrer, to finally decide the first question presented. It seems, however, to be well settled that a bill in equity, to enjoin or abate a public nuisance, must be filed by one who has sustained or is in danger of sustaining special damages. It is true that one of many persons, all of whom have been damaged by a public nuisance, may bring a bill in behalf of himself and all others who are in like situation, who are or may be injured; and it is by no means necessary to