have chiefly weighed with His Majesty's Government in refusing to recognize the right to convert merchant vessels into ships of war on the high seas. One is the facility which such a right would give to the captain of a merchant vessel qualified to act as a warship, to seize enemy or neutral ships without warning. The other is that enemy vessels under the mercantile flag, but suitable for conversion, would be able, as merchantmen, to claim and obtain in neutral ports all the hospitality and privileges which would, under the accepted rules of naval warfare, be denied to them if they were warships. Availing herself of these advantages, such a vessel, found in distant waters after the outbreak of hostilities, would be enabled to pass from one neutral port to another until she reached the particular point in her voyage where she might most conveniently be converted into a commerce destroyer. These difficulties might be met by restricting the right of conversion on the high seas to the case of vessels which had previously been specifically and publicly designated by the respective Governments as suitable for the purpose and borne on their navy lists; and by subjecting such vessels, while in neutral ports, to the same treatment as belligerent men-of-war. But any other suggestions which may be made in the desired direction, His Majesty's Government will be ready to examine sympathetically. (Correspondence and Documents, International Naval Conference, Miscellaneous, No. 4 (1909), p. 31.)

Report of British delegates to international naval conference. The report of the British delegates to the international naval conference shows that the question of conversion of merchant vessels into war vessels was not brought to a satisfactory conclusion:

The one subject of the programme which has found no mention in the declaration is the conversion of merchant-vessels into men-of-war on the high seas. The question is one of those which had been left unsolved by the second Peace Conference, and so decided was the division of opinion subsequently revealed by the memoranda exchanged by the several Governments before the meeting of the present Naval Conference that it had been found impossible to state, in the shape even of a mere Basis of Discussion, an underlying general principle commonly accepted. In our instructions the hope was nevertheless expressed that some means might be found of reconciling the opposing views and to unite on the basis of a compromise, for which we were allowed a fairly wide discretion. We regret, however, that in this instance all our efforts in bringing about an understanding were unsuccessful. We did not fail to put forward the arguments which, in the view of His Majesty's Government, militate against the recognition of an unrestricted right of conversion on the high seas, and we

endeavored in vain to obtain, in return for a recognition of such right subject to proper limitation, some guarantees against the abuses to which it appears to be obviously liable. We were met with a refusal to make any concessions or to abate one jot from the claim to the apsolutely unfettered exercise of the right, which its advocates vindicate as a rule forming part of the existing law of nations. In these circumstances we felt that we had no option but to decline to admit the right, and the result is that the question remains an open one. (Correspondence and Documents, International Naval Conference, Miscellaneous, No. 4 (1909), p. 101.)

Opinion in England. The fact that the International Naval Conference of 1908-9 was unable to reach an agreement on the question of conversion was the cause of many remarks at the time when the naval prize bill involving matters of war on the sea was before the British Parliament. Comments on the same subject appeared elsewhere. The opinions expressed by commercial bodies and other organizations show great diversity. Frequently petitions to the foreign office requested the rejection of the Declaration of London on the ground that the regulation of the conversion of private vessels into war vessels was not included. One of the ablest of these petitions of protest is that of the London Chamber of Commerce of November 11, 1910, which, among other reasons, states:

That the absence of any provision in the declaration for preventing the conversion of merchant vessels into commerce destroyers on the high seas constitute a valid reason for praying His Majesty's Government to decline to ratify the declaration or to proceed with the naval prize bill. (Correspondence Respecting the Declaration of London, Miscellaneous, No. 8 (1911), p. 14.)

In reply to this objection on the part of other commercial bodies, the foreign office had said:

Sir Edward Grey regrets equally with the chamber of commerce that it was not found possible to come to any arrangement on this important question, but, as stated. on page 101 of the Blue Book, the division of opinion between the powers represented at the conference was so decided that it was not possible to state, even in the shape of a basis of discussion, an underlying general principle commonly accepted. In these circumstances, it can hardly be disputed that the course adopted by this country

namely, refusal to admit the right claimed, the question thus remaining an open one-was the best which could be followed.

The chamber of commerce no doubt realizes that by the omission of this subject from the declaration no change is made in the existing position, and this being the case, the failure to come to an arrangement on this point would not justify the loss of the advantages which Sir E. Grey considers accrue to this country under the provisions of the declaration. (Ibid, No. 4 (1910), p. 8.)

A vote favorable to the naval prize bill was passed in the British House of Commons, but was not passed by the House of Lords; consequently the matter remains for the time being unsettled.

Of the discussion in Great Britain, Norman Bentwich, who has given particular consideration to the declaration, says:

As there appears to be some confusion on the point in the public mind, it may be as well to state that England's objection is not to the conversion of merchantmen in general-we propose to use a number of our own liners for naval purposes in case of warbut to their conversion on the high seas. Most of the Continental Powers, possessing as they do few ports outside Europe, claim a right to convert ships in their volunteer navy whenever and wherever they choose. England, on the other hand, who, through her possession of naval stations in every sea, is in a stronger position, claims that the conversion must not take place after the opening of hostilities on the high seas, but only within the national jurisdiction. The Continental demand undoubtedly opens the way to grave abuses. The "sort of warship" is able as a merchantman before conversion to obtain in a neutral port the hospitality and often the necessary supplies for her new career, then at a favorable moment to take out her armament, run up the naval flag, and swoop down on any merchantman, enemy or neutral, whom she may meet; and, later it may be, when fleeing from the enemy's cruisers, to resume her peaceful character and seek the shelter of a neutral port. The Conference was not unwilling to pass a rule that reconversion on the high seas to mercantile character is forbidden during the war; but as agreement on the main question was not attainable, the whole subject was, in the end, left open.

It has been urged by several leading Chambers of Commerce in this country that the failure to secure the acceptance of our standpoint at the Conference should be made a ground for not ratifying the Declaration; but this seems illogical. The Declaration does not in any way prejudice our position in the matter; we are free to protest against any belligerent who adopts the

practice in the future. But, it is said, the failure of The Hague and London Conferences to come to an agreement upon the subject shows that the Continental Powers intend, in case of war, to enforce their claim to convert merchantmen on the high seas. Very possibly. But they will do the same whether or not the declaration is ratified, and our ratification will not tie our hands in the least, while The Hague convention explicitly reserves our right of action. (Bentwich, Declaration of London, p. 13.)

Neutral obligations.-A neutral State is under certain obligations to prevent acts which might be construed as failure to observe neutrality. The general statement on this subject is according to the Thirteenth Hague Convention of 1907:

ART. 8. A neutral Government is bound to employ the means at its disposal to prevent the fitting out or arming of every vessel within its jurisdiction which it has reason to believe is intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, against a power with which that Government is at peace. It is also bound to display the same vigilance to prevent the departure from its jurisdiction of every vessel intended to cruise, or engage in hostile operations, which has been, within the said jurisdiction, adapted entirely or in part for use in war. (Convention Concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War.)

The same convention provides:

ART. 13. If a power which has been informed of the outbreak of hostilities learns that a belligerent ship of war is in one of its ports or roadsteads or in its territorial waters, it must notify the said ship to depart within 24 hours or within the time prescribed by the local regulations.

ART. 18. Belligerent ships of war can not make use of neutral ports, roadsteads, or territorial waters for replenishing or increasing their supplies of war material or their armament or for completing their crews.

ART. 24. If notwithstanding the notification of the neutral authorities, a belligerent ship of war does not leave a port where it is not entitled to remain, the neutral power is entitled to take such measures as it considers necessary to render the ship incapable of taking the sea during the war, and the commanding officer of the ship must facilitate the execution of such measures.

From the above provisions it is evident that responsibility may rest upon a neutral to prevent the departure of a vessel which there is reason to believe is intended to cruise against a power with which the neutral is at

peace. In absence of provisions to the contrary the period during which a ship of war may remain is 24 hours. The ship of war is not to make use of the neutral port for increasing its supply of war material. The neutral may intern a vessel which does not conform to its regulations in regard to sojourn. There is a comprehensive article relating to the whole of the thirteenth convention which states:

ART. 25. A neutral power is bound to exercise such surveillance as the means at its disposal allow to prevent any violation of the provisions of the above articles in its ports or roadsteads or in its waters.

While the belligerent is by this convention under obligation to respect the neutrality of States which are not parties to the war, the neutral States are under obligation to prevent the abuse of their jurisdiction.

Uncertainty as to vessel's character.-At the present time, while the convention concerning the conversion of merchant ships into war ships regulates conversion to some degree among States which have become parties to it, yet there are important respects in which the convention fails. The place of conversion and the matter of reconversion particularly remain open.

These uncertainties make the position of the neutral one of difficulty. If the neutral State does not use "due diligence" to prevent fitting out and arming, the neutral State may become liable for its neglect. On the other hand the

Belligerents are bound to respect the sovereign rights of neutral powers and to abstain, in neutral territory or neutral waters, from all acts which would constitute, on the part of the neutral powers which knowingly permitted them, a nonfulfilment of their neutrality. (Convention, Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Maritime War, art. 1.)

The neutral State would naturally be reluctant to intimate to a belligerent that the belligerent was not observing his obligations under this convention. The temptation to pass beyond the rights permitted under the convention would, however, be strong in case of a private vessel which was about to be transformed into a vessel of 60252-12-13