targ Academy v. Gaiser (28 S. W. 851, Mo.), is right, and it seems to be. The plaintiff corporation allowed its students to hire a dancing teacher and take lessons within its walls. The ministers of the town, led apparently by Mr. Gaiser, drew up a protest calling attention to this academic revelry, and called upon the good people of the town to withdraw their patronage. But unfortunately the said Gaiser overflowed in his statements, and charged the institution with being "harmful to the moral and religious interests of our community;" and this charge is now declared, if true, to be libelous per se, as imputing unfitness of the institution in its trade and business. The jury must decide whether the charge is true or not, so that the defendants may still escape. Why do they not, however, rather demand by quo warranto a forfeiture of the plaintiff's charter, on the ground that terpsichorean training is not a legitimate function of a military academy? Still, they have perhaps had legal advice that dancing is, and has been, one of the essential accomplishments of an army officer, the world over, whether he be a Prussian aristocrat or one of Charles Lever's dashing lady-killers or one of our own Indian-fighters; and so perhaps the ministers have wisely declined to attempt this remedy.

AN

N IMPORTANT DECISION.-The inflexibility of our law has sometimes caused criticism, but the law remains inflexible notwithstanding. Not long ago a man named Wilson was killed by a man named Starr in the Indian Territory. Wilson was assisting the United States marshal in executing a warrant for the arrest of Starr when he was shot by Starr. In his charge to the jury at Starr's trial, the judge said: "What was this posse to do? What was he commanded to do? To go into the Indian country and hunt up Mr. Starr, and say to him that on a certain day the judge of the Federal Court at Fort Smith will want your attendance at a little trial down there, wherein you are charged with horse-stealing, and you will be kind enough, sir, to put in your attendance on that day; and the judge sends his compliments to you, Mr. Starr. Is that his mission? Is that the message from this court that is to be handed to Mr. Starr upon a silver platter, with all the formalities of polite society?" After due deliberation the jury found Mr. Starr guilty of murder.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in reversing the judg

ment of the Circuit Court, said: "Whatever special necessity for enforcing the law in all its rigor there may be in a particular quarter of the country, the rules by which and the manner in which the administration of justice should be conducted are the same everywhere, and argumentative matter of this sort should not be thrown into the scales by the judicial officer who holds them." Fuller. C. J., in Starr v. U. S., 153 U. S. 614, 627.

It is therefore settled by the highest authority that even the necessity of ridding the world of horse-thieves will not justify a departure from precedent, thus correcting an impression to the contrary, which has caused the accidental death of so many horsethieves in the western states. The Supreme Court, however, does not impugn the decision of the Arkansas jury that the laws of etiquette do not require that a warrant for the arrest of a horsethief must be presented to the gentleman on a silver platter.

It is a mere trifle, and yet we must call attention to the fact that the report in this case speaks of the late Mr. Wilson as being "a white man and not an Indian." What the decision would have been in case Mr. Wilson had been a white man and an Indian is not stated, which is a great pity, since but for this unfortunate omission, this case might have furnished material to Richard Mansfield for a new play, surpassing in interest even "Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde." E. A. H.

FIN

DE SIECLE JURISPRUDENCE.-The long-felt want of a scientific classification of law has at last been filled. This triumph in jurisprudence is now un fait accompli, and it will rejoice the hearts of all lovers of athletics to know that the juridical laurel must be awarded to an institution which has already achieved many glorious victories in our Olympian games. The following extract from the current catalogue of a well-known Eastern university is self-explanatory:

"The course on Contracts is the most extended, as it is the most important, in the school. It occupies a great part of the time of four of the professors and several of the instructors during the graduate and undergraduate courses, and embraces, among other important topics, those of Agency, Bailments, Bankruptcy and Insolvency, Bills and Notes, Consideration and Assent, Contract Liabilities of Infants and Married Women, Liens, Marine, Fire and

Life Insurance, Partnership, Sales, Shipping, Sureties, Trademarks and Telegraphs. Collateral to this course are four others, one on Wills, in which the law of testamentary dispositions and executorship is examined; another on Patents in which the nature of patentable inventions, the mode of issuing letters patent, and the remedies for infringement are considered; a third on Corporations in general, treating the law governing the organization, privileges, duties, and liabilities of all incorporated bodies; the fourth on Public Corporations."

We cannot quote further, but the foregoing extract is sufficient to show that the permanent foundations of a scientific jurisprudence have at last been laid.

COMMON CARRIER.-CONTRACT LIMITING LIABILITY.—Wa

bash R. Co. v. Brown, 39 N. E. 273. The Supreme Court of Illinois in this case has reiterated the rule prevailing here, concerning the right of the carrier to limit its liability in cases of gross negligence.

It appears that by the eleventh section of the contract between the parties that "the party of the first part should not be liable for more than $100 on account of loss or injury of any horse or other animal received or carried by said party of the first part." Brown did not have his attention called to the fact that because of this special contract, he was receiving a lower freight rate than he otherwise would have received, nor in fact did he know of any other rate. The court, however, did not consider the question of notice, preferring to place its decision upon the broader ground that a common carrier, "cannot relieve itself by contract from any portion of the loss sustained by the consignee upon goods in possession of the carrier and being transported by it, resulting from gross negligence."

This doctrine that the carrier cannot limit its liability by contract in cases where the loss is occasioned by the gross negligence of the company, is peculiar to Illinois and one or two other states. For Illinois authorities see: R. R. Co. v. Morrison, 19 Ill. 136; Arnold v. Ill. Central R. Co., 83 Ill. 273; Openheimer v. United States Express Co., 69 Ill. 62; C. & N. W. R. R. Co. v. Chapman, 133 Ill. 96.

It is probably well settled today that a carrier may, by special consent, if the shipper knows and agrees to the provisions, limit his

liability against risks other than those occurring through his negligence. 6 Hun, 382; N. Y. Steam Navigation Co. v. Merchants Bank; Hunt v. R. R. Co., 112 U. S. 331; Belger v. Dinsmore, 51 N. Y. 166.

It is equally clear that no contract which contemplates total exemption from liability, in cases of loss or destruction by the negligence of the carrier, will be upheld. But whether the carrier can enter into a stipulation by which his liability is to be limited, where loss comes through his negligence is a question upon which the authorities are in hopeless conflict, but the majority of the well considered decisions seem to force the conclusion that such a provision is against the policy of the law, and therefore void. Hutchinson on Carriers, sec. 260, and cases cited; 2 Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law, 822.

In Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Wynn, 1 S. W. 311, the court says: "The carrier cannot, by contract, excuse itself from liability for the whole, nor any part of a loss brought about by its negligence. To our minds it has been perfectly clear that two kinds of stipulation-that providing for total, and that providing for partial exemption from liability for the consequences of the carrier's negligence-stand upon the same ground and must be decided by the same principles. If one can be enforced the other can; if either is invalid both must be held to be so.

* "

The same words, it seems to us, can be justly applied to the Illinois doctrine. Leaving out of consideration the difficulties of determining what constitutes slight and gross negligence, it appears very difficult to see the logic or force of the rule that says that the carrier can absolve itself from liability in cases of slight negligence but cannot do so where the negligence is gross.

If public policy demands that the latter class of contracts should be.declared void, it as certainly demands that the former class should be likewise held void. The purpose of the law of carriers has ever been to protect the interests of the shipper by requiring the utmost care and diligence on the part of the carrier. The severe rigid policy of the law which, in the early history of the subject, said that the carrier shall be liable for any losses unless caused by vis major or the king's enemies, must today dictate that no contracts relieving carriers from liability in cases of loss by negligence shall be valid. Any contract which not only makes it possible but

is very liable to cause the carrier to use less diligence than it otherwise would should be looked upon with great suspicion as jeopardizing the business interests of the community.

DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA-REVOCATION.—In the case

of Brunson, et al., v. Henry, et al. (39 N. E. R. 256) the Supreme Court of Indiana decided that a donatio mortis causa is not revoked by a subsequent will of the donor bequeathing the same property to another. "It seems to be well settled by the courts. that a subsequent will made by the donor, bequeathing to another what has already been given as a causa mortis (sic.) will not revoke the gift. The will only speaks from the death of the testator, and at his death the gift, which before was ambulatory like the will, becomes absolute and irrevocable."

The court relied upon the following cases:

Jones v. Shelby, Finch Prec. 288, a case which we do not consider in point.

Hambrooke v. Simmons, 4 Russ. 25, where it was left as a quaere "Whether a donatio mortis causa is avoided by the fact that a will or codicil is subsequently made?" The case is not authority for the doctrine, in support of which it is cited, and leaves the question an open one.

In Nichols v. Adams, the court said, arguendo, “A subsequent will which becomes operative only when the period of reclamation is past, and when the gift has become absolute by the events of the contingency, is not an effective act of revocation." The case went up on exceptions to the charge of the trial judge and the statement above was not necessary to the decision of the case.

In Emery v. Clough, 63 N. H. 552, the court said, obiter, "A gift causa mortis is not revocable by will, for as a will does not operate until the decease of the testator and the donor at his decease is divested of his property in the subject of the gift, no right or title to it passes to his representatives."

In Merchant v. Merchant, 2 Bradf. Sur. 432, the court said: "It is true, that a will does not revoke a donatio mortis causa; but the reason is, that the will does not speak till the testator's death -till the very moment the donation by its terms has become absolute, when, of course, it is too late to revoke it. On the donor's death, the donee's title becomes absolute, and therefore irrevocable