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tions. Some continued to exercise those powers, while others took the position that they were no longer applicable, since the war was over and contract modifications could not "facilitate the prosecution of the war." This resulted in a disparity of treatment of claimants for the relief of the Act whose claims had been filed but not acted upon before August 14, 1945. Whether such a contractor was to be accorded relief under the Act depended on the view the department with which he had contracted took of the Act. This situation motivated congressional action. See S. Rep. No. 1669, 79th Cong., 2d Sess.,2 accompanying S. 1477, which became the Lucas Act.

This legislative history illuminates, for purposes of the question at hand, the relation of the First War Powers and the Lucas Acts. The words of the Lucas Act itself shed further light on that subject. Like § 201 of the First War Powers Act, the Lucas Act contemplates relief by grace and not in recognition of legal rights. It speaks in § 1 of "equitable claims . . . for losses. . . in the performance of such contracts or subcontracts," and in § 2, of "fair and equitable settlement of claims." Fur

2 "This bill, as amended, would afford financial relief to those contractors who suffered losses in the performance of war contracts in those cases where the claim would have received favorable consideration under the First War Powers Act and Executive Order No. 9001 if action had been taken by the Government prior to the capitulation of the Japanese Government. However, upon the capitulation, the position was taken by certain departments and agencies of the Government involved, that no relief should be granted under the authority which then existed, unless the action was required in order to insure continued production necessary to meet post VJ-day requirements. This was on the basis that the First War Powers Act was enacted to aid in the successful prosecution of the war and not as an aid to the contractors. As a result, a number of claims which were in process at the time of the surrender of the Japanese Government, or which had not been presented prior to such time, were denied even though the facts in a particular case would have justified favorable action if such action had been taken prior to surrender."

8

Opinion of the Court.

ther, the Act limits the departments and agencies which may grant relief to those which were authorized to grant relief under the First War Powers Act. Finally, it limits claims upon which relief may be granted to those which had been presented "on or before August 14, 1945." As we have seen, that date was the one around which departments and agencies adopted the differing views of the First War Powers Act which necessitated congressional action.

In the light of the foregoing considerations and the relation of the Lucas Act to the First War Powers Act, we think Congress intended the term "written request for relief" to mean written notice presented prior to August 14, 1945, to an agency which was authorized to grant relief under § 201 of the First War Powers Act. Since there is no definition of the term in the Act or regulations, and since the legislative history of the Act does not show that any settled usage of the term was brought to the attention of Congress, no particular form of notice is required. But whatever the form of notice, it must be sufficient to apprise the agency that it was being asked to grant extralegal relief under the First War Powers Act for losses sustained in the performance of war contracts.

Petitioner, in attempting to establish an interpretation of the Lucas Act which would allow him to maintain this suit, has placed much reliance on events which occurred in Congress subsequent to its enactment. The second session of the Eighty-first Congress passed H. R. 3436, which was vetoed by the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 8291, 8658, 9602. Thereafter, Congress passed S. 3906, which failed of enactment over another veto of the President. 96 Cong. Rec. 12911, 14652. Petitioner's argument is that these bills and their legislative history show that Congress had a different intent in passing the Lucas Act than that attributed to it by its administrators and some of the courts. If there is anything in these subsequent

Opinion of the Court.

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events at odds with our finding of the meaning of § 3, it would not supplant the contemporaneous intent of the Congress which enacted the Lucas Act. Cf. United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U. S. 258, 281–282.

We do not think that the documents relied on by petitioner come within the meaning of the term "written request for relief." Neither the counterclaim in the bankruptcy court, nor the petition for compensation for requisitioned property, nor the invoices for extras, sought relief as a matter of grace. They sought payment as a matter of right. The counterclaim demanded judgment of the bankruptcy court. The petition for requisitioned property and the invoices were legal claims for compensation under contract. As such, they constituted a basis for suit in court. See, e. g., 28 U. S. C. § 1346. That petitioner himself thought of them as judicially cognizable claims is evidenced by the fact that he included them in the counterclaim filed with the bankruptcy court, which obviously had no jurisdiction to award any extra-legal relief under the First War Powers Act.

None of the documents relied on by petitioner was sufficient to apprise the Navy Department that it was being asked to accord relief under the First War Powers Act. We must therefore agree with the Court of Appeals that no "written request for relief" was filed, and, therefore, that recovery was not available to petitioner under the Lucas Act. We do not reach alternative questions. The judgment is

MR. JUSTICE BLACK concurs in the result.

Affirmed.

Syllabus.

SNYDER v. BUCK, PAYMASTER GENERAL OF THE NAVY.

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT.

No. 64. Argued October 18, 1950.-Decided November 13, 1950. 1. In a suit in a Federal District Court against respondent in his official capacity as Paymaster General of the Navy, petitioner obtained a judgment directing respondent to pay her the death gratuity provided by 34 U. S. C. § 943 for the widow of a member of the naval service. After respondent had retired and his successor had taken office, an appeal was taken in respondent's name. Six months having elapsed since respondent's retirement without any effort being made to have respondent's successor in office substituted as a party, the Court of Appeals ruled that the action had abated; and it vacated the judgment and remanded the cause to the District Court with directions to dismiss the complaint. Held: This was a proper application of § 11 (a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936. Pp. 16-22.

(a) Section 11 (a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925 made survival of the action dependent on a timely substitution. P. 19.

(b) This was a declared policy of Congress not to be altered by an agreement of the parties or by some theory of estoppel. P. 19. (c) The application of § 11 (a) did not turn on whether the judgment rendered prior to the death or resignation of the official was for or against the plaintiff. P. 19.

(d) Section 11 (a) is not limited to actions brought against officials for remedies which could not be obtained in direct suits against the United States. P. 20.

(e) An action is nonetheless pending within the meaning of § 11 (a) though an appeal is being sought-even when, as in this case, the appeal was taken after the retirement of the official and therefore without authority. Pp. 20-21.

(f) Since the suit had abated in the District Court, there was no way of substituting the successor on remand of the present case. Therefore, vacating the judgment of the District Court was the proper procedure for the Court of Appeals. P. 21.

2. Since the absence of a necessary party and the statutory barrier to substitution "involve jurisdiction," 28 U. S. C. § 2105 did not prohibit this Court's review of the ruling below on abatement. Pp. 21-22.

85 U.S. App. D. C. 428, 179 F.2d 466, affirmed.

910798 O-51-8

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No substitution of parties having been made under § 11 (a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, within six months after his retirement, the Court of Appeals vacated a judgment against respondent in his official capacity of Paymaster General of the Navy. 85 U. S. App. D. C. 428, 179 F. 2d 466. This Court granted certiorari. 339 U. S. 951. Affirmed, p. 22.

John Geyer Tausig argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Gibbs L. Baker.

John R. Benney argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman, Assistant Attorney General Morison, Samuel D. Slade and Morton Hollander.

MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

Petitioner sued in the District Court for a death gratuity under the Act of June 4, 1920, 41 Stat. 824, as amended, 34 U. S. C. § 943, claiming as the widow of a member of the naval service. Respondent, the defendant in the suit, was Paymaster General of the Navy. The relief asked was mandamus to compel him to pay the widow's allowance. The District Court held for petitioner, ordering respondent to pay her the amount of the allowance. 75 F. Supp. 902. That judgment was entered January 30, 1948. On March 18, 1948, notice of appeal was filed in the name of Rear Admiral W. A. Buck, Paymaster General of the Navy. On March 1, 1948, however, Buck had been retired and Rear Admiral Edwin D. Foster had succeeded him in the office.

Section 11 (a) of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 43 Stat. 936, 941, provided that ". . . where, during the pendency of an action . . . brought by or against an officer of the United States .. and relating to the present or future discharge of his official duties, such officer dies, resigns, or otherwise ceases to hold such office, it shall