Claim of the United Majesty's government must observe that it is, in principle, States for interest. untenable. The claims referred to the arbitrators are, it must not be forgotten, claims of the United States, not of private persons, against Great Britain, although a large proportion of them may represent losses alleged to have been sustained by private persons. Interest, on general principles recognized in the jurisprudence of all countries, and founded on reason, can be claimed only (in the absence of a specific agreement) where a debtor is in morá; that is, where default has been made in payment of a liquidated debt at the time when it ought by law to have been paid, there being no mora accipiendi. [141] or delay interposed on the part of the creditor. It is evident

that these conditions do not apply to a case in which a mass of doubtful claims, of unascertained amount, have been made by one nation against another, have from time to time been the subject of negotiation, and are at length referred to arbitrators. It is through no fault of Her Majesty's government that these claims were not submitted to arbitra tion in 1867, or again in 1869; and it is not for the United States, which five years ago refused to agree to a reference, and three years ago refused to ratify a treaty actually concluded for this purpose by their representative in England, to insist on a delay, of which they were themselves the cause, as a ground for increasing their demands upon Great Britain.

RECAPITULATION OF PRECEDING REMARKS ON THE MEASURE OF

Recapitulation of the measure of com pensation.

COMPENSATION.

To recapitulate what has been said on this branch of the subject: The losses which may be taken into account by the arbitrators are at the utmost those only which have directly arisen from the preceding remarks on capture or destruction, by one or more of the cruisers enumerated in the Case, of ships or property owned by the United States or by citizens of the United States, and the extent of the liability of Great Britain for any such losses cannot exceed that proportion of them which may be deemed justly attributable to some specific failure or failures of duty on the part of her government in respect of such cruiser or cruisers.

It is the duty of the arbitrators, in deciding whether claims for compensation in respect of any particular default are tenable, and on the extent, if any, of liability incurred by such default, to take into account not only the loss incurred, but the greater or less gravity of the default itself, and all the causes which may have contributed to the loss, and particularly to consider whether the alleged loss was wholly or in part due to a want of reasonable activity and care on the part of the United States themselves.

The claims for money alleged to have been expended in endeavoring to capture or destroy any confederate cruiser are not admissible together with the claims for losses inflicted by such cruiser.

The claims for interest are not admissible.

Should the tribunal award a sum in gross, this sum ought to be meas ured by the extent of liability which the tribunal may find to have been incurred by Great Britain on account of any failure or failures of duty proved against her.

The estimates of losses, public and private, presented by the United States are so loose and unsatisfactory, and so plainly excessive in amount, that they cannot be accepted even as furnishing a prima facie basis of calculation. The estimates of expenditure (were the claims on

that head to be considered admissible) would likewise be found too unsatisfactory to serve a like purpose.

Her Majesty's government is sensible that, should the arbitrators find it necessary to approach this question, they will probably find it one of no inconsiderable difficulty. The foregoing considerations are intended to circumscribe it, at least, within just and reasonable limits, and, subject to these considerations, the British government leaves it to the impartial judgment of the tribunal.

In concluding this Counter Case Her Britannic Majesty's government thinks it right to advert, in a few words, to considerations which invest this controversy with an importance not, perhaps, so great as is ascribed to it in the Case of the United States, but sufficient to make it a matter of profound general interest. The discussion turns on the duties and responsibilities of neutrals; and the field of discussion embraces questions of principle, questions of fact, and questions of peculiar moment respecting the application of principles to facts. The United States have asked the sanction of the arbitrators to conceptions of neutral duty, and still more of neutral liabilities, which, to the British government, appear to be fraught with grave consequences, and to demand serious attention. These views, theoretically stated in an earlier part of the American Case, are embodied in a practical shape by the charges advanced against Great Britain; and they assume a still more formidable aspect when they are invoked to support large claims for pecuniary reparation. For the first time in history, as the British government believes, it has been seriously insisted that every act or omission, however doubtful or insignificant, on the part of a neutral government or its officers, which could be construed by a belligerent into a deviation from the line traced out for neutrals by international law and practice, may be made the foundation for pecuniary demands upon the neutral

power, such as are now urged against Great Britain. If this be [142] so, it becomes a matter of the highest moment that the rules

binding on neutrals should be simple and few. But what, according to the Case of the United States, must be the ordinary situation of a neutral in a maritime war? It must be a situation of perpetual and unremitting anxiety, surrounded by dangers, harassed by a crowd of new obligations unknown in peace, which nothing short of sleepless vigilance will satisfy, while any lapse in the performance of them, on the part even of a subordinate officer, is to be visited with heavy national penalties. The transactions of private commerce must be made the object of minute inquisition and incessant supervision; private persons, suspected of being agents of either belligerent, must be tracked, when within the neutral country, by spies and informers; trade with the belligerent nations must be fettered by restraints and prohibitions; the hospitalities ordinarily extended to belligerent ships in ports of the neutral must be guarded with precautions, for the strict enforcement of which no honesty or zeal on the part of the local authorities can afford an adequate guarantee. Laws and regulations enacted by the neutral nation with a view to its own protection, far from being a means of security, become an additional source of danger, when they are liable to be construed as acts by which the neutral establishes as against himself, by admission or otherwise, a new class of international obligations. Is this picture overdrawn? It can hardly be thought so, when we pass in review the various articles of the long indictment preferred by the

United States against Great Britain, and the statements and arguments which have been used in support of them.

It is evident that, if these principles were to be generally adopted, the only prudent course for neutral powers would be to enact no regulations, repeal all laws which could be interpreted as admissions against themselves, exclude all belligerent vessels of war from their ports, prohibit all traffic with belligerent nations. But even this would not be enough, since it is difficult, perhaps impossible, for maritime states, by any legislative or administrative precautions, to isolate themselves and their subjects completely from all contact with a maritime war. States, especially the less powerful, would be tempted to abandon a position so precarious, and menaced by such heavy penalties; to choose, in preference, the certain evils of war itself; and to seek protection in an alliance with one belligerent or the other.

The British government is convinced that the arbitrators will not give any sanction to views of neutral obligation, to which not even the authority of this tribunal could secure the general assent of neutral powers: Nay, the British government is persuaded that these extreme views, though, for the sake of argument, they have been insisted on in the Caseo f the United States, are not thoroughly realized, and would never, in practice, be accepted as binding by the United States themselves.

The conceptions of neutral duty which have been stated to the arbitrators on the part of Great Britain are those on which she has constantly acted, and is prepared to act in future, and which she believes to be upheld by reason, by authority, and by the general consent of nations. It is the right of a state which remains at peace while others are at war, that its relations with foreign countries and the duties it owes to them as a member of the society of nations, should, as far as is possible, continue to subsist unaltered by discords from which it stands aloof, and wherein it has no share. Impartiality in act; the exercise of reasonable care to prevent itself from being made, even against its will. a virtual participant in the war, while claiming the advantages and immunities of peace; this is all that the neutral is bound to give, or the belligerent entitled to require. Great Britain has laid before the arbitrators, with a fullness and minuteness of detail rendered necessary by the long train of accusations she has had to meet, the acts of her gov ernment and of its officers, and every ascertained fact and circumstance which can be material to a decision; and she leaves with confidence to their judgment, and to that of the world, the question whether her obli gations as a neutral were not fairly discharged toward the United States during the civil war.

Finally, Her Britannic Majesty's government desires to express its earnest hope, in which it is assured that the Government of the United States will cordially share, that the frank and open statement of facts as they actually occurred, may effectually remove every misunderstanding between nations allied by innumerable ties to one another.

NOTE ON THE QUESTION REFERRED TO AT PAGE 12.

The subjoined citations bearing on the question referred to in page 12 are taken, as will be seen, with few exceptions, from works published before the question in controversy arose:

ANNEX (A.)

Celui-là au contraire blesse les devoirs de la neutralité qui, sans engagements antérieurs, permet à l'une des puissances belligérantes le passage ou la levée de recrues, en les défendant à l'autre, ou bien qui tolère sur son territoire les préparatifs militaires de l'une des puissances belligérantes en lui permettant d'occuper telle forteresse, en souffrant des rassemblements militaires, des armements en course, &c. ; et c'est en vain qu'il se parerait du prétexte d'être prêt à en faire autant en faveur de la partie adverse. -(Martens, Précis du droit des gens moderne de l'Europe, Vergé's edition, 1858, book viii, chap. vii.)

El armar buques para el servicio de la guerra, aumentar sus fuerzas, aderezarlos, preparar expediciones hostiles, son actos ilegitimos en territorio neutral, y las capturas subsiguientes á ellos se miran como viciosas en el foro de la potencia neutral ofendida, que tiene derecho para restituir la presa á los primitivos propietarios, si á sus puertos fuere conducida. Nada se opone á que los beligerantes apresten naves de comercio en los puertos neutrales, las tripulen y surtan de todo lo necesario; lo cual se extiende á las naves que pueden destinarse indistintamente al comercio ó á la guerra.(Pando, Elementos del derecho internacional, § 192, Madrid, 1852.)

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Nach der dritten Regel des vorigen Paragraphen darf der neutrale Staat einer kriegführenden Partei weder Mannschaften noch auch Schiffe für ihre Kriegsunternehmungen zur Disposition stellen, auch keine Waffenplätze oder Schiffsstationen für feindliche Unternehmungen einräumen, noch endlich Geldmittel zum Fortbetriebe des Krieges zufliessen lassen. Für erlaubt hielt man ehedem zwar die Vermiethung und gewissermassen Seelenverkäuferei von Truppen an einen kriegführenden Theil, selbst ohne einen dem Kriege vorausgegangenen Vertrag; theils machen jedoch die constitutionellen Rechte der Völker dergleichen heut zu Tage unmöglich; theils wird auch, wenn es noch vorkäme, eine Kriegspartei durch kein Herkommen gehindert, einen solchen Truppenlieferanten nach ihrem politischen Interesse zu be handeln. Eben so war es eine vormals sehr gewöhnliche Meinung, ein neutraler Staat diirfe einer kriegführenden Macht gestatten, sein Gebiet für ihr Angriffs- und Vertheidigungssystem zum Schaden des Gegners vorübergehend zu benutzen, falls man diesem selbst auch das Nämliche zu erlauben bereit wäre, z. B. einen Durchzug von Truppen oder die Durchführung von Schiffen durch das neutrale Wassergebiet, ferner die Anhäufung von Magazinen, Ausrüstung von Truppen, Kriegsschiffen und Capern; allein es lassen sich dergleichen Vergünstigungen mit dem Wesen strenger Neutralität nicht vereinbaren. Denn es wird darin immer ein actueller Gewinn für den Begünstigten in seinen Unternehmungen liegen, und die Umstände werden selten so geartet sein, dass aus solchen Gestattungen kein wirkliches Präjudiz für die andere Partei entstehen könnte; meistens wird die Lage eines neutralen Landes für die eine Kriegspartei günstiger sein als für die andere, demnach ihre Benutzung von Seiten der einen wirkliche Förderung ihrer feindlichen Zwecke gegen die andere Partei. Nur bei völliger Unverfänglichkeit der Verhältnisse und Zustände würde daher der Neutrale Zugeständnisse der angegebenen Art machen dürfen; unter allen Umständen aber fordert es der gute Glaube und die Klugheit, sich mit dem anderen Theile hierüber zu verständigen.

Durch das Vorstehende sind mit Berücksichtigung der wichtigsten Fälle die engsten Grenzen gezogen, innerhalb deren sich die Unparteilichkeit der neutralen Staatsgewalten halten muss. Was nun diese zu thun nicht berechtigt sind, darf im Allgemeinen auch ihren Unterthanen nicht gestattet werden. Inzwischen kann dadurch die Freiheit der Einzelnen nicht so völlig beschränkt werden, als es für die Staatsgewalt selbst, mithin auch für die Masse der Nation, Gesetz der Neutralität ist. Es kann daher keine Regierung, den Fall ausdrücklicher Vertragsverbindlichkeit ausgenommen, dafür verantwortlich gemacht werden, wenn einzelne ihrer Unterthanen freiwillig in der einen oder anderen Weise an einem fremden Kriege Theil nehmen, wenn sie sich mit

einer Kriegspartei in Lieferungs- und Darlehngeschäfte einlassen, oder in die Truppenreihen derselben eintreten, einem kriegerischen Drange oder besonderen moralischen Interessen an der Sache dieser Partei nachgehend. Im äussersten Falle würden hier nur die Grundsätze von der Auswanderung der Unterthanen zur Anwendung kommen. Sollte freilich die Theilnahme der Unterthanen eine massenhafte werden, dadurch die Aufmerksamkeit und Bedenklichkeit der Gegenpartei erregen, demnach Repressalien derselben befürchten lassen: so wird es von dem politischen Ermessen der betheiligten Staatsgewalt abhängen, ob und wie weit sie dagegen einschreiten wolle, jedoch nicht aus Pflicht gegen den kriegführenden Theil, sondern ledig. [144] lich aus Rücksicht auf das eigene Staatswohl. Als Verletzung der Neutralitätspflicht darf nach neuerem Brauch die Erlaubniss zur Annahme von Caperbriefen und Ausrüstung von Caperschiffen angesehen werden.—(Hefter: Das europäische Völkerrecht der Gegenwart, §§ 147, 148, 3d edition, Berlin, 1855.)

The foregoing passages relate to hostile expeditions organized within and dispatched from the neutral country. Heffter, whère he speaks of the act of furnishing vessels constructed for war to a belligerent, introduces it under the head of contraband:

Da sich neutrale Staaten und deren Unterthanen durch unmittelbare Gewährung einer Kriegshilfe für den einen Theil gegen den anderen einer Verletzung der Nentralität schuldig machen, so ist letzterer unstreitig berechtigt, auf offenem Kriegsfelde dagegen einzuschreiten und die unbefugten Handlungen als feindselige zu ahnden. Hierunter fällt mit Beistimmung der Praxis:

a. Die freiwillige Zuführung von Mannschaften für den Land- und Seekrieg ; b. Die freiwillige Zuführung von Kriegs- und Transportschiffen ;

c. Die freiwillige Beförderung von Depeschen an oder für einen Kriegführenden. In Fällen dieser Art, wofern sie wirklich constatirt werden, wird nicht allein die Wegnahme, sondern auch die Aneignung des Transportmittels, ja sogar der übrigen Ladung gegen den von dem verbotenen Zwecke der Reise unterrichteten neutralen Eigenthümer zulässig gehalten, obwohl nicht immer mit gleicher Strenge gehandhabt. In der That liegt darin eine Selbsthilfe, welcher der Neutrale unterworfen werden darf, der sich zum Complicen oder geheimen Gehilfen des Feindes gemacht hat.-(§ 157 b.) The foregoing passage has been extracted in the Case of the United States (p. 196) from a French translation of Heffter's work, in which it will be observed that a change of expression is introduced. The substituted words are:

b. La construction dans les ports neutres de vaisseaux de guerre ou de commerce poar le compte de l'ennemi, dès leur sortie.

Heffter himself, in bis fifth edition, published in 1867, retains the words he had previously used, while he recasts the remainder of his paragraph, entitling it "Analoge Fälle der Kriegscontrabande," omitting the opening sentence, and merely stating that the three classes of acts specified fall under the head of contraband "improper," ("uneigentliche Kriegscontrabande.")

Heffter here couples the act of furnishing a vessel of war to a bellig. erent with that of furnishing him with a transport, and also with that of transporting troops for a belligerent from place to place. That these are not acts which the neutral government is under any obligation to prevent has been constantly held by the United States.

The doctrine thus enunciated by Heffter is that of all previous writers of authority.

Ships of war, exported from a neutral territory for the use of a bellig erent, had always been ranked among articles contraband of war, without any indication of a difference, in the view of international law, be tween them and other articles of direct use in war.

In the treaty of December 21, 1661, between Charles II of England and Charles XI of Sweden, which is stated by Azuni (Système universe, &c., tom. ii, art. iv, § 16, page 121, note) to have "servi de règle à un grand nombre d'autres postérieures," it is provided, "Ne merces ulla vocatæ contrabandæ, et specialiter" (inter alia) "naves bellicæ, et præsidiariæ hostibus suppeditandæ, devehantur ad alterius hostes sine per