Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics PerspectiveGlenn R. Carroll, David J. Teece Oxford University Press, 1999. gada 28. janv. - 552 lappuses This book examines transaction cost economics, the influential theoretical perspective on organizations and industry that was the subject of Oliver Williamson's seminal book,Markets and Hierarchies (1975). Written by leading economists, sociologists, and political scientists, the essays collected here reflect the fruitful intellectual exchange that is occurring across the major social science disciplines. They examine transaction cost economics' general conceptual orientation, its specific theoretical propositions, its applications to policy, and its use in systematic empirical research. The chapters include classic texts, broad review essays, reflective commentaries, and several new contributions to a wide range of topics, including organizations, regulations and law, institutions, strategic management, game theory, entrepreneurship, innovation, finance, and technical information. The book begins with an overview of theory and research on transaction cost economics, highlighting the specific accomplishments of scholars working within the perspective and emphasizing the enormous influence that transaction cost reasoning exerts on the social sciences. The following section covers conceptual uses for the transaction cost framework and major theoretical or methodological elements within it, such as bounded rationality. While advancing some interesting theoretical propositions, these chapters are in fact more ambitious: each examines a specific field, area, or research program and attempts to fashion a new way of thinking about research questions. In the section on industrial applications, contributors study the application of transaction cost theory to a range of problems in utilities, telecommunications, laser printing, and early international trade. The book closes with four microanalytical chapters that delve into the structures and behaviors of specific aspects of firms and organizations: boards of directors, equity structures, employment models, human resource policies and practices, technology strategies, and innovation events. Firms, Markets, and Hierarchies collects excellent social science work on transaction cost economics, taking stock of its status, charting its future development, and fostering its renewal and evolution. |
No grāmatas satura
1.–5. rezultāts no 83.
9. lappuse
... incentives . The chapter discusses these aspects of various regulatory systems around the world , using illustrations from the telecommunications and other utility industries . In " Mitigating Procurement Hazards in the Context of ...
... incentives . The chapter discusses these aspects of various regulatory systems around the world , using illustrations from the telecommunications and other utility industries . In " Mitigating Procurement Hazards in the Context of ...
19. lappuse
... incentives , controls , and what may be referred to broadly be referred to broadly as " inherent structural advantages . ” In an incentive sense , internal organization attenuates the aggressive advocacy that epitomizes arm's length ...
... incentives , controls , and what may be referred to broadly be referred to broadly as " inherent structural advantages . ” In an incentive sense , internal organization attenuates the aggressive advocacy that epitomizes arm's length ...
20. lappuse
... incentive and control differences between internal and market organization . It is widely ac- cepted , for example , that communication with respect to complex matters is facilitated by a common training and experience and if a compact ...
... incentive and control differences between internal and market organization . It is widely ac- cepted , for example , that communication with respect to complex matters is facilitated by a common training and experience and if a compact ...
21. lappuse
... incentive for assemblers to integrate backward or suppliers to integrate forward . Two different cases can be distinguished : bilateral monopoly ( oli- gopoly ) and competitive assembly with monopolistic supply . The former is ...
... incentive for assemblers to integrate backward or suppliers to integrate forward . Two different cases can be distinguished : bilateral monopoly ( oli- gopoly ) and competitive assembly with monopolistic supply . The former is ...
24. lappuse
... incentives to exploit uncertainty opportunistically , and the control machinery that the firm is able to activate is more selective . 1. AFFIRMATIVE OCCASIONS FOR INTEGRATION . Three affirmative occasions to integrate on account of ...
... incentives to exploit uncertainty opportunistically , and the control machinery that the firm is able to activate is more selective . 1. AFFIRMATIVE OCCASIONS FOR INTEGRATION . Three affirmative occasions to integrate on account of ...
Saturs
3 | |
15 | |
Conceptual Uses | 119 |
Industrial Applications | 235 |
Microanalytics | 363 |
Author Index | 525 |
Subject Index | 532 |
Citi izdevumi - Skatīt visu
Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Glenn R. Carroll,David J. Teece Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1999 |
Firms, Markets and Hierarchies: The Transaction Cost Economics Perspective Glenn R. Carroll,David J. Teece Ierobežota priekšskatīšana - 1999 |
Bieži izmantoti vārdi un frāzes
agency agent analysis asset specificity behavior board composition bounded rationality capital Coase commitment companies competition constraints contract coordination corporate governance corporate law decision directors effects efficient electricity empirical employees employment models employment relation equilibrium equity family firm financing firm's founders game theory governance structures Hannan hazards implications incentives industry innovation Institutional Economics internal investor issues Joskow Journal of Economics Journal of Law Law and Economics Legal Realism legislative liquidation Markets and Hierarchies ment merchant monitoring monopoly Nash equilibrium natural monopoly nomics Oliver Williamson operating organization organizational Organizational Ecology organizational theory ownership parties performance political potential problem production regulation regulatory relational investing relationships Review role Romano sample shareholders social Spiller strategic management strategy suppliers takeover Teece tion trade transaction cost economics transaction-cost economics transmission utilities variable vertical integration Williamson
Atsauces uz šo grāmatu
The Economics of Innovation, New Technologies and Structural Change Cristiano Antonelli Priekšskatījums nav pieejams - 2002 |