tion accrued until there was a wrongful conversion of the property. The rights and obligations of a bailee of personal property are very much like those of a trustee of a resulting trust in realty, and it has always been held that the statute of limitations commences to run in favor of a trustee from the time when he denies the trust, and claims the trust property as his own. Peters v. Jones, 35 Iowa, 512; Gebhart v. Sattler, 40 id. 152. Upon the same principle the statute of limitations will not begin to run in favor of a bailee until he denies the bailment and converts the property to his own use. And the refusal to deliver the property on demand is a conversion. Iowa Sup. Ct., Oct. 2, 1888. Reizenstein v. Marquardt. Opinion by Rothrock, J. TRUSTS-DECLARATION-EXECUTORY TRUST.-The Revised Statutes of Indiana, 1881, section 2969, provides that no trust concerning lands, except such as may arise by implication of law, shall be created, unless in writing, signed by the party creating the same, or his attorney, etc. Held, that under this section a letter from a father to his son, saying that he had purchased land, had caused the deed to be made to the son, and that he should soon ask him to convey it to the writer's grandchildren for their support, and requesting him to tell his wife how the matter stood, that she might know in the event of the son's death, creates an imperfect, executory trust for the ultimate | benefit of the grandchildren, and such trust being voluntary, the donor has the right to perfect and complete it by causing the later conveyance to be made. While a literal interpretation of the above statute might seem to require that the deed or instrument in which the estate or property to be affected by the trust is granted or conveyed should also contain the declaration of the trusts upon which the property is to be held, it is nevertheless settled that the statute will be satisfied if the trust has been manifested, or can be proved by any writing under the hand of the party to be charged, or of the party who is by law enabled to declare the same, provided the fiduciary relation, together with the nature, terms and conditions thereof, are set forth in the writing with sufficient certainty so as to enable a court to carry it into execution in the manner intended by the donor or creator of the trust. 1 Perry Trusts, §§ 82, 83; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., §§ 1006, 1007, and notes. There is hence no well-founded objection to the alleged trust in the present case growing out of the fact that it was manifested by the letters which appear in the record, instead of being declared in the deed from White to Joshua C. Dodge. Forster v. Hale, 3 Ves. 696; Brown v. Combs, 29 N. J. Law, 39; Raybold v. Raybold, 20 Penn. St. 308; Kingsbury v. Burnside, 58 Ill. 329; Pinnock v. Clough, 16 Vt. 508; Steere v. Steere, 5 Johns. Ch. 1; Hollinshead v. Allen, 17 Penn. St. 275. The trust in the present case, if one was perfectly created, was intended as a provision for the grandchildren of the settlor, who were natural objects of his bounty. It was therefore upon such a good or meritorious consideration as to become irrevocable and enforceable in case it was created or declared in such a manner as to fall within the category of executed trusts. Waterman v. Morgan, 114 Ind. 237, and cases cited. A voluntary trust, resting upon a meritorious consideration, once perfectly created, is irrevocable. Rycroft v. Christy, 3 Beav. 238; Paterson v. Murphy, 11 Hare, 88; Souverbye v. Arden, 1 Johns. Ch. 240; Hildreth v. Eliot, 8 Pick. 293. A trust may be said to be executed when it has been perfectly and explicitly declared in a writing, duly signed, in which the terms and conditions upon which the legal title to the trust-estate has been conveyed or is held, and the final intention of the creator of the trust in respect thereto appear with such cer tainty that nothing remains to be done except that the trustee, without any further act or appointment from the settlor, carry into effect the intention of the donor as declared. In such a case, even though there was no valuable consideration upon which the trust was originally declared, a court of chancery will enforce it in favor of one whose relation to the donor was such as to show a good or meritorious consideration. Crawford's Appeal, 61 Penn. St. 51, 52; Stone v. Hackett, 12 Gray, 227; Ellison v. Ellison, 6 Ves. 656; Kekewich v. Manning, 1 De Gex, M: & G. 185; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., $ 1001; 1 Perry Trusts, § 98. Where however property has been conveyed upon a trust, the precise nature of which is imperfectly declared, or where the donor reserves the right to define or appoint the trust-estate more particularly, although it may be apparent that the creator of the trust has, in a general way, manifested his purpose ultimately at a time and in a manner thereafter to be determined, either by himself or by the trustee, to bestow the property upon a person named, the trust is incomplete and executory, and not within the jurisdiction of a court of chancery; the rule being that courts of equity will not aid a volunteer to carry into effect an imperfect gift or an executory trust. Adamson v. Lamb, 3 Blackf. 446; Harmon v. James, 7 Ind. 263; Dillon v. Coppin, 4 Mylne & C. 647; Colyear v. Mulgrave, 2 Keen, 82, 97; Edwards v. Jones, 1 Mylne & C. 226; 2 Story Eq. Jur., § 793b; 2 Pom. Eq. Jur., § 1001. Whether the trust is perfectly executed or not is a question of fact, in each case to be determined by the purposes and objects which the settlor had in view, as manifested in the writing and from the situation and relation of the parties, and of the property which is the subject of the supposed trust. In cases where the writing is indefinite, or the language ambiguous and of doubtful construction, the practical interpretation given it by the parties themselves in carrying out their purpose is entitled to great, if not controlling, weight and influence. Reissner v. Oxley, 80 Ind. 580; Chicago v. Sheldon, 9 Wall. 54. Ind. Sup. Ct., Sept. 18, 1888. Gaylord v. City of La Fayette. Opinion by Mitchell, J. NEW BOOKS AND NEW EDITIONS. FREEMAN ON EXECUTIONS. This is the second edition of Mr. Freeman's excellent work, which had been approved by twelve years' use and constant citation by counsel and courts. The present is in two large volumes published by the Bancroft-Whitney Co., of San Francisco. It is an entirely new work, and absolutely exhausts the subject in the accurate and intelligent treatment by which its author is so well known. We do not find any thing on the manner of working off our murderers by electricity in the future, but with that exception there is nothing on executions that is not here told. The Bancroft-Whitney Company have issued a Table of Cases and Index to the Notes in the 160 volumes of American Decisions and American Reports, together with a brief enumcration of the cases, etc., reported therein on each of the various titles of the law." It is a very useful complement to these series, and is offered to the possessors of them as a compliment. The titles of cases occupy 207 pages in double columns and fine type, and the "index to the monographic notes" occupies fifty-four pages. The volume is a key to a vast storehouse of indispensable law. SIMONDS' DIGEST OF PATENT CASES. This is a very handsomely printed volume of above 900 pages, published by L. K. Strouse & Co., of New York, and "embracing all patent cases decided in the Federal and State courts from the foundation of the government, from 1789 to 1888." This is what the Marquis of Worcester would have called a " Century of Inventions," and is apparently a useful and timely book. THEA COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Dec. 4, 1888: Appeal dismissed with costs-Sir Bache Cunard, respondent, v. Charles G. Francklyn, appellant.Appeal dismissed with costs-Julian T. Davies, receiver, etc., respondent, v. James D. Fish and another, appellants.—Order affirmed with costs-People, ex rel. Mayor, etc., of New York, respondents, v. Assessors of Brooklyn, etc., appellants.—Orders reversed and judgment for defendant for costs vacated and clerk directed to tax plaintiff's costs, who also recovers his subsequent costs in all courts-Michael Sherry, appellant, v. John G. Cary, respondent.Both appeals dismissed with costs in this court to respondent in one appeal only-Helena Dennerlein, respondent, v. John Dennerlein, appellant.—Motion for reargument denied with costs-People, ex rel. Patrick Masterson, respondent, v. Stephen B. French and others, appellants.- -Motion for reargument denied with costs-In re Reynolds Carpenter and another v. Gerotham W. Cornell.- -Motion for reargument denied with costs-Peter Born v. Henry Schenkeiser. -Motion for reargument denied with costs-In re will of Edwin B. Hart.-Motion to dismiss granted without costs in this court-National Iron Bank, respondent, v. Patrick Farrell, appellant.-Motion dismissed as to infants, as no notice was served on them, their guardian nor attorney; as to adult appellants, granted with costs-George E. Freechsel, respondent, v. Anna Bellesheim and another.—Motion to dismiss granted with costs-George W. Glynn, administrator, v. Seaman's Bank, etc., respondent.Motion to withdraw stipulation granted and that to amend remittitur also granted by directing a new trial on payment of costs of the appeal-Wm. C. Kingland, survivor, appellant, v. Mayor, etc., of New York, respondents.Motion to amend remittitur denied without costs, upon the ground that the General Term has power to entertain a motion to amend their order, which, if done, may be attached to return in this court-A. Ross v. De Witt Gleason.Motion to like the Phoenix, burst forth into renewed life from its own ashes, and WHEREAS, It has been a custom from the most an cient times that students who, coming from the whole circle of the world to this home of wisdom, should at the completion of their course of study have given proof of learning and ability, should be honored with the laurel and most ample prerogatives: and WHEREAS, The light which first arose from hence, as it were the morning light of humanity wherewith was dispersed the darkness of barbarism and ignorance, should now, at the completion of eight great circles of years, in the presence of most illustrious men coming hither from all parts of the world, have shone with greater brilliance than the noonday sun: The Academic Senate and the Order of Doctors have decreed that those most distinguished men who, whether by their public teachings, or as statesmen and magistrates, or in fine by the publication of works of learning, might have secured the reputation of a great name, should, as though by a certain right of renewed citizenship, be distinguished by the same honors and decorations as the natives of the land have been wont to receive: Now therefore, since in the convention of the body of lawyers of this University, there have been presented brilliant testimonials and proofs of the merit, learning and special services toward the State, of that most illustrious man, David Dudley Field, the body of the University, with one voice and accord have commanded that the same most illustrious man should be honored with the laurel: Accordingly we bear witness that that most illustri- Praeses Ordinis Jurisconsultum JOHANNES CAPELLINI. citizens not directly interested in the detection of The offer of rewards may stimulate the activity of interested, including the police, detectives and others criminals, but it chills the activity of those directly in the employ of the State. No doubt it is usual to limit the promise of reward to those not in the ser vice of the police, but it is well known that rewards prefer case denied without costs-Horace Secor, Jr., whom police officers have given the information and have been successfully claimed by private persons to and others, v. Lemuel B. Clark.- -Motion to advance case on calendar denied without costs-Ellsworth Tutthill and others, respondents, v. Wm. H. Skidmore and another, appellants. with whom they have shared the reward. The mis chief of offering rewards is that those who have in-Motion to advance case denied keep it back till a reward is offered. Another kind of formation, and whose duty it is to communicate it, for want of proof, without costs-Susan F. Brewer, administratrix, v. New York, Lake Erie and Western Railroad Company. NOTES. mischief lies in the ambiguity of the phrase "informa tion leading to the discovery" of the crime, and wheu a criminal for whose arrest there is a promise of a reward is caught there are generally several claimants. Those who have had to sue for a reward find such diffi culties in their way that they are sure never to try to catch a criminal again. Rewards for energy in the prevention or detection of crime should be given after the event on the recommendation of the judge, according to a practice not uncommon in English courts. Bosello, the King's Minister, being Superintendent of They began to go out of vogue in the reign of Hea Qui tam actions are no longer brought in England. MR. R. David Dudley Field has just graduated at the University of Bologna. The following is a translation of his sheep-skin (or perhaps sausage-skin): In the reign of Humbert I, King of Italy, Paulo Public Instruction. WHEREAS, Through the special favor of the most great and good God it has come to pass that the learn VII, and were practically got rid of altogether by an Act of 1859, which allowed the crown to remit in all ing of mankind, utterly effaced and extinguished been a by-word for centuries in Eugland.-Law Jourcases. In point of disrepute the common informer has in the barbarism of the ages, should here at length, Inal. The Albany Law Journal. "A ALBANY, DECEMBER 15, 1888. CURRENT TOPICS. MAN is never so honest as when he speaks well of himself," says some wise man, and the wittiest man in America says "apology is only egotism wrong side out." The Tribune is responsible for the following: "Two eminent lawyers of this city, both of them recognized leaders of the bar, were sitting together in an elevated car a day or so ago down town. One of them had recently been in Washington, and was giving the other some account of his visit. 'Did you see the chief justice?' asked his friend. 'Yes,' was the reply, I was at an afternoon tea at Mrs. Thingamy's and they brought him over and presented him to me.'" There is no doubt that lawyers think pretty well of themselves. We have been reminded of this by reading an amusing little book entitled "Vanity and Insanity of Genius," by Kate Sanborn. Miss Sanborn gives many proofs that great men have seldom been modest. One of the most striking proofs of this however she omits. When Michael Angelo was reproached with the fact that his portrait statues of the De Medici princes on their tomb at Florence were not good likenesses, he calmly replied: "Who will know that five hundred years hence?" Miss Sanborn speaks of Daniel Webster, but she omits to cite the most striking example of his vanity. It is related by one of his intimate friends that on his death bed he anxiously asked him: "Have I said or done any thing unworthy the last hours of Daniel Webster?" Some one but intolerable; he jested, he talked, he did every thing admirably; but then he would be applauded for the same thing twice. over. He would read his own verses, his own paragraphs, and tell his stories over again and again- and then the trial by jury! I almost wished it abolished, for I sat next him at dinner. As I had read his published speeches there was no occasion to repeat them to me." Byron wanted to be talking about his own well-advertised and versified woes. Madame D'Arblay also writes of him: This renowned orator, at a convivial meeting at his own house, fastened upon my father with all the volubility of his eloquence, and all the exuberance of his happy good humor, in singing his own exploits and praises, without insisting that his hearers should join in the chorus, or rather perhaps without discovering, from his own self-absorption, that this ceremony was omitted." It turns out that Erskine his attentions exclusively to another lady." So that had never read "Evelina," and that "he confined was what was the matter with little Fanny. She But had been spoiled by the fulsome and ridiculous praise of one of the most vapid and silly novels ever written. Good, old Hannah More also thought Erskine conceited, but Lord Campbell says she probably "had been silenced when she wished to enlarge upon her own writings and her own good deeds." But the roughest thing on Erskine was what Napoleon said to him on his presentation to the First Consul: "Etes-vous légiste?" though Fanny and Hannah felt coldly toward the loquacious advocate, there was one lady who found him perfectly enchanting. This was Miss Seward, but then he "honored her with frequent attentions in the ball-room at Buxton, and with frequent visits at my lodgings." After all, the knowledge that men have of their own cleverness is not to be called calls it self-consciousness, but the right name is vanity nor conceit. Another writer more politely pride. once asked Rufus Choate how he could explain certain facts in one of his cases. "Oh," said he confidently, "I shall lift the jury over all those." The most ardent "stalwart" will hardly pretend that Roscoe Conkling's top-knot came by nature. Minister Phelps delivered an address before the We all have heard about Pinkney's corsets and Glasgow Juridical Society on the 15th of last Erskine's lemon-colored kid gloves. We read with month, chiefly directed to the argument that the a thrill of admiration the passage which Thurlow common law is not much indebted to the civil law thundered from the woolsack at the lords: "I am for its institutions, and "was not the child of any at this moment as respectable- I am at this mo- pre-existing system. It was neither an inheritance ment as much respected as the proudest peer I from Rome nor the result of a haphazard medley of now look down upon." Lord Campbell speaks of usage and custom enacted into law regardless of Brougham's "insatiable appetite for present ap-right. It was an original growth, native and inplause, desire to astonish, and to obtain credit for more learning, knowledge and talent than he possessed." Miss Martineau writes: "There Brougham, wincing under a newspaper criticism, and playing the fool among silly women." It is indeed foolish to talk about the "simplicity of genius." But most of the criticism on vain great men comes from vain little men, or from the envy of other great ones. Vain people have no patience with other vain people. Here is one vain man's opinion of another vain man: "A goodly number of lords, ladies and wits. There was Erskine, good VOL. 38- No. 24. was digenous to the soil where it started. Mr. the religion we professed, its history remained, and the excellence of its morality was undisputed. It had been truly declared to be a part of the common law, and he had studied to small purpose who had not learned how large a part that was." Phelps' remarks on lawyers as speech-makers were especially interesting. He said: "Time was when the lawyers were esteemed to be pre-eminently the speech-makers. But they had been in latter days so far surpassed in that accomplishment by other classes in society, that they were no longer entitled to this questionable distinction. Lawyers were not much addicted to gratuitous oratory. They were seldom heard from until they were retained; nor then unless there was an issue formed which it was necessary to discuss. Their arguments must be confined to the matter in hand, and must cease when the discussion was exhausted or the question determined. They did not enjoy the latitude allowed to the lawyer described by the Roman satirist, whose client was heard complaining 'that his lawsuit concerned three little kids, while his advocate, in large disdain of these, was thundering in the Forum over the perjuries of Hannibal and the slaughter of Canna.' The limits of forensic discourse were grave impediments to the cultivation of eloquence, which in its modern estate needed to be unembarrassed by facts, unrestrained by occasion, and unlimited by time. So the bar fell into what might be called in comparison with discussions elsewhere, a measurable silence." Or as the president would have put it, "innocuous desuetude." We feel grieved to find so far three points of disagreement between the learned and eloquent minis ter and ourselves. We do think the common law has been under important obligations to the civil; we do not think christianity is a part of the common law; and we do not think that lawyers have lost their pre-eminence as speech-makers. The minister's address called out a little demur from Sheriff Erskine Murray, who declared that the Scotch were more inclined than their English and Ameri can brethren "to look up to the Roman law as their nursing mother." So many years ago that all our readers have forgotten it, we tried our hand at the three kids" lawsuit as follows: "On Cannæ's fatal field and Mithradates' war And all the perjuries of Carthaginian fury, And Sullas, Mariuses, Muciuses, by the score, gives among the names of counsel "The Macdermot We are glad to learn that Mr. Justice Gray has safely returned from "gunning in Virginis." Ever since Mr. Justice Lamar's equestrian accident we have been filled with terror lest some of the justomed sport. But gunning in Virginia is not so tices should do themselves an injury in unaccusdangerous to the hunter as it was twenty-five years ago. We are left in the dark as to what his stature ought to take something of his own size game the justice has been going for, but a man of would suggest to him to run down to the bay and -say a grizzly. If he did not have good luck, we take a shot at the oyster pirates. WB NOTES OF CASES. E have been requested to publish the case of Scherck v. Travellers' Ins. Co., decided in the St. Louis Circuit Court, February 7, 1887, and we comply, although the decision is axiomatic. The court said: It avers in substance that the injuries sustained by "The court is clearly of the opinion that the plea states a good defense to the action. the plaintiff, and on account of which he claims indemnity, were intentionally inflicted by one John E. Webb, who willfully assaulted the plaintiff with a knife or other sharp instrument, thereby wounding him and disabling him from attending to his business. The court is satisfied that the defendant company by its contract has excluded injuries of the kind described in the plea, from the list of injuries against which it agreed to provide indemnity. The policy declares on its face that it does not cover * intentional injuries inflicted by the insured or any other person. No refinement of reasoning or * * With loud voice and sweeping hand you harangue the jury. logic and no latitude of construction can make it ap Your rhetoric irrelevant good sense forbids - "Colum A special dispatch to the Tribune says: bia, S. C., Dec. 7. The State Bar Association had a banquet last night. In the menu published this morning 'Punch l'Ananias' figures, which seems either to have been a joke or a mistake of the printer. The lawyers are excited on the subject, talked of." The concocter of the jest evidently and a libel suit against the offending newspaper is had forgotten the proverb "in vino veritas.” pear that the injury described in the plea was not an intentional injury inflicted on the body of the plaintiff by some other person, to-wit, by John E. Webb. The injury in the question was clearly one of the exdemnity. Inasmuch as counsel have commented on pected risks against which the policy provides no inif the risk in question is excluded therefrom, it is the few risks that would be covered by this contract, proper to add that the argument based on that and unambiguous language of the contract, tion ground can have no legal force in view of the plain whether lawyers will or will not lie, it is very excluded is still broad enough to cover and provide furthermore that the policy with the risk in question doubtful that a libel suit will. But indemnity against an almost infinite variety of in juries, which the assured might accidentally sustain." In Dunn v. Brown County Agricultural Society, Ohio Supreme Court, November 13, 1888, it was held that a county agricultural society, which has constructed seats on its fair grounds for the use of its patrons, is liable in its corporate capacity to an action for damages by a person who, while attending a fair held by it, and rightfully occupying the seats, sustains an injury in consequence of its negligence in their construction. The court said: "It is evident that societies organized under the statute are the result of voluntary associations, by the persons composing them, for purposes of their own. It is true their purpose may be public in the sense that their establishment may conduce to the public welfare, by promoting the agricultural and household manufacturing interests of the county; but in the sense that they are designed for the accomplishment of some public good, all private corporations are for a public purpose; for the public benefit is both the consideration and justification for the special privileges and franchises conferred on them. These agricultural societies are not only of the free choice of their constituent members, but they are also by their active procurement; for it is only when they organize themselves into a society, adopt the necessary constitution, and elect the proper officers, that they become a body corporate. The State neither compels their incorporation nor controls their conduct afterward. They may act under the organization or at any time dissolve or abandon it. While the authority is not in terms conferred on such societies to hold fairs, and charge for admission thereto, the power to perform all such acts as they deem best calculated to promote the agricultural and household manufacturing interests' of the county appears to be ample, not only for that purpose, but also to authorize the society to select the site whereon to hold the fair, adopt plans for buildings and superstructures, and erect them at its pleasure. The society is absolutely free to determine whether it will erect any building or seats for the accommodation of their patrons, and if any, what kind, and of what material. It is subject to no control, either in the selection of the material or the employment of the architect, superintendent or workmen, and the whole management and conduct of the fair is committed to it and its officers, with the power not only to determine what shall be done, and how it shall be done, but by whom it shall be done. In short, in the execution of the powers conferred on it, the society selects its own agents, is invested with the control over them, and may, for its own indemnity, exact such guaranties against their want of skill and care in their employment as it may deem proper, and be able to obtain. There are cases where a party under no legal obligation to perform an act or service may nevertheless be liable for damages caused by his negligence, if he voluntarily enter upon its performance. And though the defendant below was not bound to provide seats for the con venience of persons attending its fairs, and the omission to do so would subject it to no liability yet having voluntarily entered upon their construc tion, for the purpose of being occupied by the people present, and to afford them greater convenience and comfort in witnessing the exhibition, constituting, when completed, not only an invitation to occupy them, but as well an inducement for the patronage of the fair, every consideration of right and justice required that in their construction the Society should have a careful regard for the safety of those acting upon the invitation. And since the defendant selects and controls its own agents and servants, and might, by the exercise of due care in their employment, have secured the construction of seats that were suitable, and therefore safe-for that law of they can be suitable only when safesocial duty which exacts of all that they shall so conduct themselves as not to injure others by their neglect, forbids that the defendant should interpose its own incorporation self-sought and voluntarily maintained — as a shield against liability to one who, being rightfully upon the seats, and free from fault, is insured by reason of its negligence in their construction." To same effect, Conradt v. Clauve, 93 Ind. 476; S. C., 47 Am. Rep. 388. In Ford v. School District of Kendall Borough. Pennsylvania Supreme Court, October 1, 1888, it was held that school-districts in Pennsylvania cannot be held liable for the negligence of their employees. The court said: "The plaintiff, at the time of the accident, January 31, 1882, was a pupil of the public schools of said district. On the afternoon of that day she, with other pupils, was standing near the stove of the school-room, in which the janitor was attempting to kindle a fire. Failing to produce the desired result, he left the room, and soon returned with a dish of crude petroleum, which he threw into the stove. The result was an explosion, by which the plaintiff was severely burned and otherwise injured. The board of directors had been twice notified of this method of kindling fires by its janitor, and warned of the danger of permitting its continuance; and, though the matter seems to have been discussed by that body, no further attention was paid to it. The Constitution provides (article 10, section 1): The General Assembly shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and sufficient system of public schools, wherein all the children of this Commonwealth, above the age of six years may be educated; and shall appropriate at least one million of dollars each year for that purpose.' Here is not only an injunction upon the Legislature to provide a system of public education for all the children of the Commonwealth over the age of six years, but to appropriate for that purpose the magnificent sum of not less than one million dollars. The appropriation may exceed that sum to any amount -- to an amount sufficient to cover the entire expenses of the system all events, that sum must be so appropriated. If * * * 6 - but at |