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those set forth in your inquiry, that the policy was a policy issued for one year, and that therefore the amount of the tax to be affixed when the policy was delivered was to be ascertained by the aggregate of the premiums, even though the premiums for the entire year were payable in four installments. Very respectfully,



The expression, " That all dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any foreign

game animals, or game or song birds, the importation of which is prohibited,” etc., found in section 5 of the act of May 25, 1900 (31 Stat., 187), refers to the animals and birds whose importation, if living, is prohibited by section 2 of that act, and does not prohibit the importation of all dead bodies of any foreign game animals," etc.


September 6, 1900. Sir: I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of August 15, 1900 (380 K), in which you request my opinion as to the true construction of sections 2 and 5 of the act approved May 25, 1900. You ask whether the words of section 5, “That all dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any foreign game animals, or game or song birds, the importation of which is prohibited," etc., refer to the animals and birds. whose importation, if living, is prohibited by section 2 of the act.

In my judgment, this is the true construction of the two sections. Section 2 was intended to forbid the importation of living animals or birds, except under certain conditions, and section 5 provides that if the dead bodies, or parts thereof, of such animals or birds are "transported into any State or Territory,” etc., they shall, upon arrival, “ be subject to the operation and effect of the laws of such State or Territory enacted in the exercise of its police powers,” etc. I do not think that section 5 was intended to enlarge the

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prohibitory features of the law, as suggested in your inquiry, by prohibiting the importation of all dead bodies, or parts thereof, of any foreign game animals," etc. To justify this construction, as you state, it is necessary to read into the act the word “hereby," so that the sentence would read, "the importation of which is (hereby) prohibited.” Such an addition to the act should not be made unless its plain meaning or purpose requires it, for it is to be presumed that, if Congress had intended an additional prohibitory clause by section 5, it would have added the word “hereby.” Its omission to do so, and the fact that the sentence quoted is intelligible when read in connection with section 2, justify the conclusion that the dead bodies therein referred to are those of animals or birds whose importation, if living, has been prohibited by section 2. Very respectfully,




Under the treaties with the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians no person

not a citizen or member of a tribe, or belonging to the exempted classes, can be lawfully within the limits of the country occupied by these tribes without their permission, and they have the right to

impose the terms upon which such permission will be granted. The provisions of the act of June 28, 1898 (30 Stat., 495), for the organi

zation of cities and towns in said Indian country and the extinguishment of Indian title therein have not yet been consummated, and it is still Indian country. This act does not deprive these Indians of the power to enact laws with regard to licenses or taxes, nor exempt pur

chasers of town or city lots from the operation of such legislation. Purchasers of lots do so with notice of existing Indian treaties and with

full knowledge that they can only occupy them by permission from the Indians. Such lands are sold under the assumption that the pur

chasers will comply with the local laws. Sections 2147 to 2150, inclusive, of the Revised Statutes, expressly confer

the right to use the military forces of the United States in ejecting trespassers upon Indian lands, and the grant of this power carries with it the duty of its exercise.

It is the duty of the Department of the Interior to remove all classes forbidden by treaty or law who are within the domain of the Five Civilized Tribes without Indian permission; to close all businesses which require permit or license and are being conducted without the same; and to remove all cattle which are being pastured on said land without Indian permit or license.


September 7, 1900. Sir: I have the honor to reply to your note of August 13, 1900, requesting my official opinion upon several questions there stated, arising from conditions now existing in the Indian country occupied by the Five Civilized Tribes of Indians, and which conditions are stated, in substance, thus:

Without referring specially to the tax legislation of these Indian nations, they generally require that persons, not citizens or members of any Indian tribe, who reside or carry on certain kinds of business within their limits, shall procure and pay for a permit or license to do so.

Many persons of this description have bought, under the act of Congress referred to below, lots in the towns and cities in these nations, and many of them are engaged in mercantile, professional, and other kinds of business, and refuse to pay such tax, claiming, among other reasons, that the act of Congress referred to, in authorizing the sale of such lots to persons not Indians or connected with any tribe, has recognized this right to so purchase and to reside and carry on business on said lots, and has exempted them from such tax.

In addition to this, vast herds of cattle, owned by persons not citizens of such nation nor connected with any Indian tribe, are, by their owners, kept and grazed upon the public lands of these nations and the owners refuse to pay the tax imposed on account thereof, and the questions propounded relate chiefly to the power and duty of the Department of the Interior to enforce payment of these taxes, and to remove from the limits of such nation, as intruders, those who refuse payment thereof. On account of the number of persons, the vast amount of property and the consequences involved, the question is, as you suggest, one of great magnitude and importance.

Without referring specially to the different treaties with these Indian nations, it may be stated that they provide that all persons not citizens of such nations or members of any Indian tribe found within the limits of such nation should be considered as intruders, and be removed from and kept out of the same by the United States. From this class of intruders are excepted the employees of the Government and their families and servants; employees of any internal improvement company; travelers and temporary sojourners; those holding permits from any of the Indian tribes to remain within their limits, and white persons who, under their laws, are employed as “teachers, mechanics, or skilled in agriculture."

It is apparent, therefore, that, save the excepted classes, no one, not a citizen or member of a tribe, can be lawfully within these limits, without Indian permission; and equally apparent that all may be so, with such permission. And it follows that the same power that can refuse or grant such permission can equally impose the terms on which it is granted.

So far as concerns the Choctaw and Chickasaw nations (and the same rule applies to the others), this question was passed upon by my predecessor, Attorney-General Wayne MacVeagh, who held (17 Opin., 13+) that such permit and license laws, with their tax, were valid and must be enforced. The same doctrine was held by Acting Attorney-General Phillips, in 18 Opinions, 34. Both these opinions are cited by the court of appeals of Indian Territory in Maxey v. Wright (54 S. W. Repr., 807), which distinctly affirms the validity of this legislation. Iquite agree with these opinions and have no doubt that it is competent for those Indian nations to prescribe the terms, here being considered, upon which they will permit outsiders to reside or carry on business within their limits.

Nor does the act of June 28, 1898 (30 Stat., 495), either deprive these nations of the power to enact such legislation or exempt purchasers of town or city lots from its operations.

This was also decided in the case last referred to. So far as affects any question here, that statute provides a plan for the organization of cities and towns, for the sale of town and city lots, and the extinguishment of the Indian title. This last has not yet been consummated, but, as said by the court in Maxey v. Wright, supra, decided January 6, 1900, "The Indian title to such lands still remains in them and it is yet their country.”

But, however this may be, and, even if the Indian title to the particular lots sold had been extinguished, and conceding that the statute authorizes the purchase of such lots by any outsider, and recognizes his right to do so, the result is still the same, for the legal right to purchase land within an Indian nation gives to the purchaser no right of exemption from the laws of such nation, nor does it authorize him to do any act in violation of the treaties with such nation. These laws requiring a permit to reside or carry on business in the Indian country existed long before and at the time this act was passed. And if any outsider saw proper to purchase a town lot under this act of Congress, he did so with full knowledge that he could occupy it for residence or business only by permission from the Indians. I do not say that Congress might not violate its treaty promises and authorize the outside world to enter upon and occupy the lands of the Indians without their consent, but do say that provisions very different from any contained in this act would be required to justify the imputation of any such intention. All that this act does in this respect is to give the consent of the United States to such purchase, with the assumption that the purchaser, if he wishes to occupy, will comply with the local laws, just as in other cases. The United States might sell lands which it holds in a State, but it would be a strange contention that this gave the purchaser any immunity from local laws or local taxation. The case is much like that of a Federal license to manufacture and sell spirituous liquors, which, while good as against the United States, confers no right where such manufacture and sale are forbidden. This act was passed with the full knowledge of these laws of the Indian nations, approved by the President and having the full force of laws, and, had Congress intended to nullify

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