reference to the aforesaid third section of the act of 1877, the act on which complainants rested their case, as originally instituted) are constitutionally valid were passed, this court had, in virtue of this suit, jurisdiction of the cause, and therefore custody of the fund in litigation. Its jurisdiction having once attached, it could not be ousted thereof by legislative enactment. To thus interfere, says Chancellor Reese, in the case of Fisher's Slaves v. Dobbs, 6 Yerger, and take away the remedy, is to destroy the right,-a result which, in the judgment of the supreme court of Tennessee, could not be accomplished in that way. There is still another reason why the legislature did not have the authority to "alter, postpone, or release" these unpaid taxes. The constitution of Tennessee requires that taxes shall be uniform. Now, if, in the first instance, the legislature had itself levied or authorized the city of Memphis to levy and collect taxes from that portion of its citizens who paid the levies made, and had exempted the delinquents, or if the legislature had required the former to pay in money promptly as the levies were made, and authorized the delinquents to pay from 10 to 15 per cent. of the assessment in depreciated debts, etc., as it has assumed to do by these repealing and subsequent acts, the legislation would have been admittedly in contravention of the constitution, and void; and the prompt tax payers could have protected themselves against such inequality and injustice by enjoining the collection of the taxes assessed against them. Now, can this same result be accomplished by indirection? Under the constitution of Tennessee the legislature cannot, without a gross violation of that instrument, assess a uniform tax, collect from three-fifths of those assessed, and then release the residue. If it can, the injustice and inequality which the constitution sought to prevent would result. So the legislation which is used to defeat complainants encroaches upon the vested rights of the other tax payers as well as upon the rights of creditors. If the delinquent taxes had been collected in due course of law, there would have been no apparent necessity for the efforts that have been and are now being made to repudiate the city's debts, or do what is, in principle, no better: force a settlement under the name of a compromise, at say 25 per cent. of the whole debt. If legislation can thus strike down municipal securities, the value of the $1,000,000,000 of county, township, city, and other municipal obligations, now outstanding, in the hands of bona fide holders for value, depends, not on constitutional guaranties, as the American people have heretofore supposed, but on the enactments of legislatures, to be elected in large measure by the debtor communities. Then we will realize what Judge Story's prophetic vision saw many years since, that the legislative interference in this instance, which gives immunity to Memphis, is "but the first link in a long chain of repetitions, every subsequent interference being naturally provoked by the effects of the preceding one," by which injustice will be done, and the standard of integrity lowered, to be followed by other evils, that will demoralize and plague the country. These are my views. But a decree will be entered dismissing complainants' bills and distributing the fund in the hands of the receiver in accordance with the mandate from the supreme court. UGDENSBURGH & LAKE CHAMPLAIN R. Co. v. THE NORTHERN R. Co. OF NEW HAMPSHIRE and others. (Circuit Court, D. New Hampshire. February 24, 1881.) 1. BILL FOR ACCOUNT-SEVERAL AND DISTINCT ACCOUNTS-PARTIES. In Equity. Demurrer to Amended Bill. . Sidney Bartlett and Wallace Hachett, for complainant. LOWELL, C. J. This bill is brought upon the same contract which was under consideration by this court in the district of Massachusetts in a case heard by Mr. Justice Clifford and myself,-Ogdensburgh & Lake Champlain R. Co. v. Boston & Lowell R. Corp. 4 FED. REP. 64. We then gave a construction to this very singular and difficult contract, and held that the four railroad companies, who are its parties of the third part, had agreed severally with the plaintiff corporation to repay to it the large sum which it had advanced, to the extent of the gross proceeds of the business in said contract mentioned and provided for, and only to this extent. The demurrer to the bill in that case was sustained because there was no allegation as to the amount of gross earnings, and because it did not appear that Smith & Stark, the trustees of the sinking fund, had no fund in their possession applicable to the payment of the debt. In the present case the bill has been amended to meet the objections which were sustained in the other case. The principal point made in support of the demurrer is that the Nashua & Lowell Railroad Company, against whom a separate suit is pending, being within the state of New Hampshire, ought to have been made a party defendant. It was intimated in the former decision that if all four of the borrowing corporations had been found in one district, a single suit might properly have been sustained against them; but we held that they were not necessary parties. The amended bill demands only one-fourth of the debt from this defendant, and, if its gross earnings are equal to that sum, I do not see that the other corporations are even proper parties to that inquiry. At all events, there is no advantage in joining two out of four of the accounting parties, each account being several and distinct. Demurrer overruled. v.5,no.10-56 OGDENSBURGH & LAKE CHAMPLAIN R. Co. v. THE NASHUA & LOWELL R. Co. (Circuit Court, D. New Hampshire. February 24, 1881.) In Equity. Demurrer. Sidney Bartlett and Wallace Hachett, for plaintiff. F. A. Brooks, for defendants. The bill in this case is like that passed upon in Ogdensburgh & Lake Champlain R. Co. v. Boston & Lowell R. Corp., 4 FED. REP. 64, and has not been amended to meet the objections sustained in that case. The order must therefore must be: Demurrer sustained. SPANGLER V. SELLERS.* (Circuit Court, S. D. Ohio. February 16, 1881.) 1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-ATTORNEY UNDERTAKING TO PERFORM SERVICE BEYOND HIS EMPLOYMENT-Degree oF SKILL. If an attorney, employed to conduct a cause, undertakes to perform any service in regard to the case which, by his employment, he was not bound to do, unless specially directed by his client, he will be held to the same strictness in the manner of its discharge as if within the terms of his contract. 2. ATTORNEY At Law-PERFECT LEGAL Knowledge not Required. The undertaking of an attorney is not that he possesses perfect legal knowledge, or the highest degree of skill in relation to the business he undertakes, nor that he will conduct it with the greatest degree of diligence, care, and prudence. 3. SAME ORDINARY LEGAL KNOWLEDGE AND ORDINARY DILIGENCE REQUIRED. But the undertaking of an attorney with his client is that he possesses the ordinary legal knowledge and skill common to members of the profession, and that in the discharge of his duties he will exercise ordinary and reasonable diligence, care, and prudence. *Reported by Messrs. Florien Giauque and J. C. Harper, of the Cincinnati bar. 4. SAME-SAME-Want of, is Negligence. The failure of an attorney to bring to, or exercise in, the discharge of his duties such knowledge or such degree of diligence, care, and prudence, would be negligence. 5. SAME-NEGLIGENCE-DAMAGES-WHEN RECOVERABLE. To authorize a recovery in damages against an attorney for negligence, not only the negligence must be established, but it must also be shown that the damage claimed was the result of such negligence. Demurrer to Petition. John F. Follett, for plaintiff. Bateman & Harper and H. C. Whitman, for defendant. SWING, D. J. The petition avers substantially that in the year 1870 the plaintiff, at the special instance and request of the defendant, had retained and employed the defendant as an attorney and counseller at law, for certain fees and rewards to said defendant, to prosecute and conduct and manage a certain action to be commenced in the court of common pleas within and for the county of Miami, in the state of Ohio, and to prosecute, conduct, and manage said lawsuit through the different courts to which it might be taken, by appeal or otherwise, until the final termination thereof, and the said defendant then and there accepted and entered upon said retainer and employment; said action to be brought by the said plaintiff against Daniel Brown, Eliza H. Brown, et al. The nature and object of said action was as follows: That at the October term of the court of common pleas of Coshocton county, Ohio, for 1869, Thomas Moore and Thomas Dix, partners, recovered a judgment against Daniel Brown, Albert Christy, and Alexander H. Spangler, the plaintiff, on a certain promissory note, whereon the said Daniel Brown was liable as principal, and the said Albert Christy and plaintiff were liable as sureties only of the said Daniel Brown; that on the thirtieth of November, 1869, execution was issued upon said judgment to the sheriff of Miami county against the said Daniel Brown, which was afterwards returned, indorsed: "Received this writ December 4, 1869, and delivered the same to M. A. Evans, my successor, January 3, 1870;" which was afterwards returned, on the fourth of January, 1870, indorsed, "No goods or chattels, lands or tenements, |