convictions and sentences of respondent upon which to predicate the sentence of the court as for a third conviction, and that such sentence in that respect is regular and valid.

We find no error in this case. circuit court is affirmed.

The judgment of the

MOORE, C. J., and STEERE, BROOKE, STONE, OSTRANDER, and BIRD, JJ., concurred. KUHN, J., did not sit.

PEOPLE v. DUDLEY.

1. CRIMINAL LAW-PROBATION-SENTENCE.

After respondent had pleaded guilty to a criminal charge and had been placed on probation by the court, under Act No. 124, Pub. Acts 1909, he was taken into custody and put in jail by the probation officer, for a violation of the conditions of his parole. The court deferred sentence, on the advice of the officer, who was of the opinion that if respondent was permitted to remain in jail a few days, he would keep the conditions of the probation thereafter. Having been released, he again broke the conditions and was rearrested and sentenced to imprisonment. Held, that the sentence was valid, and that the court had not exhausted its authority by reason of the action of the officer, taking the respondent into custody and releasing him on the former occasion. Act No. 91, Pub. Acts 1903.

2. SAME.

The officer had no power to revoke the probation.

3. SAME CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-BENEFIT OF COUNSEL.

No constitutional right to the aid or advice of counsel is infringed by the statute which contains no provision granting respondent such right.

4. SAME JURY TRIAL-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

On being taken into custody for violation of his parole respond

ent was not entitled to a jury trial to establish the question whether he had violated its conditions, or to be confronted with witnesses as in criminal trials, and the acts are valid although they make no provision for hearing and trial.

5. SAME.

The violation of the terms of probation is not necessarily a crime and is not treated by the law as a crime, but rather as a breach of contract; when the person convicted is granted rights thereunder he agrees to the terms and understands that for certain misconduct his probation will be terminated, nor is the proceeding for carrying out this feature of the law in any sense a criminal prosecution.

6. SAME-DUE PROCESS OF LAW.

Respondent was not deprived of liberty without due process of law by being summarily rearrested and sentenced.

Case-made from the superior court of Grand Rapids; Stuart, J. Submitted November 14, 1912. (Docket No. 134.) Decided December 17, 1912.

George Dudley was convicted of obtaining money under false pretenses. Affirmed.

Roger I. Wykes, Attorney General (Samuel D. Pepper, Assistant Attorney General, Earl F. Phelps, Prosecuting Attorney, and Louis T. Herman, Assistant Prosecuting Attorney, of counsel), for the people.

Lombard, Hext & Washburn, for respondent.

STONE, J. The respondent having been duly arrested upon a warrant charging him with having fraudulently obtained $50 by false pretenses in the city of Grand Rapids, and having waived an examination upon said charge, and having been duly bound over to the superior court of Grand Rapids, and having on March 8, 1910, been duly arraigned in the superior court upon an information charging him with said offense, and having pleaded guilty thereto on March 19, 1910, he was brought before the court, when an order was duly entered by the court in said cause that "sentence be deferred from day

to day, and from term to term, as the court may see fit," and the respondent was permitted to enter into his personal recognizance conditioned to appear before the court at the then next term thereof, and from day to day, and term to term, and to do and receive what should by the court and by the probation officer be then and there enjoined upon him. He was placed in the custody of the probation officer, which officer was then and there instructed by the court to take said respondent into custody at any time thereafter that the said respondent violated the conditions of his probation, and the said officer was instructed to report to the court the fact of the respondent's commitment, and the said officer then and there informed the respondent of the conditions accompanying, and incident to; his freedom, among which he was instructed to report every Monday evening to said probation officer at his office in the courthouse, and was given a card containing certain written and printed instructions as to the conditions of his parole, among which conditions was one requiring him to refrain from the use of intoxicating liquors, or from entering any place where intoxicating liquors were sold.

Respondent secured employment, and for a time reported satisfactorily to said probation officer, but after a while that officer learned that respondent had been visiting saloons, and drinking intoxicating liquors, and was guilty of other improper and unlawful conduct; and thereupon said officer, feeling that respondent had violated his parole, took him into custody, and placed him in jail on or about the 13th day of April, 1911, without any further order or direction whatever from the court. The probation officer reported the matter to the court very soon thereafter, and also reported that respondent and his family felt very sorry for what he had done, and said officer also reported that in his opinion, if respondent was kept in jail a few days, and then given another chance, he would perhaps be able to keep the conditions of his parole in the future, and the officer was informed by the court

that he might take such course, and it was taken. The probation officer a few months later found that the respondent was again drinking heavily, that he was visiting saloons, and was guilty of other improper and unlawful conduct; whereupon on or about August 12, 1911, the officer again took respondent into custody for the reason that the latter had violated the conditions of his parole, and imprisoned him in the Kent county jail, where he remained until September 2, 1911, when he was brought into said superior court, and by the judge thereof was sentenced to the Michigan reformatory at Ionia, where he is now confined. Before sentence, the respondent demanded an examination in open court of the charge of having violated his probation. This demand was refused, and respondent's counsel excepted.

The respondent has brought the case here for review, and the following are the assignments of error:

(1) That the court erred in directing and causing the rearrest of the said respondent on the 12th day of August, 1911, for the reason that upon the release of said respondent from custody on the 26th day of April, 1911, said court lost all further jurisdiction over him in the cause.

(2) That the court erred in passing sentence upon the said respondent on the 2d day of September, 1911, for the reason that the release of said respondent on the said 26th day of April, 1911, was in law and in effect a full and complete discharge of said respondent, and said court had no further jurisdiction over him, to either order his arrest, or to sentence him.

(3) That the court erred in passing sentence upon the respondent on the 2d day of September, 1911, for the reason that the statute (Act No. 91, Public Acts of 1903, as amended by Act No. 124, Public Acts of 1909) is unconstitutional and void, as it denies the respondent the benefit of counsel as a matter of right, as there is no provision in said acts for his defense on the violation of his probation, as provided for in section 19, art. 2, of the Constitution of this State.

(4) That said act and its amendments are unconstitutional, as they deny to the respondent the right to be confronted with witnesses who allege the violation of the

terms of his probation, and are therefore in conflict with said section and article.

(5) That said act as amended is unconstitutional for the further reason that it deprives the respondent of the right to a trial by jury, as to those facts relating to the violation of the terms of his probation.

(6) That said act as amended is unconstitutional for the further reason that it deprives the respondent of his liberty without due process of law, as provided in section 16 of article 2 of said State Constitution.

(7) That said act as amended is unconstitutional for the further reason that by its terms said respondent is more than once placed in jeopardy for the same offense.

Act No. 124, Public Acts of 1909, amends section 1 of the original act to read as follows:

"SECTION 1. Provided the defendant has never before been convicted in this State or elsewhere of a felony other than simple larceny, after a plea or verdict of guilty in any case where the commission of a crime or misdemeanor is charged and where discretion is conferred on the court as to the extent of the punishment, the several circuit courts of this State and all other courts having like jurisdiction in criminal cases, where it may appear to the satisfaction of the court that the circumstances are such that the defendant is not likely to again engage in a criminal course of conduct, and that the public good will be as well subserved as to pass and enforce sentence, shall have power to place the defendant on probation under the charge and supervision of a probation officer in the following manner: First, before passing sentence, the court before whom he stands convicted may place the defendant in the custody and under the supervision of the probation officer, or some other suitable person, and under such terms and conditions as it may require, and may require a recognizance with one or more sufficient sureties and in such penalty as the court may deem reasonable, conditioned for the appearance of the respondent at such times as the court may order; second, at any time during the probationary term of a person convicted and released on probation as aforesaid, the court before which the person was so convicted, when presided over by its judge at the time of the conviction, or his successor in office, may in its discretion revoke and terminate such probation. Upon such revocation and termination the court may immediately