Exactly as in Report So long as the savings and loan associations were small and relatively unimportant sources of credit, no such extension of credit through them would have been possible. With their growth over the past ten years, it has become possible. With their prospective growth over the next few years, unless something is done to level off their competitive advantages, they may well be able with the assistance of their supervising agency to completely nullify every endeavor of the Federal Reserve to regulate the availability of mortgage credit. There is the further likely probability that Federal Reserve may be reluctant to curb the commercial banks under their jurisdiction if the only effect will be to drive borrowers to the competing mutual institutions. Similar difficulties are encountered with the other responsibility of the Federal Reserve-the maintenance of a sound banking and currency structure. With the cooperaation of the Comptroller of the Currency and the state supervisory authorities, it can insure that the commercial banks within its system maintain a high degree of liquidity and are in a position to meet even extraordinary demands on them. That will be of little avail if other banking and quasi-banking institutions over which they have no control are permitted to operate with low liquidity ratios in banking fields that call for high liquidity. It is inherently unsound to invest in 20-year, 25-year and even 30-year mortgages, funds that are virtually certain to be called for in six months to twelve months. Yet the record of withdrawals clearly indicates that the savings and loan associations are operating in that manner, and the mutual savings banks do not seem adverse to pursuing "hot money." It is the firm opinion of this Association that mutual savings and thrift institutions (savings banks and savings and loan associations) should be strictly required to: Exactly as in Re 1. Operate in the savings and thrift field only, 2. Maintain a liquidity ratio and cash reserves similar to those maintained by commercial banks against savings deposits, and, 3. Pay the same taxes as the rigidly regulated commercial banks with whom they vigorously compete. Unless equalization is effected in the areas above enumerated the splendid commercial banking system is virtually certain to encounter serious difficulties, and the principal sufferers will be the people of the nation. SUMMARY STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 1. There was no problem as between commercial banks, the mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations and credit unions until after the end of World War II. Each was developing normally with the economic growth of the country. 2. A serious problem has developed during the past ten. years, resulting from the abnormal growth of the mutual thrift institutions at the expense of the commercial banks. 3. This problem had its origin in the opportunity pre- (i) Substantial freedom from taxation. Exactly as in Report (iii) Privilege of borrowing for current needs. (iv) Friendly-often solicitous-regulation and su pervision. 4. The problem consists of (i) the hard fact that for the past ten years the mutual savings banks, savings and loan associations, and credit unions have been aggressively using their government bestowed favors to draw huge amounts of deposits out of the commercial banks on an interest rate basis and under the false assumption that they are individual savings, and (ii) the further hard fact that this unfortunate trend is accelerating. 5. The aggressive competition of the mutual thrift institutions over the past ten years has given rise to some highly questionable practices by some of them: (i) The giving of costly premiums for new accounts and additions to old accounts. (ii) Flamboyant advertising not in keeping with the nature of the banking business and which would be severely criticized if indulged in by a commercial bank. (iii) The employment of outside soliciting firms on a commission basis whose sales technique is definitely high pressure, and verging on misrepresentation. (iv) Excessive advertising of interest and dividend rates. (v) The steady lowering of liquidity ratios to levels which could be dangerous. Exactly as in Report 6. This development of the past ten years, plus the threat that it will go much further, gives rise to some most serious questions demanding immediate attention. Question One: What will be the effect on the banking structure of the nation of draining still further deposits out of commercial banks. Question Two: How far can rate competition for bank deposits go before it becomes unhealthy! Question Three: Are the mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations attracting funds on a rate basis that are not savings in any proper sense of the term? Question Four: What will be the effect of the continued growth of the mutual thrift institutions on our Federal Reserve banking system? Question Five: If the mutual savings banks and savings and loan associations desire to encroach further on the powers of commercial banks, ought they not to be required to surrender their mutual charters and convert to stockholder owned commercial banks! BOX ADDED NEW YORK REPORT UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED After the Special Study Committee of the New York State Bankers Association submitted its report, within which the foregoing "Analysis of Problem" section appears, the following statement was added to the report as submitted: The foregoing report and Proposals, after full consid eration and study, have been approved unanimously by the following members of the Council of Administration of the New York State Bankers Association: Exactly as in Report President-Vernon Alexander, President, The National Vice President-Richard S. Perkins, Vice Chairman, The Past President-William F. Ploch, Vice President, The Chairman, Trust Division-Herbert A. Jones, Vice Presi- Group 1: Chairman Ralph Stoddard, President, Buffalo Industrial Representative-Denton A. Fuller, President, Citizens Na- Member at Large-Anson F. Sherman, President, Citizens |