Lapas attēli
PDF
ePub

and by comparison of hand-writing.' The conjunction of two half proofs produces a full proof. Though a single witness generally makes but half a proof, yet there were exceptions to this general rule in the Civil Law, as in cases of great difficulty, where no other evidence could be had, or in unimportant causes, or where the witness was of very extraordinary rank or character. In general, 287 where half proof has been made, a supplementary oath or oath of the party is to be superadded to make full proof.

3

No instance is known in which the suppletory oath has ever been administered to a plaintiff in the Admiralty Courts of the United States, in civil causes of Admiralty jurisdiction, except a party's oath in support of his book charges. (a) The purgatory oath to the adverse party is often compelled in these Courts by pointed interrogatories, justified by the general rules of practice. In the District Court of Massachusetts, it is the constant practice to receive the oath of a party in support of his book of charges, which is a species of suppletory oath, and so considered and classed by the writers of the Civil Law. But this species of evidence is admissible in the Common Law Courts of New England, and many other States. In the Supreme Court of

12 Bro. Civ. and Ad. Law, 370. 2 Ibid.

3 Ibid, 385.

4 Hall's Adm. Prac. 95; Heinecc. in Pand., P. 4, § 134. 5 Bigelow's Dig., Evidence, L; Prince, Adm'x, v. Smith, 4 Mass. R. 455.

(a) A charge by the master on his shipping paper, fortified by his suppletory oath, would be proof.-The David Pratt, Ware R. 505.

the State of Maine, the suppletory evidence of the plaintiff in a cause at Common Law was admitted, to prove the

particular contents of a trunk of goods, which a 288 shipmaster received on board his vessel on freight, and which he broke open and rifled; there being no other evidence of the contents of the trunk to be obtained, and the plaintiff having sustained his action by other testimony on all points, but the extent of his damage.1 It is not settled how far the Admiralty Courts of the United States have adopted, in civil cases, the principle of the Civil Law requiring two witnesses in cases, where, at Common Law, one would be sufficient. It was held by a learned Admiralty Judge in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, that the practice of the Civil Law Courts was most congenial with Admiralty proceedings, and that he should consider himself justified in adopting the Civil Law rule on this subject, when the purposes of justice should render it necessary, although he had not generally attended to it, and did not know that the Admiralty law, in the principles of evidence, was different from the Common Law. In a case where the Civil Law rule is adopted, the suppletory oath would seem admissible, when the party has made half proof by one witness.3

289

2

There is a security against false testimony and unfair representations in the Admiralty Courts in Europe, in the oaths of calumny and malice. The substance of the former oath is contained in the following Latin verses:

1 Herman v. Drinkwater, 1 Greenl. R. 27.

The Ship Betsey, 2 Bro. Penn. R. 349.

3 Hall's Adm. Prac. 94; 2 Bro. Civ. and Ad. Law, 386.

"Illud juretur, quod lis tibi justa videtur;
Et, si quæretur, verum non inficietur ;

Nil promittetur; nec falsa probatio detur;

Ut lis tardetur, dilatio nulla petetur."

In this, the party swears to the justice of his cause, that he will not knowingly offer false proof, that he will not fraudulently delay his opponent, that he neither has bribed, nor will give any bribe, for the sake of gaining his cause, and that he has only paid the lawful fees, and to those authorized to receive them. This oath is taken only once in a cause, and usually immediately after contestation of suit; but, if omitted then, it may be required at any subsequent stage of the suit. There is also the special oath against calumny called the oath against malice, which the Judge may, at any stage of the cause, whether required by the parties or not, cause to be administered. These oaths may be administered to both parties; and it is said, that they were in use in the Roman Courts in the time of Cicero, and

are alluded to by him in his oration in defence of Ros- 290 cius. If the libellant refuses to take the oath of calumny, he is required to desist from the further prosecution of his suit. If the defendant refuses, he is condemned as confessing the charges against him. No instance is known in which these oaths have been adopted in the practice of the Admiralty Courts of the United States.

There is also a mode of proof in the Civil Law Courts, called the oath decisory, which one of the litigant parties tenders to the other; offering to have the cause decided by the oath of his adversary, which he either must accept or

1 Law's Eccl. Law, 282-284, and notes.

2 Ibid, 283, note.

render back a similar proposal; otherwise he will be condemned as confessing the allegations against him.1 This has been practically adopted in the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts, and Admiralty causes have been determined in that Court, by the oath decisory; but the cases in which this oath has been adopted have been where the tender has been accepted, and no case

is known to have occurred there in which the oath has 291 been refused and tendered back to the adversary. It

remains to be decided, whether that would be permitted, or whether the party's refusal of such an offer would raise so strong a presumption against the justice of his case, as to induce the Judge to decide the cause against him.

1 Law's Eccl. Law, 282, note; Wood's Civ. Law, 314.

CHAPTER XI.

THE TRIAL AND DECREE.

292

THE cause being set down for trial, and the parties ready to proceed, the libel is read by the proctor for the libellant, and the answer by the proctor for the respondent. The proctor for the libellant then reads the written evidence, if there be any, in behalf of his client, and calls his witnesses, who are duly sworn, or affirmed. They are then examined by him, and cross-examined by the respondent, generally in the same manner as in a Court of Common Law. The case

being thus opened, the proctor for the libellant then states briefly the points of law which he intends to make, and cites the authorities on which he relies.

The proctor for the respondent then reads the written evidence, if there be any in behalf of his client, and calls his witnesses, who, after being duly sworn, or affirmed, are examined by him, and cross-examined by the proctor for the libellant.

The closing argument in the defence is then made, in which the points of law, and authorities, relied on 293 in behalf of the respondent, are stated. This is followed by the closing argument in favor of the libellant.

The examination is conducted generally with more conciseness and delicacy towards the witnesses, than is observed in the Common Law practice; and many of the strict rules of the Common Law Courts respecting calling

« iepriekšējāTurpināt »