MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Continued. 2. Held, that the refusal to grant a new trial was sufficiently supported by conflicting evidence. Id. 3. An ordinance of the city of St. Joseph, requiring a license fee of $4 for one day and $100 a year for the privilege of peddling flour and other cereal products, is not as a matter of law unreasonable or invalid as a police regulation, and does not amount to a tax. 1 Comp. Laws, §§ 3107-3110, 2 How. Stat. (2d Ed.) §§ 5629-5632. O'Hara v. Collier, 611. 4. Every presumption is indulged in favor of the reasonableness of such an ordinance; the courts can only interfere in case of an abuse of the legislative discretion vested in the city council. Id. 5. Where plaintiff's notice to a city of the fourth class claiming damages by reason of personal injuries sustained in falling on a defective sidewalk contained a statement of her injuries as follows: "She was severely wrenched, strained, and bruised; her back and legs and the tendons and ligaments thereof were wrenched, bruised, and strained; she had, some two years prior to that time, undergone a surgical operation and that the attachments formed after such operation were torn loose and that she was severely and permanently injured internally, the extent of which is unknown to your petitioner at this time; that at the time of said accident she was in a family way and said fall caused her to have a miscarriage; that ever since said fall she has suffered great mental and physical pain, and has been incapacitated from doing any labor, and prevented from having any amusement, recreation, and pleasure; that she is advised that her injuries are permanent and further developments may show other and different injuries than have so far become known," it was a sufficient statement of the extent of injury to permit her to recover for injury to the pedicle of the left ovary and consequent hindrance to proper circulation, rupture of blood vessels, adhesion to the intestines and inflammation of the surrounding organs. Hayes v. City of St. Clair, 631. 6. A liberal construction of statutes requiring such notice is favored so as to permit a recovery if a substantial statement of the injury is made. Id. 7. Plaintiff was not improperly permitted to amend her declaration after the trial had proceeded about eight days, the court granting to defendant an adjournment for two weeks, where the amendment changed the averment of the declaration that plaintiff had previously enjoyed good health and substituted for it allegations showing the operation, its effect on her health and described exactly and correctly the injuries sustained. Id. 8. And after admitting testimony that adhesions formed after plaintiff's fall and that it might have torn them loose, the court's charge that the evidence so admitted was incompetent, but submitting to the jury special questions based on the excluded testimony was misleading and prejudicial. Id. 632. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—Continued. 9. It was also improper to admit testimony as to an operation performed on plaintiff which had nothing to do with the fall or injuries caused thereby. Id. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (9); STREET RAILWAYS (4, 5). MUTUAL ASSURANCE COMPANIES-See INSURANCE (2). 1. Except in case of a view of the premises by the jury, testi- 2. It was not sufficient or competent evidence of notice to defendant that plaintiff's apparatus was liable to be caught and stop on the crossing so as to require the reduction of speed in running defendant's street cars, because on previous occasions the steam roller and other equipment had stopped on the tracks at the crossing and prevented the car from passing. Good Roads Construction Co. v. Port Huron, etc., R. Co., 1. 3. The court correctly charged the jury that if they found defendant guilty of ordinary negligence only, not wilful cr wanton and reckless conduct, their verdict must be for defendant, but that plaintiff might recover if defendant's motorman was guilty of gross negligence; that they might consider the testimony as to the distance at which the road roller could be seen by the motorman, the degree of curve in the track, the blowing of the whistle, the distance in which a car running 50 miles an hour could be stopped; that gross negligence meant intentional failure to perform a manifest duty in reckless disregard of the consequences as affecting the life or property of another, and implied, also, thoughtless disregard of consequences, without the exercise of any effort to avoid them. Id. 2. 4. Evidence that defendant's linemen, in placing wires, laid certain wires across the driveway and yard of plaintiff, that plaintiff supposed the men had ceased working and, though he had been informed that they might recommence work at any time, left his team, on a subsequent day, standing for a short time directly over the wires, that he looked to see if the men were working before he left the horses standing, but could see no one, and that defendant's servants began tightening the wires and raising them while the animals remained above the wires. frightening them and causing serious injuries to plaintiff, presented a question for the jury as to plaintiff's contributory negligence, and the court should not have directed a verdict for defendant. Balderson v. Portland Telephone Co., 412. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (7, 8); CORPORATIONS (1); EVIDENCE (1); HIGHWAYS AND STREETS; INSURANCE (3, 4); MASTER NEGLIGENCE-Continued. AND SERVANT; NEW TRIAL (1); PLEADING (1): RAILROADS (1, 2); STREET RAILWAYS (1-3, 8). NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS-See BILLS AND NOTES; PRINCI- NEWLY DISCOVERED EVIDENCE-See NEW TRIAL (2-4). NEW TRIAL. 1. Under conflicting testimony of interested and disinterested witnesses on both sides, claiming on one side that the hall or exit from a theatre in which plaintiff fell was not lighted and that railings had not been constructed at the place where plaintiff claimed to have fallen, but disputed on the other side, the court was justified in refusing a new trial. Branch v. Klatt, 32. 2. Certain testimony taken before a circuit court commissioner after judgment, and used as a basis for a motion for a new trial, considered by the trial judge to be merely cumulative and not liable to cause a different result on a new trial, addressed itself to the discretion of the court, and unless such discretion was manifestly abused, it could not be reversed. Id. 3. Held, also, that the newly discovered evidence related only to an issue that might not have been decisive of the case, i. e., the presence of handrails, and the jury may have determined that the hall and stairway was properly lighted and handrails unnecessary. Id. 4. A new trial is only authorized on the ground of newly discovered evidence if the moving party exercised due diligence in attempting to secure it. Houser v. Carmody, 123. 5. On motion for a new trial, the circuit court should have set aside a verdict and judgment for defendant, when it was shown that defendant and his counsel hired and paid one of the panel, who was not serving on the jury, to watch plaintiff and his counsel and the jury, and gave him money to spend with the jurors; since the tendency of such misconduct was to bring the court and its proceedings into disrepute, whether or not it affected the final result. Solomon v. Loud, 233. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (2). NONSUPPORT-See DIVORCE (8). NOTICE-See BANKS AND BANKING (2); DEEDS (3); EVIDENCE (1); LIENS (1,2); MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5, 6); NEGLIGENCE (2); TAXATION (7, 8); VENDOR AND PURCHASER '1 2). NOVATION. The necessary elements to establish a novation are (1) parties capable of contracting; (2) a valid prior obligation to be dis NOVATION-Continued. placed; (3) the consent of all the parties to the substitution; See BANKS ANd Banking (1-3); BILLS AND NOTES (6); Vari- OBJECTIONS-See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (1). OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS-See CORPORATIONS (1). OIL WELLS-See CUSTOMS AND USAGES (1, 3, 4). ORDER PRO CONFESSO-See DIVORCE (6). ORDINANCES-See MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (1, 3, 4). 1. On the trial of an action brought by the father for earnings of 2. The employer should have been permitted to show what relations existed between the minor and his father, whether he was denied a place at home, so as to be compelled to seek outside shelter, whether existing relations were such as to indicate that the father did not expect to be paid for the labor, and knew the surrounding circumstances; it was competent to cross-examine the parent to show that he was needy, and to inquire his reasons for not having demanded the infant's wages. Id. 8. Admissions made by the father to others, tending to show what the arrangement with defendants had been, were admissible. Id. 263. 4. Where defendants made gifts, at various times, of clothing and small sums of money to the minor, whose parents had removed to another locality and made no provision for the boy, nor took any interest in discovering what he needed, credit should have been allowed therefor, though one defendant testified that he gave them to deceased. Id. See ESTATES Of Decedents (3, 4); INTOXICATING LIQUORS (1). PAROL AGREEMENT TO VARY WRITTEN CONTRACT · BILLS AND NOTES (7). PAROL CONTRACTS-See CONTRACTS (2). See PAROL EVIDENCE See BILLS AND NOTES (8); CUSTOMS AND USAGES (2); PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (4). PAROLE, VIOLATION OF TERMS OF-See CRIMINAL Law (15, 16). PARTIES-See CORPORATIONS (2); DIVORCE (4); MORTGAGES (2). PARTNERSHIP-See PUBLIC OFFICERS (1). PAVING TAX-See TAXATION (3). PAYMENT See ESTATES OF DECEDENTS (12); PARENT AND CHILD (4). PERFORMANCE-See MECHANICS' LIENS. PERJURY. Evidence tending to show that respondent in a civil suit denied receiving or depositing certain money in the bank, that he in fact made such deposit and that a deposit slip produced by him was falsified, held, to sustain a conviction of perjury. People v. Dahrooge, 375. PERSONAL INJURIES-See EVIDENCE (3,.6); MASTER AND SERVANT; MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS (5-9); NEGLIGENCE (4); PLEADING (1); RAILROADS (1); STREET RAILWAYS (1, 2, 8). PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE-See ARREST. PHOTOGRAPHS-See EVIDENCE (7). PHYSICIANS AND SURGEONS-See EVIDENCE (9). 1. No reversible error was committed on the trial of an action for 2. Circuit Court Rule 27, permitting plaintiff to go to trial as to joint defendants without discontinuing and requiring the jury to return a verdict against the defendants that are liable, applies to actions of tort as well as to actions ex contractu. Id. 3. One filing a bill to have an assignment of an interest in a land See DAMAGES; DIVORCE (1–3); ESTOPPEL POLICY-See INSURANCE (1). POSSESSION-See VENDOR AND PURCHASER (3). (1); MUNICIPAL |