Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics PerspectiveGlenn R. Carroll, David J. Teece Oxford University Press, 1999. gada 28. janv. - 552 lappuses This book examines transaction cost economics, the influential theoretical perspective on organizations and industry that was the subject of Oliver Williamson's seminal book,Markets and Hierarchies (1975). Written by leading economists, sociologists, and political scientists, the essays collected here reflect the fruitful intellectual exchange that is occurring across the major social science disciplines. They examine transaction cost economics' general conceptual orientation, its specific theoretical propositions, its applications to policy, and its use in systematic empirical research. The chapters include classic texts, broad review essays, reflective commentaries, and several new contributions to a wide range of topics, including organizations, regulations and law, institutions, strategic management, game theory, entrepreneurship, innovation, finance, and technical information. The book begins with an overview of theory and research on transaction cost economics, highlighting the specific accomplishments of scholars working within the perspective and emphasizing the enormous influence that transaction cost reasoning exerts on the social sciences. The following section covers conceptual uses for the transaction cost framework and major theoretical or methodological elements within it, such as bounded rationality. While advancing some interesting theoretical propositions, these chapters are in fact more ambitious: each examines a specific field, area, or research program and attempts to fashion a new way of thinking about research questions. In the section on industrial applications, contributors study the application of transaction cost theory to a range of problems in utilities, telecommunications, laser printing, and early international trade. The book closes with four microanalytical chapters that delve into the structures and behaviors of specific aspects of firms and organizations: boards of directors, equity structures, employment models, human resource policies and practices, technology strategies, and innovation events. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies collects excellent social science work on transaction cost economics, taking stock of its status, charting its future development, and fostering its renewal and evolution. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 55.
vii. lappuse
... reason . Within the firm , there is necessarily a greater or lesser degree of decentralization of decision making , which must be regulated for efficiency in the same sense that prices regulate efficiency in competitive markets . The ...
... reason . Within the firm , there is necessarily a greater or lesser degree of decentralization of decision making , which must be regulated for efficiency in the same sense that prices regulate efficiency in competitive markets . The ...
22. lappuse
... reason of “ first mover ” advantages ( such as unique location or learning , including the acquisition of undisclosed or proprietary technical and managerial procedures and task - specific labor skills ) . The problem with condition ( 1 ) ...
... reason of “ first mover ” advantages ( such as unique location or learning , including the acquisition of undisclosed or proprietary technical and managerial procedures and task - specific labor skills ) . The problem with condition ( 1 ) ...
23. lappuse
... reason for integration : the small supplier of a critical component whose assets are insufficient to cover a total damage claim leaves the purchaser vulnerable . But this is an argument against small suppliers , not contracting quite ...
... reason for integration : the small supplier of a critical component whose assets are insufficient to cover a total damage claim leaves the purchaser vulnerable . But this is an argument against small suppliers , not contracting quite ...
26. lappuse
... reasons the sup- ply curve of finance behaves in the way postulated . The following conjecture is offered as a partial explanation : unable to monitor the performance of large , complex organizations in any but the crudest way or to ...
... reasons the sup- ply curve of finance behaves in the way postulated . The following conjecture is offered as a partial explanation : unable to monitor the performance of large , complex organizations in any but the crudest way or to ...
27. lappuse
... reason is akin to self - insurance by individuals who know themselves to be good risks but are priced out of the insurance market because of their inability , at low cost , to " reveal " this condition to insurers . 2. OBSERVATIONAL ...
... reason is akin to self - insurance by individuals who know themselves to be good risks but are priced out of the insurance market because of their inability , at low cost , to " reveal " this condition to insurers . 2. OBSERVATIONAL ...
Saturs
3 | |
15 | |
Conceptual Uses | 119 |
Industrial Applications | 235 |
Microanalytics | 363 |
Author Index | 525 |
Subject Index | 532 |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Glenn R. Carroll,David J. Teece Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1999 |
Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Glenn R. Carroll,David J. Teece Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1999 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agency agent analysis asset specificity behavior board composition bounded rationality capital Coase commitment companies competition constraints contract coordination corporate governance corporate law decision directors effects efficient electricity empirical employees employment models employment relation equilibrium equity family firm financing firm's founders game theory governance structures Hannan hazards implications incentives industry innovation Institutional Economics internal investor issues Joskow Journal of Economics Journal of Law Law and Economics Legal Realism legislative liquidation Markets and Hierarchies ment merchant monitoring monopoly Nash equilibrium natural monopoly nomics Oliver Williamson operating organization organizational Organizational Ecology organizational theory ownership parties performance political potential problem production regulation regulatory relational investing relationships Review role Romano sample shareholders social Spiller strategic management strategy suppliers takeover Teece tion trade transaction cost economics transaction-cost economics transmission utilities variable vertical integration Williamson
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
The Economics of Innovation, New Technologies and Structural Change Cristiano Antonelli Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2002 |