which they are sworn on admission to obey and for the wilful violation of which disbarment is provided: I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR: I will support the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the State of I will maintain the respect due the Courts of Justice and judicial officers: I will not counsel or maintain any suit or proceeding which shall appear to me to be unjust, nor any defense except such as I believe to be honestly debatable under the law of the land; I will employ for the purpose of maintaining the causes confided to me such means only as are consistent with truth and honor, and will never seek to mislead the Judge or jury by any artifice or false statement of fact or law; I will maintain the confidence and preserve inviolate the secrets of my client, and will accept no compensation in connection with his business except from him or with his knowledge and approval; I will abstain from all offensive personality, and advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which I am charged; I will never reject, from any consideration personal to myself, the cause of the defenseless or oppressed, or delay any man's cause for lucre or malice. SO HELP ME GOD. We commend this form of oath for adoption by the proper authorities in all the states and territories. INDEX AND SYNOPSIS OF CANONS. PREAMBLE, p. 575. THE CANONS OF ETHICS, pp. 575 to 584. 1. THE DUTY OF THE LAWYER TO THE COURTS. (1, 2, 4; iii, iv, vi.)1 2. THE SELECTION OF JUDGES. (69.)1 3. ATTEMPTS TO EXERT PERSONAL INFLUENCE ON THE COURT. (3, 16.)1 4. WHEN COUNSEL FOR AN INDIGENT PRISONER. (64; xviii, xxi, xxiii.)1 5. THE DEFENSE OR PROSECUTION OF THOSE ACCUSED OF CRIME. (14; xv.)1 6. ADVERSE INFLUENCES AND CONFLICTING INTERESTS. (37, 28, 24, 25; viii.)1 7. PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES AND CONFLICTS OF OPINION. (42, 49, 50, 48; vii, xiv, xvii.)1 8. ADVISING UPON THE MERITS OF A CLIENT'S CAUSE. xix, xx, xxxi, xxxii. See also xxx.)1 (38, 35; xi, 9. NEGOTIATIONS WITH OPPOSITE PARTY. (46, 47, 51; xliii, xliv.)1 10. ACQUIRING INTEREST IN LITIGATION. (xxiv.)1 11. DEALING WITH TRUST PROPERTY. (40; xxv, xxvi.)1 12. FIXING THE AMOUNT OF THE FEE. (54, 55, 56, 58; xviii, xxviii, Xxxviii, xlix.)1 13. CONTINGENT FEES. (57; xxiv.)1 14. SUING A CLIENT FOR A FEE. (53; xxvii. See also xxix.)1 15. How FAR A LAWYER MAY GO IN SUPPORTING A CLIENT'S CAUSE. (11; i, x, xi, xii, xiii, xiv, xl.)1 16. RESTRAINING CLIENTS FROM IMPROPRIETIES. (44.)1 V.)1 (31, 32; 18. TREATMENT OF WITNESSES AND LITIGANTS. (59, 30; ii, xiv, xlii.)1 19. APPEARANCE OF LAWYER AS WITNESS FOR HIS CLIENT. (21, 22; XXXV, xvi.)1 20. NEWSPAPER DISCUSSION OF PENDING LITIGATION. (19, 20.)1 21. PUNCTUALITY AND EXPEDITION. (6, 36; See xxxvi.)1 22. CANDOR AND FAIRNESS. (5; xli.)1 23. ATTITUDE TOWARD JURY. (60, 61, 17, 63; xlvii.)1 24. RIGHT OF LAWYER TO CONTROL THE INCIDENTS OF THE TRIAL. (33; x.)1 25. TAKING TECHNICAL ADVANTAGE OF OPPOSITE COUNSEL; AGREEMENTS WITH HIM. (45, 43; v, ix.)1 26. PROFESSIONAL ADVOCACY OTHER THAN BEFORE COURTS. (27.)1 27. ADVERTISING, DIRECT OR INDIRECT. (18.)1 28. STIRRING UP LITIGATION, DIRECTLY OR THROUGH AGENTS. (23.)1 29. UPHOLDING THE HONOR OF THE PROFESSION. (9, 65, 12; xxxiii, XXXIV, Xxxvii, xxxviii.)1 30. JUSTIFIABLE AND UNJUSTIFIABLE LITIGATIONS. (15; x, xi, xiv.)1 31. RESPONSIBILITY FOR LITIGATION. (15; x, xi, xiv.)1 32. THE LAWYER'S DUTY IN ITS LAST ANALYSIS. (66; xxi, etc.)1 OATH OF ADMISSION, pp. 584, 585. The Arabic numerals in the brackets immediately following the synoptic titles of the canons are cross-references to the compilation of canons as set forth in Appendix B of the 1907 report of the Association's Committee on Canons of Ethics (A. B. A. Reports XXXI, 685-713); the Roman numerals are cross-references to Hoffman's Resolutions, reprinted as Appendix H of the committee's 1907 report (id. 717-735). REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON PROPOSED COPYRIGHT BILL. To the American Bar Association: Your committee beg leave to report as follows: At the last session of the Association your committee reported that after much study of the subject the Committees on Patents of the House and Senate had each reported a separate Copyright Bill, which bills differed from each other in some important particulars, and that a minority of the Senate Committee had made a dissenting report, disagreeing with the views of the majority of the committee. In this condition of disagreement it became necessary that the subject should be carefully studied again by these committees and also by those interested in the enactment of some form of copyright legislation. The principal subject of disagreement between the committees of the House and Senate was the propriety of granting to musical copyright such measure of legal protection as would control the use of the copyrighted music upon pianola rolls, phonograph disks and the like. During the spring of this year, and before the committee had taken any action in the matter, the Supreme Court of the United States handed down a decision in the case of White-Smith Music Co. vs. Apollo, in which they held, affirming the court below, that a copyright upon a musical composition under the existing law would not be infringed by the making and selling of a pianola roll for the reproduction of the copyrighted music. Subsequent to this decision, the Committees on Patents of the House and Senate held several joint meetings for the purpose of discussing the question as to what should be done in the premises. After a number of days of very elaborate discussion of the subject and the hearing of many persons who were interested, the committees expressed themselves as disposed to concede to the composers of music an exclusive right to control their compositions for all purposes, including the use of their musical works upon pianola rolls, phonograph disks and the like, subject to the condition that if the owner of the copyright has himself used or permitted the use of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon payment of a royalty to the copyright proprietor. In order to accomplish this result an amendment was drawn to the House Bill, H. R. 243 (section 1, subsection e), which * grants the absolute right to the composer to control his musical work for all purposes, including the right of public performance and for the purpose of publishing, copying and vending the musical work, to make any arrangement or setting of it or of the melody of it in any system of notation or any form of record in which the thought of the author may be recorded and from which it may be read or reproduced. This grant is coupled with the proviso that it shall apply only to compositions published and copyrighted after the passage of the act, and also with the proviso that whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used, or permitted the use, of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, any other person may make similar use of the copyrighted work upon the payment of a royalty to the copyright proprietor. This royalty is to be fixed by the Bill. Section 28 (e) (H. R. 243) is also to be amended to correspond. This section is the civil remedial section of the Bill and it is provided that "in case of infringement of a copyrighted musical work, whenever the owner of a musical copyright has used, or permitted the use, of the copyrighted work upon the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical work, that in case of infringement of such copyright by the unauthorized manufacture, use or sale of interchangeable parts, such as disks, rolls, bands or cylinders, for use in mechanical music-producing machines adapted to reproduce the copyrighted music, no criminal action shall be brought, and in a civil action no injunction shall be granted, but the plaintiff shall be entitled to recover, in lieu of profits and damages, a royalty equal to — per centum of the gross sum which may be received by the infringer for such manufacture, use or sale, and in all cases the highest price in a series of transactions shall be adopted." These two provisos taken together will result in compelling the manufacturers of mechanical music-producing machines to make a contract with the owner of the copyright before they use the copyrighted musical composition for their machines for the payment of the royalty fixed in Section 28 (e), (H. R. 243), with such conditions for guarantee of payment, account and the like, as the owner of the copyright may reasonably impose; or, if this cannot be accomplished, or is neglected, to submit in case of suit for infringement to the payment of the same royalty, plus costs and such counsel fee as the court may see fit to allow to the plaintiff, besides the expense, such as counsel fee, which they themselves may be compelled to pay in the defense of such an action. It is believed that these two sections taken together will do full justice to the composer and at the same time permit any manufacturer of mechanical music-producing machines to employ in the manufacture of his machine, any copyrighted composition, upon payment of a reasonable royalty therefor. Section 4 (H. R. 243) has been amended so as to bring it into closer accord with the language of the Constitution and also to reiterate in this section the language used in Section 1, sub-section (e). The repetition of this language has been thought justified by a desire to make the grant of the Act as broad as the language of the Constitution and also to give to that language a congressional interpretation which will convey to the courts the view. of Congress as to how that language should be construed. It has also been amended by adding another provision, which seems important in view of the history of copyright legislation and litigation in the United States. It has been held, and is now the established law, that after publication all rights in copyright |