conflict of laws, his utterances are frequently loose, and sometimes incorrect, as when he declares that the domicile of a ward is that of its guardian (p. 160). From a literary standpoint the book would be improved by a revision to eliminate sentences of the type of the following: "Children born on the high seas, or while passing through foreign countries, have the legal nationality of their parents" (p. 139). The value of the book is enhanced by an appendix setting forth at length the results of the Second Hague Peace Conference, which the author attended as a delegate. E. H. G. A TREATISE ON THE INCORPORATION AND ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATIONS. Third Edition. By Thomas Gould Frost. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1908. pp. xvi, 909. 8vo. Mr. Frost's book is divided into three parts. Part I, which is reprinted from the first edition without change, is devoted to a study of general incorporation law, with a large number of cases cited. Though the scheme of the treatment of the subject is to take up in order the steps of organizing corporations, the author has permitted himself frequent excursions into general corporation law where the immediate step in hand forms an easy entrance into such discussion. This adds to the value of the work and makes it a treatise rather than a manual. Part II is a careful digest of the incorporation acts of the various states, well annotated. Part III contains a large number of forms and precedents, covering all the necessary steps for organization of corporations. The work will be a useful addition to the library of the incorporation specialist, and should be welcomed by the general practitioner. E. R. B. 12mo. THE MYSTERY OF THE PINCKNEY DRAUGHT. By Charles C. Nott. New A TREATISE ON THE MODERN LAW OF CORPORATIONS. By Arthur W. Machen, Jr. In two volumes. Boston: Little, Brown and Company. 1908. pp. ccxxv, 816; iv, 817-1798. 8vo. THE CONTROL OF PUBLIC UTILITIES. By William M. Ivins and Herbert Delavan Mason. New York: Baker, Voorhis and Company. 1908. pp. lxxvii, 1149. THE LAWS OF ENGLAND. By the Right Honorable the Earl of Halsbury. Volume III. Philadelphia: Cromarty Law Book Company; London: Butterworth and Company; Rochester: Lawyer's Coöperative Publishing Company. 1908. pp. cxxxi, 578. 8vo. HARVARD LAW REVIEW. VOL. XXII. IN FEBRUARY, 1909. THE SCIENCE OF JURISPRUDENCE. No. 4. his preface to Thucydides Hobbes tells us that "They be farre more in number, that love to read of great Armies, bloudy Battels, and many thousands slaine at once, than that minde the Art, by which the Affaires, both of Armies, and Cities, be conducted to their ends." In that quaint and pedantic way one of the masters of the Science of Politics has attempted to emphasize its overshadowing importance. The expounders of that science, of which Jurisprudence is only a distinct and important branch, are divided into two schools whose methods of investigation and demonstration are radically different from each other. To a student of the older or Analytical School1 a constitution, a code of laws or customs, present themselves as things that have existed from the very beginning in their present form. His primary duty therefore involves only such an analysis of their various provisions as will reveal the existing rules under which rights and duties are defined and remedies administered. With the history of the processes. through which such constitutions or codes came into existence he has nothing directly to do; in his view the history of law is really no part of Jurisprudence; it is simply a side light which may or may not be used as an aid to interpretation. Putting aside the teachings of history, except such as are permanent in nature, and rejecting the fact that political and legal institutions can best be studied, not as arbitrary or imaginary combinations, but rather as 1 It should be said, however, that the Analytical School is divided into two branches: the one beginning with the investigation of the abstract ideas of right and law in their relation to morality, freedom, and the human will generally; the other beginning with the actual facts of law as they now appear, when metaphysics and ethics are excluded from view. The difference, in a general way, is that which divides German expounders of Naturrecht from the Benthamites. belonging to societies of definite historical types, the student of the Analytical School proceeds, with the aid of an a priori process, to elaborate his own conception of the inherent nature of rights and law. Such, in general terms, was the method applied to the study of the Science of Politics upon its revival by Machiavelli, Bodin, and Hobbes, after the existing state system of Europe had taken on definite and permanent form. The group of scholars who founded, something more than a century ago, the science now known as Comparative Philology revolutionized the thought of the world not so much through the marvelous revelations of that science as by the discovery of a new method of investigation that made such revelations possible. Out of the application of the new method to fresh subject matters have since arisen Comparative Mythology, Comparative Politics, and Comparative Law. By the aid of the two sciences last named, as combined in what is generally known as the Historical Method, a flood of light has been shed upon the processes through which the aggregate, commonly called government and law, emerged from progressive history in the nations that have made the deepest impress upon civilization. The Historical Method of investigating the origin and growth of law, public and private, beginning with its germs in primitive society, attempts to explain its nature and meaning through the record of its development. The main difficulty in the way of complete demonstration is the fragmentary character of the evidence as to the initial forms of law in the early periods. Only by a comparison of such fragments as have been preserved in the survivals of ancient law or custom, in the usages of savage tribes and stagnant nations, or in the annals of a few ancient historians, is it possible to reconstruct primitive society as a complete organism. Savigny, the founder, or rather consolidator, of the Historical School, as well as his immediate followers, dealt only with Roman materials; and they applied the new method only in a very limited way to the general theory of politics. The most important outcome was embodied in Savigny's declaration that law is not the creation of the will of individuals, but the outcome of the consciousness of the people, like their social history or their language. In his famous pamphlet, Beruf unserer Zeit, published in 1814, he expressed the then new idea that law is a part and parcel of national life. Down to that time comparative investigation of archaic legal systems had scarcely been undertaken at all, certainly not on any considerable scale. The almost unbroken soil of that rich and inviting field was to be turned over by the plow of one who revealed wonders. Sir Henry Sumner Maine, whose "Ancient Law" appeared in 1861, said in his preface that "The chief object of the following pages is to indicate some of the earliest ideas of mankind, as they are reflected in ancient law, and to point out the relation of those ideas to modern thought." In the masterly demonstration that followed he showed that legal ideas and institutions have a real course of development as much as the genera and species of living creatures; that they cannot be treated as mere incidents in the general history of the societies where they occur. The works of these epoch-making men — the one German, the other English - have resulted in the creation of what may be called the natural history of law. The most important single outcome of Comparative Politics which may be called the science of state building, the science of constitutions is embodied in the discovery that the only two conceptions of the state known to the ancient and modern world have been and are represented by aggregations or federations in which the starting-point was the village community. In Greece the first stage in the aggregation is represented by the gathering of a group of village communities or clans into a brotherhood; the second by the gathering of brotherhoods into a tribe; the last by the gathering of tribes into a city-state. In Italy the village community appears as the gens. Out of a union of gentes arose the curia; out of the union of curiae arose the tribe; out of a union of tribes arose the city-state. Out of the settlements made by the Teutonic nations upon the wreck of the Roman Empire has gradually arisen the modern conception of the state as a nation occupying a definite area of territory with fixed geographical boundaries, the state as known to modern international law. The typical Teutonic tribe, the civitas of Cæsar and Tacitus, represented an aggregation of hundreds, while the hundreds represented an aggregation of townships. The typical modern state in Britain, known as England, represents an aggregation of shires; each shire an aggregation of hundreds; each hundred an aggregation of village communities or townships. The power to subdue and settle a new country and then to build up a state by this process of aggregation constitutes the strength of the English nation as a colonizing nation. By that process, capable under favorable geographical conditions of unlimited expansion, has been built up the federal republic of the United. States. After thus unfolding the origin and growth of the political constitutions of states, ancient and modern, Comparative Politics has undertaken to classify and label such constitutions as buildings and animals are classified and labeled by those to whom buildings and animals are objects of study. Not until the history of the outer shells or constitutions of states had been thus subjected to critical examination at the hands of Comparative Politics, did Comparative Law undertake to unfold the history of such bodies of interior or private law as have existed as distinct codes. The outcome is the discovery that there are existing in the world today only five distinct systems of law: the Roman, the English, the Mohammedan, the Hindoo, the Chinese. A survey of the geographical areas thus occupied discloses the fact that about nine-tenths of the civilized world is now dominated by Roman and English law in not very unequal proportions. Thus it appears that the student of the Science of Jurisprudence is directly concerned only with Roman and English law, from whose histories are to be drawn practically the entire data with which he has to deal. When the external histories of these two world codes are unfolded, side by side, the coincidences, the likenesses, are striking indeed. Each consisted at the outset of a body of customary law which became rigid and unelastic the moment it was reduced to written formulas. Long after that stage was reached each state grew into a world power with vast territorial dependencies. Thus each state was forced so to expand its meager and unelastic code of archaic law as to meet the manifold and ever-changing conditions of the aftergrowth. That result was worked out in each by identically the same agencies — Legal Fictions, Equity, and Legislation. Each state as it advanced manifested its conservatism by promoting law reform mainly through the agency of judge-made law, the Roman responsa and the English case-law system presenting parallel processes of innovation in existing rules, made only after exhaustive discussion as to particular deficiencies revealed by the facts of individual cases. As old institutions became obsolete, they were, as a general rule, permitted simply to die out without formal abrogation. Thus at Rome as in England out of the old was slowly evolved, bit by bit, the new. When the state system of modern Europe, in which the state as the nation is the unit, swept away and superseded the ancient state system in which the city-commonwealth had been the unit, the public law of Rome, constitutional and administrative, was rejected because inapplicable to widely divergent political conditions. What |