insure that the applied research to be supported seeks generic solutions to broad problems rather than specific solutions to specific and unique problems.

Accordingly, and in this light, we welcome the limitations inherent in the phrases, “*** at academic and other nonprofit institutions, and, when directed by the President, at other appropriate organizations, relevant to national problems involving the public interest." The Board, the Director, and the staff will have relatively little difficulty in applying the guidelines stated above to applications and proposals from academic and nonprofit institutions. Hence, to clarify this entire paragraph and give force to the statement concerning Presidential directives, it is strongly suggested that this subsection be altered to read as follows:

"(b) In addition to the authority contained in subsection (a), the Foundation is authorized to initiate and support scientific research, including applied research, at academic and other nonprofit institutions. When so directed by the President, the Foundation is further authorized to support, at other appropriate organizations, applied research relevant to national problems involving the public interest."

Section 3(c) (p. 4, lines 13 to 15)

The Board is mindful of the intent of the subcommittee that the Board participate in the development of national science policies in a more significant and meaningful manner than has been the case heretofore. We are also mindful of the rationale which led to the enactment of Reorganization Plan No. 2 of 1962, and the resultant limitations placed upon this role of the Board.

Accordingly, we welcome the explicit charge to the Board stated in this paragraph. It is our belief that the Board function described therein is the logical extension of the "balance wheel" concept of the role of the Foundation, an agency which is expected to assure the vitality and strength of the national scientific enterprise. Since this function can be effectively discharged only if those responsible for giving direction to the affairs of the Foundation are adequately informed with respect to the nature and magnitude of all aspects of that national enterprise, the Board considers it logical and proper that the body, within the Federal Government, which, perforce, must be thus knowledgeable, also make general recommendations with respect to perceived national weaknesses and deficits and the requirements for their strengthening.

In addition, we believe this section should make it clear, as does section 3(a) (1) of the original act, that all elements of the Foundation should partake of this function. In fact, it is a necessity for the Director to "recommend and encourage the pursuit of national policies for the promotion of basic research and education in the sciences" in the councils of Government.

ON THE NATIONAL SCIENCE BOARD

Section 4(a) (p. 5, lines 11-13)

The proposed version of this paragraph would alter the status of the Board by deleting from the original act the phrase "* * * and shall, except as otherwise provided in this Act, exercise the authority granted to the Foundation by this Act." While stating instead that "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the function of the Board shall be to establish the policies of the Foundation."

In order to assure the efficacy of the National Science Board as a policymaking body, it is recommended that the statutory responsibility of the National Science Board for the programs as well as the policies of the Foundation be continued and be made explicit in the act.

To be sure, relatively little of the Board's effort is currently directed to the review and approval of grants or contracts. Were it to undertake the yet more extensive policymaking role provided by section 3(c), undoubtedly the Board would employ its present legal prerogative and delegate yet more, it not all, of its grantmaking authority to the Director.

Accordingly, the Board concurs with the decision (sec. 5(b), p. 9) to give de jure recognition to the fact that it is the Director who does, in fact, exercise the grant and contractmaking authority of the Foundation. In so doing, the Director and the staff normally obtain advice from appropriately constituted technical panels and committees rather than from the Board.

But legal retention by the Board of ultimate responsibility for the affairs of the Foundation offers a series of important virtues. For example, it affords a mechanism whereby the Board could offer protection to the Director, should external circumstances so warrant. Moreoever, while the Board wishes to

emphasize its complete confidence in the present Director to exercise the full authority described in new section 5(b), it is not unthinkable that initial confidence in the wisdom and judgment of some future Director of the Foundation will have been misplaced and, under such circumstances, the Board could serve the Nation best if it had statutory responsibility for the manner in which the Foundation's authority is exercised. Further, a Board charged with the responsibility for programs of grants and contracts, whether or not it has statutory authority to make such awards, must continue to review the monthly lists of grants awarded and proposals declined so that, in fulfilling its obligation as the policymaking body of the Foundation, it is also sufficiently knowledgeable with respect to implementation of its policies. Finally, external policy recommendations from a de jure even if not operationally de facto-powerful National Science Board would carry greater weight than recommendations from a body which had lost responsibility for the implementation of those recommendations within the very agency with which it is most concerned.

It is suggested also that the meaning of the sentence on page 5, line 11, "Except as otherwise specifically provided in this Act, the function of the Board shall be to establish the policies of the Foundation.' is somewhat confusing and unclear as well as in some conflict with section 5(b).

The report of the subcommittee strongly suggests that the general position presented above is shared by the subcommittee. Accordingly, to make these relationships entirely explicit, it is most earnestly urged that the sentence on lines 11, 12, and 13 of page 5 be deleted and, in its place, there be substituted: "The Board shall establish and be responsible for the policies and programs of the Foundation."

This sentence is intended to convey the following:

1. The Board is to establish the purpose and general nature of the various individual programs of awards conducted by the Foundation.

2. The Board is to exercise a continuing general surveillance of the awards made under such programs.

3. The Board can modify or terminate such programs when, in its judgment, they no longer appear to serve the national interest adequately.

4. The Director will bring to the Board those applications for grant or contract funds which raise matters of policy or their interpretation. Under these circumstances, whereas it will be apparent that the Director will exercise the authority of the Foundation and with his staff will render the multitudinous judgments required in the award of research grants, construction grants, training grants, and fellowships, and in the management of the national centers and programs, ultimate responsibility for the nature and national purpose of these programs and the manner in which their operation reflects their goals continues to reside in the Board. Thereby can we retain the remarkable, unique character of the National Science Foundation, the character which has won for it the respect and confidence of the scientific and academic communities as well as of the Congress, the administration, and Federal agencies generally. Section 4(b) (p. 5, lines 14-17)

The Board believes that the authority contained in this subsection authorizing the Board to delegate to its executive committee or the Director or both such of its powers and functions as it deems appropriate will add desirable flexibility to the operation of the Foundation.

Section 4(g) (p. 7, lines 9–18)

The Board, having agreed that the Board and the Director should engage more extensively in activities which lead to the formulation of national policies for science, believes that the proposal that the Board should submit an annual report to the President, for submission to the Congress, on the status and health of science would provide a platform for the policy recommendations of the Board and assure adequate "visibility" to the recommendations. We are concerned, however, that the proposed language is, at once, perhaps both too broad and too explicit. It seems neither necessary nor feasible to attempt an annual assessment of the whole of science and its various disciplines and it would certainly be unwise to restrict such evaluations to the accomplishments of the immediately preceding year. Accordingly, the following modification is suggested:

"The Board shall render an annual report to the President, for submission on or before the 31st day of January of each year to the Congress, on the status and health of science and its various disciplines. Such report shall include an assessment of such matters as national scientific resources and trained manpower, progress in selected areas of basic scientific research and an indication of those

aspects of such progress which might be applied to the needs of American society. The report shall include such recommendations as the Board may deem timely and appropriate, together with minority views and recommendations, if any, of members of the Board."

Section 4(h) (p. 7, lines 19-24; p. 8, lines 1–11)

The Board recognizes the sympathetic, good wishes of the subcommittee in offering to the Board a professional staff and establishing for the latter pay ceilings which should be attractive. Presumably, authority to secure such a staff for its own purposes has already been available to the Board under the terms of the act. Until now, no need for such a continuing staff, specifically assigned to the Board, has been apparent, while in those instances in which it required special assistance, the Board has considered that the entire staff of the Foundation is the staff of the Board. Incidentally, the Board has had a superb secretariat which has ably met its past needs.

The prospect of undertaking an annual report of the Board, however, warrants consideration of the manner whereby a staff can serve the Board in this regard. This annual activity will require the services of statisticians, scientific professionals, writers and artists, as well as secretaries and clerks. If the earlier sug

gestion that the annual report focus sharply on selected areas of science or science education be adopted, then the necessary qualifications of the staff will also change annually, while the number of the staff, in any one year, may considerably exceed the five specified in the proposed amendment.

For these reasons it is suggested that the committee consider whether the amended act should recognize the increased total workload engendered by the amplified policy-related activities of the Board and the annual Board report, thereby necessitating a significant increase in especially well qualified staff, without specifying either the number thereof or the specific organizational arrangements so that these may evolve as the Board and the Director learn to function in their new and altered capacities.

ON THE DIRECTOR OF THE FOUNDATION

Section 5(a) (p. 9, lines 3 to 5)

The Board enthusiastically endoreses the proposal that the Director of the Foundation be raised to level II of the Federal executive salary schedule, the top level for the chief official of an independent office. The Director bears a huge responsibility and, hence, warrants such status while, concomitantly, such action gives recognition to the significance of the Foundation in our national life. Section 5(b) (p. 9, lines 8 to 15)

The Board concurs with the provisions of this subsection. Although it is a clear transfer to the Director of authority previously held by the Board, this transfer recognizes the de facto situation. Were the language proposed above for section 4(a) accepted by the committee, and section 5(d) deleted as suggested below, then an appropriate and acceptable balance of authority and responsibility would be established thereby. The full-time Director would exercise full authority for the award of grants and contracts while the part-time Board (of which the Director is a member) which is in constant communication with the scientific, academic, and industrial communities, would determine the purpose and nature of the programs which are implemented by the award of grants and contracts by the Director and the success and efficacy of these programs would remain under continuing review by the Board.

Section 5(d) (p. 9, lines 23 and 24; p. 10, lines 1 to 7)

This subsection, in effect, offers to preserve some measure of the authority of the Board as originally described in section 5(b) of the present act. In our view, were the language proposed above for the new section 4(a) adopted, the provisions proposed for the new section 5(d) become unnecessary. Indeed, there are serious objections to these provisions which are considered, seriatim, below:

1. An awkward problem is posed by the phrase, ***if such contract, grant, or other arrangement involves a new program ***" One can foresee needlessly difficult episodes if the act were to encourage the Director to plan, announce and commence to implement new programs on his own initiative, without prior Board consultation, and then "test" them by offering the Board power to disapprove of the initial awards under such programs. This problem would be obviated if, instead, it is clear that the Board, as the policymaking body of the Foundation, is specifically authorized to establish all new programs, prescribe their guidelines

and frames of reference, terminate unsatisfactory, inadequate, or unnecessary old programs and adjudicate any instance in which it is unclear whether a given action is in accord with the Board's intent in establishing the relevant program. 2. The proposed requirement for Board approval of all commitments in excess of a specified amount is, indeed, a description of current practice. This practice evolved over the history of the Foundation as, with an expanding number of transactions, the part-time Board could address itself to an ever-diminishing fraction of the total. But the practice lacks a compelling logic. Awards involving large sums are studied closely, not only by the Director and his staff but by panels of well-qualified experts. In a general way, the larger the sum, the closer and more intense the scrutiny, and the more cautious the approach. The technical judgment, however, is rendered by the panel of experts, in any case. If the terms and conditions of the program from which such an award is to be made have been clearly set forth by the Board, then problems of policy are no more likely to arise in the award of large sums than in the award of lesser sums. And it is to such problems that the Board should address itself with respect to the on-going operations of the Foundation. Large, ad hoc single commitments to a new enterprise (e.g., Mohole) may themselves be considered to be "new programs" and, hence, require Board approval. The committee may wish to give explicit consideration to this specific type of award.

3. Essentially similar considerations apply to the proposal that prior Board approval may be required "* * * subject to such other conditions as the Board in its discretion may determine and publish in the Federal Register."

If the Board remains authorized to give definition to the terms and conditions of awards under all of the programs of the Foundation, this provision seems quite unnecessary and accordingly the Board recommends that section 5(d) ̊ be eliminated.

ON THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR AND ASSISTANT DIRECTORS

Section 6(a) (p. 10, lines 19 to 25; p. 11, lines 1 to 7)

The Board welcomes this subsection in all respects. The role of the Deputy Director in the life and operations of the Foundation is such that he well merits the status which is engendered by Presidential appointment and Senate confirmation.

Section 6(b) (p. 11, lines 8 to 18)

The Board respectfully requests that this subsection be deleted.

We recognize that, by this proposal, the subcommittee offers increased prestige and visibility to the Foundation. But it is hoped that the committee will remove this provision on the following grounds:

1. The positions here designated as "Assistant Directors" appear to be viewed as analogous to the Assistant Secretaries of the large Federal departments. But this analogy is not apt. Whereas Assistant Secretaries are arms of the Secretary and function in a staff capacity, those who presently hold the title of "Associate Director" of the Foundation have line-operating responsibility and authority. 2. The Board hopes that it can remain apparent that positions at this level are a reasonable and legitimate aspiration for the career professional staff. The present system of career appointments encourages cohesiveness and rapport among the top management of the Foundation and supports the morale of the entire professional staff. It would not serve the interests of the Foundation and its mission to convert this level of position into relatively temporary and possibly politically oriented appointments.

3. Were those at this level of the Foundation staff to be so appointed, the requisite number would certainly exceed four and may be expected to change with time as circumstances dictate changes in the organizational structure of the Foundation. Since it would not do to have first- and second-class Assistant Directors, the inevitable consequence of this situation, it seems logical to avoid the problem in its entirety.

ON THE DIVISIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE FOUNDATION

Section 8 (p. 13, lines 7 to 9)

The Board believes that the Director, as the chief executive officer of the Foundation, should exercise the initiative for ordering the administrative structure of the Foundation. As the divisions are integral parts of such administrative arrangements, we feel that primary responsibility for this matter should be

lodged in the Director. We, therefore, recommend that the proposed new section 8 of the National Science Foundation Act of 1950 be changed to read: "There shall be within the Foundation such divisions as the Director may, in consultation with the Board, from time to time, determine."

ON WEATHER MODIFICATION

Section 14 of the present act (p. 14, lines 7 and 8)

The Board notes that the operational responsibility of the Foundation for weather modification is to be repealed. If the proposed new section 3(b) is enacted, this appears to be a wise and sound course. Indeed, it may, to some degree, serve as a model for the role of the National Science Foundation in applied research as proposed in the new section 3(b). Whenever applied research supported by the Foundation has been sufficiently successful as to permit undertaking a substantial development or operations program, the latter should become the responsibility of some Federal agency with an appropriate mission. The Board notes also, however, that the Foundation may and should continue to support research in atmospheric science and in weather modification.

Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Seitz. Our next witness is Dr. Frederick Seitz, who is the President of the National Academy. You will be our closing witness. We are pleased to have you here before us again, Dr. Seitz.

Dr. SEITZ. Thank you very much, Mr. Daddario. It is a pleasure to be with this committee again.

STATEMENT OF DR. FREDERICK SEITZ, PRESIDENT, NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES

Dr. SEITZ. Since I am sixth in the sequence of those testifying on the proposed revision of the Science Foundation bill, many of the matters which I can emphasize have already been stated quite eloquently by others. I would, however, like to underscore some points which have been made, and would also like to emphasize that the scientific community has a very special attitude toward the National Science Foundation as a Federal agency supporting scientific research. I would like to begin with the second point first, since it will provide the setting for more detailed comments concerning the bill.

It has been said so often that we live at present in a society that is vitally dependent on science-based technology, that there is serious danger that we will, through boredom, accept the statement without appreciating its full implications. There is also the danger that we will confuse the needs of science with the requirements of what I might call classical technology; that is, the form of technology which was predominant before the age of modern science, and which served human society enormously well for most of its history. In actual fact, our Nation had little science-based technology of its own origin until this century. Prior to that our country was quite successful in developing its natural resources and raising our standard of living, without much direct recourse to science.

Man is a toolmaker. We can find the tools he has made over the last several hundred thousand years in countless places where he lived. These tools become more and more sophisticated as we go from the past toward the present and as the intelligence and skill of our antecedents grew through the process of natural evolution. Starting about 50,000 years ago, the types of tools he made began to show vast diversity and ingenuity, leading us to suppose that Homo sapiens finally reached something in the nature of an intelligence plateau,

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