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1964, and 1965 is prohibited, with the exceptions stated in amended section 4956. And I am of opinion that these exceptions, though not so expressed, apply alike to the prohibitions in all these three sections, so far as, in their nature, they are applicable to articles mentioned in sections 1964 and 4965.

These exceptions are thus stated:

“Except in the cases specified in paragraphs 512 to 516. inclusive, in section 2 of the act" of 1890—the Tariff act.

"And except in cases of persons purchasing for use and not for sale, who import subject to the duty thereon, not more than two copies of such book at any one time, and except that in case of newspapers and magazines not containing in whole or in part, matter copyrighted under the provisions of this act, unauthorized by the author, which are hereby exempted from prohibition of importation."

The effect of the first exception is to exempt from the prohibition of importation the articles mentioned in paragraphs 512 to 516, inclusive, of the Tariff act of 1890. It relates expressly to those named articles, and it does not extend the exemption to any others, nor to any others that may be included in the same or similar paragraph of any subsequent act, and as music or musical compositions are not included in these paragraphs 512 to 516, neither is exempted from the prohibition of importation, nor does it become so by having one of the articles named in paragraph 503 of the Tariff act of 1897. The exemption referred expressly to articles in the tariff act of 1890, and not to articles in the Tariff of 1897.

The other exception of prohibition of importation has relation, so far as is important here, to books only, and not to music.

With relation to this and to some other portions of this opinion, I am not unmindful that music and musical compositions are sometimes in the form of books, and are sometimes produced or reproduced by lithography, or by a process of photography. But it is apparent that in these acts the words books," "lithographs,” and “photographs" nised in their ordinary and popular sense; and that the word

book," " lithograph," or photograph” was not under


stood or intended to include music or musical compositions is apparent from the fact that, while mentioning these three, the act in several instances expressly adds also musical com: positions as not being already provided for.

This term would have been without meaning and useless in the statute, although several times used, if it were included in what is otherwise expressed. When a general word or term is used, broad enough to include another particular thing or species, but that other is also expressly named in the same connection, it is presumed that this was done because it was not understood or intended to be comprehended in the more general word or term.

It is quite obvious, and is also the result of rules of legal construction, that the words “ book," "lithograph" or "photograph” were not intended to include music or musical compositions. They are, therefore, not within any exception to the prohibition of importation. Littleton v. Oliver Ditson Co., 62 Fed. Rep., 597.

Paragraph 503 of the Tariff act of 1897—as to the effect of which you inquire—has nothing whatever to do with the question submitted. The object and office of a tariff act is

to prescribe certain duties to be levied upon certain imported · articles, and to state what articles are exempt from such

duties. Unless expressly so provided, it has little or nothing to do with authorizing the importation of foreign goods. Generally, and unless expressly forbidden, the importation of goods from one friendly nation to another is merely a matter of common right and comity, and does not require any special authorization by tariff laws or otherwise.

Indeed, the Tariff act of 1897 does not profess to confer any right of importation. As is usual in such statutes, its first section simply provides that "there shall be levied, collected, and paid upon all articles imported,” etc., certain specified duties, and the free list begins with the statement that, "unless otherwise specially provided for in this act, the following articles, when imported, shall be exempt from duty." Doubtless, if it were required, these would amount to an implied permission to import upon the terms stated; but this is not at all the object or purpose, nor is it at all necessary. Nor does the right to import depend at all upon these

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provisions, but would exist equally without them, and by the comity of friendly nations.

Paragraph 503, of the Tariff act of 1897, therefore simply provides when and under what circumstances the articles there specified, including music, are exempt from duty on importation, and does not contradict, much less repeal, modify, or abrogate any part of the copyright act. Your question is, therefore, answered in the negative. Respectfully,



The act of March 24, 1900 (31 Stat., 51), which directs that certain

Porto Rican customs revenues "shall be placed at the disposal of the President, to be used for the Government now existing and which may hereafter be established in Porto Rico, and for other governmental and public purposes therein, until otherwise provided by law,” vests in the Executive the power to place the disbursement of such appropriation under the control of the “Administrative authorities" instead of the “Executive Council.”


June 7, 1901. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of May 31, 1901, inclosing a letter to the President from Hon. Charles H. Allen, Governor of Porto Rico, dated May 7, 1901.

In this letter, Governor Allen asks that the order of the President, dated April 23, 1901, allotting $500,000 from the appropriation made for the benefit and government of Porto Rico, by the act of March 24, 1900, be so modified as to direct the unexpended balance of that sum "to be devoted to public and permanent improvements in Porto Rico, and other governmental and public purposes

* * and to be expended under the supervision and subject to the approval of the Governor and the administrative authorities of the island.” The change proposed is the substitution of the words - Administrative authorities" for the words -- Executive Council."

The reason for this is stated in the letter of the Governor,


but is not involved in your inquiry, which is, whether there is any statutory objection to the proposed modification.

The act of March 24, 1900, directs that certain Porto Rican customs revenues “shall be placed at the disposal of the President, to be used for the government now existing and which may hereafter be established in Porto Rico, and for the aid and relief of the people thereof, and for public education, public works, and other governmental and public purposes therein, until otherwise provided by law.” And those revenues are, by the act, appropriated to those specified purposes.

Within the above-specified purposes of that appropriation the discretion of the President is absolute, not only as to the distribution of this money to the different purposes named and the amount to each, but also as to who shall, from time to time, have the supervision and control of its expenditure.

Under this act, the President, by his order, on April 23, 1901, allotted and set aside $500,000 of this appropriation “ to be expended for public and permanent improvements in Porto Rico, under the supervision and subject to the approval of the Governor and Executive Council of the Island."

This, by no means, exhausted the President's discretion as to who should supervise and approve this expenditure, nor did it confer upon the Governor or Executive Council any permanent right to continue to do so, or beyond the pleasure of the President.

I have no doubt of the power of the President to make the proposed modification of his order, if he sees occasion to do so. Respectfully,




Opinions of July 26 and 27, 1900 (ante, pp. 181, 195), holding that the

concessions granted by Spain to certain railway and telegraph companies in Cuba and the Philippine Islands are not binding as contracts on the United States, Cuba, and the Philippines, or other governments replacing Spain, reaffirmed.


June 14, 1901. Sir: This Department received your letters of the 4th of January and 5th of February last, each inclosing one from the British embassy, saying that the British Government was unable, for reasons stated, to concur in the views of the Attorney-General, expressed in opinions of the 26th and 27th of July, 1900, concerning the Manila Railroad Company and certain cables in and near the Philippine Islands, and asking a modification of those opinions.

The Secretary of War wrote this Department the 4th of February last upon the same subject, stating that a report of Major-General McArthur, of June 29 last, a copy of a letter of the Secretary of State, of March 26, 1900, and a copy of the letter or memorandum of the British ambassador, were referred to the Military Governor of the Philippines and the Philippine Commission for recommendation.

On the 21st of January the Secretary of War transmitted an indorsement, dated December 20, 1900, by the Chief Signal Officer, upon a copy of the report of the Military Governor, dated June 29, 1900, and stated that a copy of this memorandum had been transmitted to the Secretary of State.

On April 26 last, the Secretary of War sent to this Department a copy of a communication from the Military Governor, dated the 16th of March last, and on April 30 last, you sent me a copy of a personal note from Lord Pauncefote, adverting to the claims made against this Gorernment by the Manila Railway Company, and expressing the hope that this Department may, on reconsideration, arrive at conclusions agreeing with those of the British Government.

All of these papers have received careful attention, and your request for an answer to be communicated to the British ambassador would have been complied with at an earlier date, but for the fact that it was hoped that decisions of the Supreme Court, or action by Congress, or both, would throw some additional light upon the question in wbich the British Government is interested.

The British ambassador questions the correctness of the opinion of the Attorney-General to the effect that the Spanish concessions granted to certain companies “are not bind

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