and the reception of private messages derived from the United States be discontinued, and no reason is suggested to me why such a course should not be pursued. I am aware that on a former occasion the validity of the concession to the International Ocean Telegraph Company was assailed. Its concession, however, appears to be regular on its face, and the power necessary to inquire into and determine conclusively whether that concession is void for reasons not appearing on the face thereof, is not vested in this Department, and no decision on that question is intended. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. BURIAL EXPENSES OF PENSIONER. The word "person" as used in the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 964), includes a municipal corporation, and authorizes the payment by the Secretary of the Treasury, from the accrued pension of a deceased pensioner, of such sum as may be necessary to reimburse a municipal corporation for the expenses it incurred during the last sickness and for the burial of a deceased pensioner, who died not leaving sufficient assets to meet such expenses. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, March 26, 1901. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your note of March 18, 1901, with its inclosure, asking my official opinion whether the word "person," as used in the act of March 2, 1895 (28 Stat., 964), includes a municipal corporation. The case under which the question arises is this: The town of Dover, Me., makes claim upon the Treasury Department for reimbursement of the expenses paid by it of the last sickness and burial of Sara C. Cook, late a pensioner, who died there, leaving an accrued pension sufficient for such reimbursement. The deceased left no minor child nor any other available assets for such expenses. It appears that the deceased, during her last sickness, was furnished by the town with pauper relief, upon application of the board of overseers of the poor, and the burial expenses were thus paid. The statute of that State provides that towns shall do this, in case of destitute persons having a settlement in such town. The act of March 2, 1895, above referred to, so far as is important here, provides, as to accrued but unpaid pensions of a deceased pensioner, that, "if no widow or child survive such pensioner no payment whatsoever of their accrued pension shall be made or allowed, except so much. as may be necessary to reimburse the person who bore the expense of their last sickness and burial, if they did not leave sufficient assets to meet such expense. * * It is quite settled that the word "person" in a statute may, in some cases, and in others may not, include artificial persons-corporations, private or municipal. Whether it does or not, in a particular case, will generally depend upon the subject-matter of the statute, the context, and especially upon the purpose and object of the statute. and object of the statute. If there is nothing in the context to indicate whether the word is used in a restricted sense as applicable to natural persons only, or in its broad, generic sense, as including also artificial persons, we look especially to the object and purpose of the enactment; and, if we find that these have relation to artificial persons as well as to natural ones, and if there is the same reason for the statute in respect of both classes, we conclude that it refers to both. It is a familiar rule of construction, and one of the most important and useful, that a statute is to be construed with reference to its manifest purpose and object, and so as to accomplish these. Tested by this rule, the meaning of the section referred to is fairly certain. The purpose of this portion of the section is to reimburse, to the extent and in the manner provided, from what would be the property of the pensioner, if living, the expenses paid for his last sickness and burial. And this purpose can have little regard for the question who the person is, who has paid these expenses, or whether it was a natural or artificial person, or, if a corporation, whether private or municipal. The whole object is accomplished when, from what would have been the pensioner's property if living, these expenses are repaid, and equally so, whether the person who originally defrayed them was a natural person or a municipal corporation. And it can make no difference in this respect, or with the purpose of the statute that, upon grounds of public policy, it was made the duty of such municipality to thus provide for the destitute. This section expressly, as do the pension laws generally, treats accrued unpaid pensions as the property of, and belonging to, the pensioner, though paid but quarterly. They would be his absolute property, a part of his estate and liable for his debts, but that this section provides, in a case like this, that, after the pensioner's decease, the accrued pension shall not be paid at all, except to reimburse the person who has defrayed the expenses of the last sickness and burial; so that the section appropriates so much of what would be the property of the pensioner, if living, to reimburse the payment of these last expenses. The section recognizes that the accrued pension is so far the property of the pensioner that it should be applied to reimburse the payment of those expenses which humanity and public policy require should be paid by someone. In this view, it can make no difference who, or what kind of person it is who first pays these expenses, or whether this payment was dictated by humanity or by the requirement of public policy. The simple fact is, they were paid, and the section recognizes the propriety of reimbursement. In addition to this, section 1, Revised Statutes, provides that "In determining the meaning of the Revised Statutes, or of any act or resolution of Congress passed subsequent to February 25, 1871, *the word person may extend and be applied to partnerships and corporations.” * * * * * The word "corporations" may include municipal as well as private corporations. Hence the word "person" may apply indifferently to either. But while the word "person" may include a municipal corporation, yet, whether it does so in a particular case, may depend upon the context, the subject-matter of the act, and the object and purpose of the statute. In this case, I am of opinion that the word "person,” as used in the section referred to, includes a municipal corporation. Respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. ATTORNEY-GENERAL-OPINION. The Attorney-General will not render an opinion upon questions which involve the payment of money by the Treasury Department. That duty, by section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 208), is imposed upon the Comptroller of the Treasury. Former opinions (see 21 Opin., 178, 181, 188, 530; 22 Opin., 581) affirmed. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, March 26, 1901. SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt from you of certain papers relating to the claim of J. M. Ceballos & Co. for payment for the transportation of 393 persons from the Philippine Islands to Spain, under a contract with your predecessor dated March 4, 1899, with your request. that I render to you an opinion as to the same and as to the amount, if anything, due J. M. Ceballos & Co. upon said claim. I respectfully call your attention to section 8 of the act of July 31, 1894 (28 Stat., 208), which provides that "the head of any Executive Department may apply for, and the Comptroller of the Treasury shall render, his decision upon any question involving a payment to be made by him or under him, which decision, when rendered, shall govern the Auditor and Comptroller of the Treasury in passing upon the account containing said disbursement." By the invariable rule of this Department, opinions are not rendered by the Attorney-General upon questions which may under this statute be presented to the Comptroller. (See 21 Opin., 178, 181, 188, 530; 22 Opin., 581.) The papers are accordingly returned in order that they may, if desired, be transmitted to the Comptroller of the Treasury for his opinion thereon. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. TREATY-EXTRADITION-HABEAS CORPUS. Under article 3 of the treaty of extradition of 1890 (26 Stat., 1509), between the United States and Great Britain a person who, under the provisions of that treaty, is extradited for an offense and upon trial is acquitted, can not be again arrested and tried upon some other charge until he first shall have had an opportunity of returning to the country from which he was surrendered. Underwood, an American citizen, having been extradited from Canada in 1897 on a charge of murder committed in Texas, was tried and acquitted and immediately rearrested on two charges of robbery committed prior to his extradition, was tried, found guilty, and sentenced to sixteen years' imprisonment in the penitentiary of Texas. Upon demand of the British Government for his release, Held: That, the prisoner being an American citizen, and having taken no legal steps to invoke the provisions of that treaty, no international obligation exists on the part of the United States to secure, on demand of the British Government, the release of Underwood, regardless of any action which he might take on his own behalf to secure his release on habeas corpus. The question involved is a legal one and respects the legal rights of the prisoner under the extradition treaty; his remedy, therefore, is a legal one; and, under the circumstances of this case, there are no steps which may appropriately be taken by the Executive in order to fulfill the obligations of that treaty. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of February 7, inclosing, for my consideration and for advice to you on the subject, a copy of a protest from the British ambassador upon a supposed violation of Article III of the treaty of extradition of 1890 between this country and Great Britain in the case of Edward Underwood, an American citizen, who was extradited from Canada in 1896 on a charge of murder, who was acquitted and immediately rearrested on two charges of robbery committed prior to his extradition, was found guilty thereon, and was sentenced in 1897 by the criminal district court of Harris County, Tex., to a term of sixteen years' imprisonment in the penitentiary of that State, which sentence was, on appeal to the court of criminal appeals of that State, duly affirmed. You state that if I should hold with the British Government that Underwood's neglect to invoke the provisions of Article III of the treaty can not operate to prevent His Majesty's Government from insisting that those provisions be carried out," you would be glad if appropriate steps were taken to fulfill the obligations of the treaty on the part of this Government." There can be no doubt, in view of the affirmative restric |