3. Power transmission and distribution

1972

4. Scaffolding, pump jack scaffolding, and roof catch platforms 5. Lavatories for industrial employment

1972

1973

6. Trucks, cranes, derricks, and indoor general storage 7. Temporary flooring -- skeleton steel construction

8. Mechanical power presses - ("no hands in dies")

1973

1974

1974

Modified

1988

1975

1975

11. Industrial slings

1975

12. Guarding of farm field equipment, farmstead equipment and cotton gins

17. Guarding of low-pitched roof perimeters during the performance of built-up roofing work

24. Marine Terminals -- Servicing Single Piece Rim Wheels (Part 1917) 25. Grain Handling Facilities (Part 1910)

1987

1987

26. Safety Testing of Certification of Certain Workplace Equipment and

Materials (Laboratory Accreditation Revision)

1988

27. Crane or Derrick Suspended Personnel Platforms (Part 1926) 28. Concrete and Masonry Construction (Part 1926)

1988

1988

29. Powered Platforms (Part 1910)

1989

30. Underground Construction (Part 1926)

1989

31. Hazardous Waste Operations (1910) (Mandated by Congress)

1989

32. Excavations (Part 1926)

1989

33. Control of Hazardous Energy Sources (Lockout/Tagout) (Part 1910)

1989

Chairman FORD. Mr. Eilar?

Mr. EILAR. Thank you, Mr. Chairman and committee members. My son, Stephen Eilar, was crushed to death in a mechanical power press at the American Bumper and Manufacturing Company plant in Ionia, Michigan, last September 20th, one day after his 25th birthday.

Steve went to work for the company the previous Sunday. They were running 7 days a week, two 12-hour shifts. On Friday, minutes before the end of the 12-hour shift, about 15 minutes before shift ending, Steve and his coworker were killed. Ricky Dora, the other worker who was killed that day, had been on the job 2 days. The press that they were working on was a 1950's vintage press, built in Germany and used by Volkswagen. It was brought to this country, modified, and put into use. The press exerted 1,300 tons of downward pressure. The press was about three stories high, and it had three upper and three lower sets of dies. On the day that my son was killed, nine people were working on the press which was designed to be operated by six. Hand buttons were available only for six of the nine press operators that day.

I hope you are not shocked by what I am going to tell you now. Steve's coworkers and many others in the plants who witnessed the incident have contacted our family and told us what happened on that fateful day.

Steve and Rick leaned inside this mammoth press, as they were required to do by their employer, to muscle out a 60-pound automobile bumper. The company makes bumpers for the big three auto makers. The press malfunctioned and came down with 1,300 tons pressure on Ricky and on Steve and crushed them, but it did not stop with the first cycle. It cycled twice more in rapid succession. So mangling the young men's upper bodies and heads that they were unrecognizable.

Witnesses have told us that Steve's legs were left standing at his station at the press. They said that the legs were twitching when the entire upper body and head had been crushed to pulp. My son was identified by the identification in his wallet in his pants pocket. They knew then that the other worker was Ricky Dora. Another employee working on the press that day was struck by the press as it cycled downward for the first time, knocked unconscious into a passageway area between the three sets of dies on the press. Within 30 minutes of the incident, an inspector from Michigan's OSHA division was present on the scene. The company had not had time to completely go through that press, and the other 21 or 22 main presses in the company, and see to their present state of operation. That safety inspector and her supervisor found 216 safety violations in the pressing operation. Of those, 11 on the press that took my son's life were characterized as willful and serious, the highest degree under MIOSHA, Michigan OSHA, of designation. There were 96 willful and serious violations noted in all in that plant.

MIOSHA Chief Inspector Charles Collier is quoted as saying that the firm's upper management instructs, allows, and condones unsafe work methods and practices to continue on a daily basis. Management wantonly and willfully exposes employees to the point of operation, the jaws of these monstrous presses. The sub

stantial probability existed that death or serious physical harm could result from the violations that they allowed to exist. The MIOSHA report, here in its entirety, runs more than 1,000 pages. It is replete with references to the operations of that particular industrial facility, past warnings that the company had received, and orders that it had received to abate or to eliminate safety hazards. The report was issued and at the same time, under Michigan law, it was sent to the Michigan attorney general's office for investigation and possible criminal prosecution. Michigan's Workers' Compensation Act which, adopted in 1912, has undergone some changes in subsequent years but still does not place primary responsibility for serious worker injuries or worker deaths in the hands of the immediate employer. The provisions of that act similarly tie the hands of the law enforcement agencies, including the attorney general's office, in bringing criminal prosecution. They prevent family members or injured workers themselves from seeking wrongful death or wrongful injury awards without demonstrating conclusively that the employer intended that those things happen, that the injuries or the deaths occurred.

It is a very difficult burden of proof to overcome. It can be shown, in part, through the sheer weight of evidence indicating that the company had full knowledge and awareness and in fact encouraged the kind of unsafe operation that caused the two deaths that day. The process, under MIOSHA, is one of endless appeals and great attention to due process, both procedural and substantive due process, allowing the employers to effectively tie up State government and all the parties concerned for a long time without even making the first step toward major abatement of the unsafe conditions in those factories.

I told you that Steve was killed on his fifth day of work and Ricky on his second. Their entire safety training by that company consisted of viewing a minutes long video presentation which dealt with workplace safety respective to toxic chemicals, grease on the floor, and other basic safety concerns-nothing whatever to do with the operation of those presses. Employees have told MIOSHA and have told us that the way people learn to operate those presses, they were shown one single operation or cycle of the press, told, "This is how it is done. Do your job." That is all the training they received. That, in part, accounts for a number of the citations issued by MIOSHA.

The company had been fined in the past and has stated publicly that it is proud that it has been able to have those fines eliminated or reduced on appeal. Many times MIOSHA cited the plant, and while MIOSHA inspectors were there, changes were made to the equipment to bring it into compliance or more nearly into compliance with the State law. According to workers, as soon as the inspectors left, the same practices were again used. Employees were told to reposition the hand controls on those presses and use other methods that are faster but not as safe. According to what we were told as recently as Monday of this week, the same thing goes on, on a daily basis in that plant.

The plant is not a small plant. It has a total payroll of about 900. More than 700 work in the industrial operations portion of the plant. My son left a job that paid a little above the minimum wage