jurisdiction came to be based on other grounds. Such attenuated rights as those claimed under the doctrine of the "sphere of influence" or the "sphere of interest" began to be maintained. Other methods of obtaining actual or prospective jurisdiction in smaller or weaker States were devised. The practice of leasing territory became common from the late years of the nineteenth century. Some of these leases involve absolute exclusion of the lessor State from any rights within the leased area. Other leases only confer certain specified rights upon the leaseholder. Some of the leases provide that the jurisdiction over the territory shall pass back to the lessor State in case the lessee for any reason withdraws from the territory.

Degree of protection. The protection given a political unity by a State which owes it protection varies widely. In some instances the protected community almost loses its own identity, while in other cases the protected community is in nearly every respect equal to other States. The protection exercised may be for the good of all States and may make the development of the protected State possible. Many States are bound by treaties which limit their freedom of action in certain respects. This does not destroy their statehood. The action of the State is limited by its own will and only to the extent specified in the treaty.

Congo lease. One of the early leases of territory was on the part of the Congo Free State to Great Britain. By an agreement of 1894 a strip of territory running along the German frontier for a considerable distance was leased to Great Britain and to be subject to British administration for a period corresponding to that during which Belgium should have control over the Congo territory. Germany maintained that an indefinite lease of this character was equivalent to a cession of the territory, and would injure her political position and interrupt her trade. The agreement with the neutralized Congo Free State was terminated by Great Britain, but apparently rather from diplomatic than from legal

reasons.

In a note to Hall's International Law, appearing in the fourth edition, about this time, in 1895, the legal aspects of the Congo lease are considered:

Great Britain could only receive a lease of the territory subject to the provisions of antecedent treaties made between the Congo State and Germany, and notwithstanding a slight ambiguity in the language of the treaty made in 1884 between the two States, there can be no doubt that she would have been precluded from levying duties upon goods imported from German Sources. As regards the general "political position," the Congo State is neutral, and the treaty provides that in the event of cession of any part of its territory "the obligations contracted by the association" (i. e., the Congo State) "toward the German Empire shall be transferred to the occupier." Assuming, then, for a moment that a lease of indefinite duration is equivalent to Ia cession, the territory leased to Great Britain would have remained affected by the duties of neutrality, and could not have been used to prejudice the position of Germany. The treaty, it should be added, contains no stipulation, express or implied, that transfer of territory in any form should be dependent on German consent. It is difficult, therefore, to understand the conventional basis of the objection taken, and of legal basis in a wider sense it is evidently destitute. The Congo State has all rights of a neutral State, of which it has not been deprived by express compact. Those rights beyond question include the right to do all State acts which neither compromise nor tend to compromise neutrality. In the particular case the Congo State was clearly competent to grant a lease, because the lease carried with it, of necessity, the obligations of neutrality. Although a lease for an indefinite time may in certain aspects be the equivalent of a cession, in law it is not so; a State may be able to make a cession of territory freed from its own obligations, but in granting a lease it can not give wider powers than it possesses itself, and consequently, altogether apart from the treaty with Germany, the Congo State could not disengage territory from neutral obligations by letting it out upon a subordinate title.

It may be remarked that the Congo State is equally competent to acquire by way of lease, because the territory so acquired can at least be invested with a neutral character at the will of the Congo State, and probably must of necessity be considered, for such time as the connection lasts, to be a temporary extension of the neutral territory (p. 96, n.)

From this discussion of the Congo lease, it is evidently the opinion that the lease can not be held to create rights which did not appertain to the territory before it was

leased, nor confer rights beyond those specified in the agreement and within the competence of the lessor State. The idea that the lease was in fact an actual alienation of the territory seems to be contrary to law and contrary to fact, though it may be that such leased territory may, at some future time, more easily pass under the actual ownership and sovereignty of the lessee. Undoubtedly it was the intention of some lessees to follow the lease by actual acquisition of sovereignty over the leased territory, but on the other hand many leases specifically state that sovereignty is not transferred, and within the last few years there has been a growing tendency, in part, perhaps, due to international jealousy, to insist that the terms of such agreements be observed strictly. While Port Arthur had been leased by China to Russia, yet after the area came within the military occupation of Japan as a result of the Russo-Japanese War, the lease did not pass in a formal manner until the consent of China was given in the treaty of Pekin in 1905.

Establishing coaling stations. Since the importance of fuel has made necessary stations from which a convenient supply can be obtained, the States of the world possessing navies have established stations at available points. The character of these stations sometimes involves the actual cession of sovereignty over the area acquired for a fuel or naval station, or at times involves simply a right to keep a supply ship in the territorial waters of a foreign State.

In certain cases, in Asia and Africa, these coaling stations have become the centers of spheres of influence which have developed into actual territorial possessions.

In establishing these coaling or naval stations the terms of cession usually maintain that the sovereignty remains in the State which grants the station to the foreign State. It is evident that for purposes of war the responsibility for acts committed within the area must be either in the granting or in the holding State. If the responsibility is in the granting State, and that State is neutral, then the use of the area for a naval or coaling station would involve a failure to observe neutral obliga

tions. If the responsibility is in the holding State, and that State is at war, the use of the station would be an act in the ordinary course of war, and the station would be liable to attack or to other treatment to which enemy territory might be liable. It is also evident that such treatment will be logical, as the agreements by which stations are granted look specially to a condition of war. The territory which is leased for a coaling or naval station gains no immunity from the consequences of war in which the lessee is engaged from the fact that the terms of the lease may specify that the sovereignty over the leased territory remains in the lessor. Practice in recent years has shown that, as in the case of Port Arthur leased by China, the lessor's neutrality may be recognized even when the leased territory may be the scene of hostilities.

The treatment of areas leased before the outbreak of hostilities and regularly occupied by the lease-holding State should be distinguished from a neutral port which is used as a base. As Kleen says, there are at the present time many incentives which would lead a belligerent to take advantage of a weak neutral:

Ce n'est que de notre époque que les aides de guerre de cette catégorie ont gagné une grande importance. Après l'énorme développement des moyens d'attaque et de leurs accessoires en suite des progrès techniques, les munitions de guerre ont reçu une augmentation telle, que l'organization de dépôts de ces objets sur divers points en pays étrangers mais voisins ou situés sur le chemin pour le théâtre de la guerre peut acquérir une signification décisive pour le succès d'une armée. Et depuis que la vapeur est devenue la force motrice des flottes, la permission accordée à une grande marine militaire d'entretenir des dépôts de houille à des stations neutres intermediaires, serait, surtout sur la route qui conduirait à un ennemi éloigné, d'une valeur inestimable, en facilitant le renouvellement des moyens de locomotion et en épargnant les longs transports. Il devient d'autant plus nécessaire de maintenir le droit et le devoir des neutres de ne point accorder des permissions semblables. Sans l'interdiction, les États neutres plus faibles et possédant des ports d'escale commodes, seront exposés aux pressions des puissances maritimes en guerre prétendant aux faveurs des dépôts, au détriment de la tranquilité et de la neutralité de l'État souverain des côtes.

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Le droit des neutres d'interdire tout dépôt par un belligérant chez eux n'a guére été révoqué en doute. Il fut déjà reconnu par les premiers auteurs du droit des gens, dans le principe établi par eux de ne tolérer sur le territoire neutre aucune démarche qui soit de nature à seconder les opérations de guerre. Mais en outre, depuis qu'une attention plus grande a été fixée sur les questions y relatives, parce qu'il y a plus de causes qu'autrefois pour la supposition qu'elles surgissent dans la pratique, la dite interdiction par les neutres leur est imposée comme un devoir. En effet, l'abus de leurs territoires en vue de quelque dépôt pour la guerre ferait du pays neutre un point d'appui des opérations. (Kleen, Lois et usages de la Neutralité, I, p. 487.)

United States, coaling and naval stations.—With the development of what is called world politics the acquisition of strategic positions for naval purposes has become important. To the United States this is no new idea, and the necessity for the acquisition of naval bases has been pressed home upon the United States.

President Johnson said, in his third annual message, December 3, 1867:

In our Revolutionary War ports and harbors in the West India islands were used by our enemy, to the great injury and embarrassment of the United States. We had the same experience in our second War with Great Britain. The same European policy for a long time excluded us even from trade with the West Indies, while we were at peace with all nations. In our recent Civil War the rebels and their piratical and blockade-breaking allies found facilities in the same ports for the work, which they too successfully accomplished, of injuring and devastating the commerce which we are now engaged in rebuilding. We labored especially under this disadvantage, that European steam vessels employed by our enemies found friendly shelter, protection, and supplies in West Indian ports, while our naval operations were necessarily carried on from our own distant shores. There was then a universal feeling of the want of an advanced naval outpost between the Atlantic coast and Europe. The duty of obtaining such an outpost peacefully and lawfully, while neither doing nor menacing injury to other States, earnestly engaged the attention of the executive department before the close of the war, and it has not been lost sight of since that time. A not entirely dissimilar naval want revealed itself during the same period on the Pacific coast. The required foothold there was fortunately secured by our late treaty with the Emperor of Russia, and it now seems imperative that the more obvious necessities of the Atlantic coast should not be less carefully provided for. A good and convenient port and