standpoint of the U.S. national interest, broadly conceived, i.e., the activities further U.S. foreign policy objectives.

"The Department of State considers that the National Science Foundation Act, as so revised, will make it possible to deal more affirmatively than heretofore with opportunities afforded by science and technological developments when affirmative action is desirable from the standpoint of U.S. foreign policy. It will enable us, provided funds are available for the purpose, to seize opportunities in the so-called gray areas which thus far have proven difficult to act upon. Thus it should make possible the inauguration of new bilateral and multilateral scientific relationships which could prove to be of overriding advantage to the United States."

We believe that the language of the revised section 3(a) (2) will permit the Foundation and the Department of State, among other things, to explore the feasibility and perhaps to demonstrate the practicability of internationally financed and operated laboratories for basic research as suggested by the committee.

A BILL TO AMEND THE NATIONAL SCIENCE

FOUNDATION ACT OF 1950

WEDNESDAY, APRIL 20, 1966

HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

COMMITTEE ON SCIENCE AND ASTRONAUTICS, SUBCOMMITTEE ON SCIENCE, RESEARCH, AND DEVELOPMENT,

Washington D.C.

The subcommittee met, pursuant to adjournment, in room 2325, Rayburn House Office Building, at 10:05 a.m., Hon. Emilio Q. Daddario presiding.

Mr. DADDARIO. The meeting will come to order.

Dr. Hornig, will you please come forward with your staff if you would like to have them sit with you.

Our hearings this morning begin with a statement from Dr. Donald F. Hornig, Director, Office of Science and Technology. We are happy to have you here, Dr. Hornig.

Dr. HORNIG. I am glad to be here.

STATEMENT OF DR. DONALD F. HORNIG, DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

Dr. HORNIG. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, it is a privilege and a pleasure to testify on this bill. The hearings, studies, and reports of this subcommittee have been thorough and in the best tradition of congressional inquiry into important issues of public policy. The questions raised by the subcommittee have prompted extensive thought and discussion in the executive branch and in the scientific community. I shall discuss what seem to me some of the most significant aspects of the bill, particularly the relationships between the Director and the Board and the extension of the authority of the Foundation to support applied research.

The general policies of the Foundation have important effects upon such matters as the paths of development of fields of science, the relative emphasis among fields, the numbers and quality of the Nation's corps of scientists for decades ahead, the effects of science on the cultural and economic development of the country, the independence of universities and their capacity to teach, and the quality of science education at all levels. These are matters of concern to the Nation as a whole, and they are matters to which many highly qualified people have given serious thought. Therefore, the general directions and philosophy of the National Science Foundation are properly framed with the participation of a broadly representative, experienced group of informed citizens who are not full-time officials. At the same time, the Foundation must be responsive to the policies of the President. The President is responsible for setting

the general goals of his administration, and for insuring that the basic goals and the programs of the major executive agencies-of which the National Science Foundation is one-form a consistent whole. Because the policy functions of the Board must be carried out within the overall policies of the administration I would suggest that the Chairman and the Vice Chairman of the National Science Board should be designated by the President from among the members of the Board.

The policies and operations of the Foundation must also be responsive to the will of Congress as expressed in legislation congressional intent and appropriations.

Mr. DADDARIO. Dr. Hornig, will you go, more completely into the reasons, for your suggestion that the Chairman of the National Science board be designated by the President from among the members. The President does appoint all the members. I would presume that with the authority he has, he could assure that a Chairman and a Vice Chairman, if you were to carry it that far, would be men of his choice. Why do you specifically make this suggestion?

Dr. HORNIG. This is not a strong point, but I do feel that it would improve the linkage of the Board to the President. Among the members of the Board all of whom have been selected by the President, the Chairman and Vice Chairman of the Board have special responsibilities in forwarding the views of the Board and making recommendations. It seems to me there are some virtues, therefore, in having them designated by the President. Chiefly, it would improve communication channels, and perhaps elevate slightly the status of the Chairman of the Board.

Mr. MOSHER. Mr. Chairman.

Dr. HORNIG. I don't think there is any question of principle here. Mr. MOSHER. When you suggest that the President because he chooses all members of the Board could probably influence the selection, what do you mean? Do you mean using his influence in informal discussions with the members? You certainly don't mean that he would appoint some of these people on the precondition

Mr. DADDARIO. Not at all, but there are many boards in all elements of government where the board chooses its chairman and executive officer. It is usually understood by all of the members that the Chairman should have direct responsibility to the President who has great authority. It is not a matter of preconditioning, but it does involve the way in which policy can be developed through the use of any board where there would be a harmonious rather than a conflicting relationship. It usually works out this way.

Mr. MOSHER. I thought you meant, Mr. Chairman, that the President could somehow suggest or tell the Board who should be Chairman. You weren't suggesting that.

Mr. DADDARIO. I hope I just made it clear that I have not. It seems to me as the situation now stands. We have had 15 years of experience where the Chairman has been appointed from within the membership of the Board, where there has been no such conflict in respect to the chairman's position with the President.

Mr. MOSHER. I think you are right, that there would be a general understanding on the Board that they select someone acceptable to the President.

Mr. DADDARIO. The purpose of my question to Dr. Hornig was to get a more complete analysis of the reasoning behind his suggestion.

He has just given, I think, an excellent reason which involves the prestige that would be attached to the appointment of the Chairman of this Board. Because he was so designated by the President, this would give him, perhaps, a stronger position both within the Board and within the scientific community.

Mr. Conable?

Mr. CONABLE. Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask Dr. Hornig if he thinks the fact that there has not been sufficiently close linkage between the President and the National Science Foundation may have had something to do with the past loss of the National Science Foundation's coordinating function in science to the Office of Science and Technology? Was it necessary to have a closer relationship in carrying out the President's science policy than it was possible for him to have between the National Science Foundation and his Office? Dr. HORNIG. I wasn't here during the whole of this history but I would like to observe, first, that I think the relationship between the National Science Foundation and the President has been as close and effective as between any of the executive agencies. It has been normal and it has been healthy as far as I can observe.

Now, as to the question of coordinating the activities of all of the agencies of the Government. I think the problem has come up in many places. By and large, it has proved practically impossible, or at least impracticable, for one agency on a parallel level in the Government to effectively dictate the programs and courses of another

agency.

This is a question of practical workability, and it has come up not only in this area but in areas far removed from science within the Government.

Mr. DADDARIO. The National Science Board is a unique board in Government, Dr. Hornig. I wonder what your impression would be of the effect of the appointment of the Chairman by the President on the individuality of the Board. Would it affect it in any way? Might it give the type of emphasis which could change its character? For good or bad?

Dr. HORNIG. Well, I wouldn't have made the suggestion unless I thought that on balance it would help. I don't see off hand any ways in which it might decrease the effectiveness or hurt the functioning of the Board.

I then should add in making this suggestion that I think the Board has functioned in an exemplary way with existing arrangements. This is not a suggestion made to remedy any particular problem that has occurred but it might improve the tie to the President if the Chairman were a chairman of his choosing.

Mr. DADDARIO. Fine, I think we have enough in that regard.

Dr. HORNIG. The wording of the bill, section 4(a), is open to the interpretation that the broad policies of the President and of Congress should not be binding upon the Foundation. This objection would be met if the last sentence of section 4(a) were changed to read: "The Board shall be the policymaking body of the Foundation, and shall review its programs.' Such a change would have other desirable effects which I shall mention later.

It is necessary to examine carefully the policy role assigned to the Board in the bill in relation to the functions of the Director. In considering the relative roles of the Director and the Board, a dis

tinction can be drawn between day-to-day decisions that can be called operations and broader matters that can be called policy.

The role of the Board is in the policy area. Its function should be to set general directions, to assess the implications of the Foundation's major actions, to assess the implications of proposed actions, and in these respects to act much like the trustees of a university or a foundation. In short, the Board should outline, within the broad guidance provided by the President, and the Congress, the policies which set the general goals that the Foundation is to pursue under the executive direction of the Director. The precise scope of the policy role is most difficult to define precisely in legal terms. In fact, it is not possible to be precise on this point because there are no criteria that will define exactly what policy matters are as contrasted with operating matters. The wording for the policy function of the Board proposed above-that is, "The Board shall be the policymaking body of the Foundation, and shall review its programs"provides the necessary flexibility in my view. The wording is intended to give the Director necessary flexibility in taking executive action on matters bordering on policy and to give the Board an explicit role in reviewing the programs of the Foundation.

Day-to-day, detailed decisions can be made effectively only by a full-time executive who has full authority to act. It is important that the basic authority and administrative structure be provided for a coherent, forceful center of administrative responsibility and action. The bill provides for such an administrative center by two related clauses. First, it stipulates, section 4(b), that the Board may delegate to the Director any of its powers and functions. Liberal use of this authority by the Board is essential to the effective operation of the Foundation, and I hope that congressional intent on this point will be made clear. Second, it provides in section 5(d) that except as otherwise specifically provided in the bill, the Director shall exercise all of the authority granted to the Foundation by the act, including that delegated to him by the Board, and that the Director's actions are final and binding. Taken together, these provisions constitute a much improved definition of the role of the Director.

In my view two serious flaws exist in section 5(d) concerning the authority and relationships of the Board and the Director. The first flaw is that authority to review programs is given to the Board only through the awkward device of requiring prior approval of the Board for specific awards involving a new program. The Board should review new programs well before they reach the grant stage in consultation with the Director. The second flaw in section 5(d) is the requirement that the Board approve all awards above a given monetary level. Relatively small grants may raise policy questions and relatively large ones may be clearly within existing policy guides. The authority and responsibility of the Director and the Board, respectively, should not be defined in terms of the size of the awards. The Director should have full operating authority, but with an obligation to follow policy guides and an obligation to consult with the Board. Accordingly, in my view, section 5(d) should be deleted, and wording such as the following substituted: "The formulation of grams by the Director shall be in conformance with the policies of the Foundation and shall be done in consultation with the Board."

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