tury on the words "labor," "laborer," and "manual;" for example, from definition 2 of labor: "Skilled labor is that employed in arts and handicrafts which have to be learned by apprenticeship or study and practice; unskilled labor is that requiring no preparatory training. Nearly all work of both classes is included in the phrase manual labor.” And note the contrast suggested between ordinary manual labor and that requiring skill in the following sentence from Bacon's "Advancement of Learning," quoted under the word "manual" in the Century. "I find some collections made of agriculture and likewise of manual arts." But the opinion of the circuit court of appeals in United States v. Gay, 95 Fed. Rep., 228, quotes from the Trinity Church decision and, commenting thereon, says: "The history of its passage [the alien contract labor law] through Congress is given, which shows clearly that Congress never intended to include in the act skilled labor of any kind." The opinion seems to hold that only a "common manual laborer" is within the act; but I am not required to discuss that decision. It is to be conceded that the correct result in the special case was reached; for the Government acquiesced. It may be, on the other hand, that the court's logic and its construction of the scope of the decision in the Trinity Church case were pressed too far. That particular kind of case is not before us now, and I need only suggest that there may be an anomalous region between the line of manual labor and that of the professions, in which are to be found occupations of certain superior clerkly functions or involving taste and skill little short of art, the status of which may be difficult to settle. Much the same doubtful situation is found in the Chinese-exclusion laws, in which the question remains for conclusive decision whether an upper clerk or "buyer and seller" or "assistant accountant," who is not strictly a laborer nor yet a merchant, should be embraced in the exclusion expressly directed at the one class, or admitted under the permission expressly (and perhaps exclusively) granted to the other class and its cognate classes. It does not, however, seem to me that there is any such dubious element in the present case, and with that suggestion of my conclusion I pass to the language of the statute upon which the question hinges. The law considered in the Trinity Church case was the first section of the act of February 26, 1885 (23 Stat., 332), which made it unlawful in any way to encourage the migra tion of aliens under agreement "to perform labor or service. of any kind in the United States, its Territories, or the District of Columbia." The decision proceeded partly on the ground that the particular result was so absurd as to make it unreasonable to believe that the legislators intended to include it. Section 5 of that act, with which we are also concerned, provides, as amended (sec. 5, act March 3, 1891, 26 Stat., 1084; sec. 6, act March 3, 1893, 27 Stat., 569): 66 * * * nor shall this act be so construed as to prevent any person, or persons, partnership, or corporation from engaging, under contract or agreement, skilled workmen in foreign countries to perform labor in the United States in or upon any new industry not at present established in the United States: Provided, That skilled labor for that purpose can not be otherwise obtained; nor shall the provisions of this act apply to professional actors, artists, lecturers, or singers, nor to persons employed strictly as personal or domestic servants; nor to ministers of any religious denomination, nor persons belonging to any recognized profession, nor professors for colleges and seminaries * * * I observe that section 4 of the original act punishes by a fine and imprisonment the master of any vessel who shall knowingly bring within the United States "any alien laborer, mechanic, or artisan" who comes under previous contract; and a similar implication is found in the allowance of section 5 to skilled workmen who come to perform labor upon a new industry, etc. It is therefore in my opinion not absurd or unreasonable to hold that the prohibition of section 1 does include all persons who are in the category of skilled or unskilled manual laborers, if not all persons who are not fairly within the classification of the recognized learned professions or the other specific exceptions named. The immigration clearly forbidden is that brought under contract to perform manual labor or service (United States v. Gay, 80 Fed. Rep., 254: Trinity Church case as quoted, 143 U. S., 463), and manual labor includes both skilled and unskilled labor. I therefore have no hesitation in advising you that if the lacemakers in question are not entitled to admission into this country on one of the other claims brought forward, they should be excluded as manual laborers, skilled or unskilled, who have come to this country in order "to perform labor or service." I return the inclosures of your letters herewith. Very respectfully, JOHN W. GRIGGS. The SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY. FORTIFICATIONS ACT-RANGE FINDERS-PORTO RICO. The appropriation contained in the fortifications act of May 25, 1900 (31 DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, SIR: I beg to acknowledge receipt of your communication of 4th instant, by which you transmit to me a communication from the Assistant Comptroller of the Currency relative to the question whether the appropriation contained in the fortifications act of May 25, 1900 (31 Stat., 183–184), for the installation of range and position finders, may be used for the installation of range and position finders in Porto Rico, and you request my opinion upon that question. As I understand it, your desire is that, in accordance with the suggestion of the Assistant Comptroller, I shall advise you whether Porto Rico is "a part of the United States" within the meaning of the act of Congress above referred to, that officer having expressed to you the opinion that if that question be answered in the affirmative, then there is no reason why the appropriation may not be used for the purposes indicated in the island of Porto Rico. An examination of the appropriation act referred to does not disclose to me the necessity of determining any such question as is suggested in the letter of the Assistant Comptroller. The act is not limited in its operation to any particular territory, and does not require, either directly or indirectly, that the moneys appropriated in general language, without designation of specific locality, shall be expended only within territory which is to be considered as a part of the United States" in any sense in which those words may be used. The object of the act is to make appropriations for fortifications and other works of defense for this nation. Except as limited by the express terms of the act, where special local appropriations are made, it would seem to me that the appropriations are applicable to proper works of the character specified anywhere where the United States exercises its sovereignty or jurisdiction, and where that sovereignty may, under any circumstances, need to be defended. Porto Rico is territory belonging to the United States. The United States desires to and will defend it. The construction of works of defense in Porto Rico would be a proper subject of appropriation by Congress, and I see nothing in the act to restrict or restrain your discretion to expend the particular item of appropriation referred to in any place under the jurisdiction and subject to the sovereignty of this nation. It is unnecessary to go into a discussion of the question that may be supposed to lie beneath the phrase “a part of the United States," for whether Porto Rico is or is not a part of the United States in all senses in which that phrase may be used, it is undoubtedly within the sovereignty and protection of the United States, and therefore within the proper scope and purpose of the act referred to. Very respectfully, The SECRETARY OF WAR. JOHN W. GRIGGS. CONTRACT-EQUITABLE INTEREST IN REALTY. The United States entered into an agreement with C. for the purchase of a tract of land, not including buildings, at a price named per acre, a portion of which land C. owned and was to convey to the United States, he expressly agreeing that if the balance of the tract could not be purchased by the United States within the price named per acre, then he would pay all expenses of a condemnation proceeding to acquire the same, which might be in excess of the price agreed upon. The condemnation proceedings cost more than the price named, and the excess was deducted from the amount otherwise due C. for the portion of the tract conveyed by him. Held: That the title to the buildings acquired by the United States as a result of the condemnation was a bare legal title, and that it is held in trust for C. This equitable interest may be purchased by the United States from the appropriation for "Barracks and Quarters" made by the act of May 26, 1900 (31 Stat., 205), which authorizes not only the construction of the buildings therein mentioned, but also the purchase instead, of suitable buildings already constructed. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, February 12, 1901. SIR: I have the honor to respond to your note of December 21, 1900, with its inclosures, in which you request my official opinion upon the claim of Henry T. Clarke for the value of certain buildings on the lands known as the "Zucker" tract, being part of the lands of Fort Crook Military Reservation. The case is this: The Government, desiring to acquire certain lands for this military reservation, the claimant, Henry T. Clarke, of Omaha, Neb., on July 29, 1889, made to the Secretary of War a written proposition, which, so far as is material here, was, in effect, that he would sell to the United States a portion of the required land, and would obtain for the United States the remainder required, at a price not greater than $132.50 per acre, provided that, if this latter portion could not be purchased at a reasonable price, the Secretary would proceed to condemn the same, in which case Mr. Clarke agreed to pay all the amount of such condemnation and costs in excess of $132.50 per acre. But the proposition contained the stipulation that the proposition did not include the buildings on these lands. This proposition, as accepted, was, as far as is material |