- DAMAGES · But 1 however does not point to this phase of the question, nor does it raise it singly. It takes the broad position that it was not the duty of the railroad to furnish "good and safe platform and lights, or either of them." We have shown above, that if the road did furnish a platform, it must be good and safe; and that in certain conditions it was its duty to furnish a light. The demurrer does not sufficiently point out or specify any defect in the complaint, and it was rightly overruled. Ala. Sup. Ct., May 30, 1888. Alabama G. S. R. Co. v. Arnold. Opinion by Stone, C. J. TELEGRAPH COMPANY NEGLIGENCE WHO LIABLE.-Where a telegraph company negligently omitted a word from a message, and the receiver sued the sender for damage caused thereby, and recovered, the sender, not having been liable therefor, cannot recover such damages or the expenses of such suit from the company, though he had notified it to appear and defend, but may recover the cost of sending the message. Such neglect created the plaintiff's cause of action alleged in the complaint, and he is clearly entitled to recover at least nominal damages, and such substantial damages as he has sustained; that is, such as in the course of things were naturally the proximate consequence of the wrong complained of; such as the parties may have fairly contemplated by their contract in case of a breach thereof; but not such as may have been the consequence of secondary and remote causes indirectly growing out of such breach. Thus if the plaintiff, in consequence of the message received by him in reply to his, falsely transmitted by the defendant to the brokers in Richmond, purchased the stock referred to, and failed to realize for it what it cost him, and reasonable compensation for his labor and trouble about it, he might recover the amount so lost, and such compensation, and also the sum he paid for transmitting the message. he could not recover damages for any injury sustained by the persons-the brokers-to whom his message was falsely transmitted by reason thereof, because the injury done to them was not an injury to him. He had no cause of action on that account; they had, if they so sustained injury. Nor was the plaintiff liable to the brokers for any such injury sustained by them, or on account of the breach of any contract with them created by the message as transmitted, because he did not send or direct the defendants to transmit the message it transmitted. He did not offer or agree to sell to the brokers the stock at "forty." They had no contract with him. As we have seen, the defendant had no agency or authority of the plaintiff to change or modify in terms the message he delivered to it to be transmitted to the brokers. It transmitted the false message to them in its own wrong, and it alone was answerable to them for any injury they sustained thereby. The plaintiff had done them no injury. The defendants may have done so in delivering to them the false message, upon which they may have acted to their detriment. If they did not, they could not have recovered substantial damages. Telegraph Co. v. Hall, 124 U. S. 444. But it is earnestly contended by the plaintiff that the brokers brought their action in a court in the State of Virginia, having proper jurisdic-eral rule, it is also true that one may so sell or part tion, against him, and recovered judgment for damages and cost, which he paid, on account of such falsely transmitted message to them; that the plaintiff notified the defendant to appear and defend that action, and save him harmless, which it failed to do, and he is therefore entitled in this action to recover such outlay on his part, as damages. We cannot so decide. We are unable to see how an action upon a contract never in fact made could be successfully prosecuted against the present plaintiff; and it is still more difficult to comprehend how the damages he has sustained in such action can be recovered by him in this action, there being, as we have seen, no privity between the plaintiff and defendant in that respect, and no such relations subsisting as to give the former cause for redress against the defendant, measured by the result of the action referred to, the only evidence of which was the transcript of the record thereof. Such evidence would be admissible if an agent, in performing his principal's orders, would incur a personal responsibility and loss, and seek indemnity therefor against the latter on the ground of their relations. In such case, if the principal had notice of the action, its result would be conclusive as to the extent of the damage. But this is a very different case from one of that nature. Here the present plaintiff was not answerable to the plaintiff in the action just referred to for injnries they sustained by the negligence of the present defendant, nor was the latter answerable therefor to the plaintiff in this action in any respect of their relations. Hare v. Grant, 77 N. C. 203; Leak v. Covington (decided at the present term). As the defendant was not answerable to the plaintiff for any injury the brokers sustained by reason of the false message transmitted to them by it, the plaintiff cannot recover from the defendant, as damages in this action, any sum the brokers may have for any cause recovered from the plaintiff. There is no error, and the judgment must be affirmed. N. C. Sup. Ct., May 24, 1888. Pegram v. Western Union Tel. Co. Opinion by Merrimon, J., Davis, J., dissenting. TRADE-MARK — INFRINGEMENT-USE OF ONE'S OWN NAME.-Defendant, Le Page, and his partner had been manufacturing and selling liquid glue under the name of "Le Page's Liquid Glue," and sold out their business and trade-marks to a corporation. Held, that the corporation was entitled to an injunction restraining Le Page from selling glue as "Le Page's Liquid (or Improved Liquid) Glue," but not from selling liquid glue, and indicating that he was the maker of it. Held, also, that defendant would be restrained from describing the company under whose name he conducted his business, as "Le Page's Liquid Glue Company." A person cannot make a trade-mark of his own name, and thus debar another having the same name from using it in his business, if he does so honestly, and without any intention to appropriate wrongfully the good-will of a business already established by others of the name. Every one has the absolute right to use his own name honestly in his own business for the purpose of advertising it, even though he may thereby incidentally interfere with and injure the business of another having the same name. In such case the inconvenience or loss to which those having a common right to it are subjected is damnum absque injuria. But although he may thus use his name, he cannot resort to any artifice or do any act calculated to mislead the public as to the identity of the business firm or establishment or article produced by them, and thus produce injury to the other beyond that which results from the similarity of name. Holloway v. Holloway, 13 Beav. 209; Meneely v. Meneely, 62 N. Y. 427; Gilman v. Hunnewell, 122 Mass. 139; Rogers v. Rogers, 53 Conn. 121. While this is the gen with the right to use his own name as a description or designation of a manufactured article as to deprive himself of the right to use it as such, and confer this right upon another. A name used as an adjective of description is not necessarily understood by the public as any assertion that the person whose name is used is the maker of the article. One who has carried on a business under a trade name, and sold a particular article in such a manner by the use of his name as a trade-mark or a trade name as to cause the business or the article to become known or established in favor under such name, may sell or assign such trade name or trade-mark when he sells the business or manufacture, and by such sale or assignment to conclude himself from the further use of it in a similar way. Manufacturing Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 18 Fed. Rep. 816; McLean v. Fleming, 96 U. S. 245; Crucible Co. v. Guggenheim, 2 Brewst. 321; Probasco v. Bouyon, 1 Mo. App. 241; Oakes v. Tousmierre, 4 Woods, 555; Manufacturing Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 32 Fed. Rep. 94; Ainsworth v. Walmsley, L. R., 1 Eq. 524; Shaver v. Shaver, 6 N. W. Rep. 188; Frazer v. Lubricator Co., 18 Bradw. 462. A person may be enjoined therefore from using his own name as a description of an article of his own manufacture, and from selling the article under that particular name when he has parted with the right thus to apply it. Gillis v. Hall, 2 Brewst. 342; Kidd v. Johnson, 100 U. S. 619. It is not upon the ground of the invasion of the trade name adopted by another, but by reason of the contract he has made, that he is deprived of the right himself to use his name as all others of the same name may use theirs. The recent case, Hoxie v. Chaney, 143 Mass. 592, which has been decided since the decree originally made in the case at bar was rendered, is quite conclusive in regard to it. It was there held that "A. N. Hoxie's Mineral Soap," and "A. N. Hoxie's Pumice Soap were trademarks, and assignable as such, and that they did not necessarily mean that the soaps were made by A. N. Hoxie. Where one who had adopted these trademarks, or more properly trade names, for his manufacture, entered into a partnership with another under articles by which he contributed the good-will of the business he was carrying on, with the tools, implements and fixtures, and on the dissolution of this partnership conveyed to his partner "all my right, title and interest in and to all and singular the partnership property belonging to the firm, meaning hereby to sell and convey all my interest in the entire assets of the firm," it was further held that these trade names became, by the articles of copartnership, a part of the property of the firm, and that the right to use them as such passed by the bill of sale, and that the partner so conveying had parted with his own right so to do. Upon the evidence in the case at bar, it appears that 'Le Page's Liquid Glue" was the name adopted by Brooks and Le Page for the light glues manufactured by them, a special word such as 46 straw,' ""carriage," etc., indicating for what especial use the particular light glue was designed, being inserted before the word "glue;" that they manufactured glues under this name; and that at a subsequent period, in 1882, formed the plaintiff corporation, to which they sold their business, and which continued the manufacture of these glues under the same name. The defendant was a member of the corporation, and a director thereof until February, 1886, when he left it, and shortly after engaged in the manufacture and sale of glue at Gloucester, where the plaintiff's business has always been carried on, using the name Le Page's Improved Liquid Glue," to advertise the article produced by him. When Brooks & Le Page sold their business to the plaintiff they in express terms sold "the right to use the trade-marks belonging to or in use by said copartnership." When Le Page (with Brooks) sold to the corporation and when he left the corporation, it must be held that the name "Le Page's Liquid Glue" was a trade name or trademark, and it is not important which term is used, indicating the liquid glue which the plaintiff was manu facturing. The right to use it as such was necessarily 44 an exclusive use, as it was intended thus to distinguish the plaintiff's goods from those of others. As a trade-mark belonging to the corporation, the defendant, while an officer thereof, had himself sought to obtain registration for it at the United States patent-office. We are of opinion therefore that the de fendant should be enjoined from using the words "Le Page's Improved Liquid Glue" or "Le Page's Liquid Glue," to describe the article manufactured by him, and from describing the company under whose name he conducts his business as "Le Page's Liquid Glue Company," whether with or without any addition thereto. While the plaintiff has not sought to prevent the defendant from manufacturing glue, in order to avoid misunderstanding, we add that while the defendant cannot use the words adopted as a trade name for the article manufactured by him, we do not decide that he may not use the words "Liquid Glue," or other appropriate words to describe his product, or to state in that connection that he is himself the manufacturer of it. Mass. Sup. Jud. Ct., June 19, 1888. Russia Cement Co. v. Le Page. Opinion by Devens, J. THE COURT OF APPEALS DECISIONS. HE following decisions were handed down Tuesday, Order granted in each case that contains the proper claims for preference in the original notice of argument; the others are denied-Vau Nest v. The Mayor, etc., of New York and twenty-one other motions. Motions to advance case on the calendar granted without costs-Storm v. Storm, Bailey v. Buchanan, Pfeiffer v. Campbell, Jenness v. Constantine, Pitman v. Hall, Holcombe v. Campbell, People, ex rel. Eckerson v. Christie, Feitner v. Lewis, and Hood v. Hood. -Denied with costs-In re application of the City of Rochester to acquire lands for water supply for reargument.-Motion to dismiss (granted with costs in all courts; opinion by Earl, J.; all concur-People, ex rel. Franklin N. Wright, appellaut, v. Reuben Willard, respondent.Motion to dismiss denied with costsIn re Vanderbeek.. -Motion to dismiss denied by default with $10 costs-Sherry v. Curry.-Motion to dismiss granted with costs-Parks v. Murray.— The appeal of the Bartholomay Brewing Company is dismissed without costs, and the motion of the respondent to dismiss appeal of the commissioners of the land office is denied without costs; opinion by Earl, J.; all concur-People, ex rel. Charles G. Burnham, v. State Land Office.- Motion to dismiss granted with costs-Post v. Benchley.-Motion to strike from the preferred calendar granted without costs-Hood v. Hayward.-Motion to revive action and appeal and to advance it on the calendar granted without costs-Harkness v. New York Elevated Railroad Company.- Motion granted without costs, judgment appealed from affirmed with costs-Smythe v. Sturgess.- -Motion to amend and for permission to apply to court below to amend order of reversal granted on payment of $10 costs to attorney for defendant-Cook v. Devoe.-Motion to amend; ordered that the clerk of the court below return to this court the order of the General Term made June 18, 1888, resettling its order of reversal, and that the return now on file in this court be amended by adding costs-James M. Comey, appellant, v. William Andrews, respondent. The Albany Law Journal. ALBANY, OCTOBER 20, 1888. SEVERA CURRENT TOPICS. rickety sign endangers our head or a low wire our throat. We stop to chat a moment with a friend and lean against a deadly charged electric pole, and it is all over with the conversation. (Why not plant such poles at the streetcorners for the dispersion of the gangs of loafers who there do congregate?) A passing plumber burns our coat with his unextinguished handfurnace; a passing carpenter lacerates our trousers with a saw; a passing porter imperils our head with a long piece of gas-pipe on his shoulder. One is annoyed, if not endangered, by the servant washing the sidewalk by a hose, or the fireman carrying his wriggling serpent up a ladder. A fresh young Italian maid from Cork, with a white muslin night-cap on her head, runs us down with a baby-carriage, scarring our shins or necessitating a visit to the chiropodist. Then there is the woman's umbrella that wasteth at noonday, scooping us up after the manner of a drag-net, or impaling us in its blind and headlong charge. All these are sidewalk perils. If we undertake to cross the street dangers multiply. The pedestrian has no rights which the driver is bound to respect, and the footfarer, unless a handsome woman personally conducted by a big policeman, will be subject to being sician in a hurry, or the chief of the fire departrun down by the driver of a beer wagon, or a phy or a coroner intent on beating a rival, or a be- EVERAL paragraphs in the newspapers have recalled certain dangers of the city streets, some of which occurred to us years ago in discussing the topic of nuisance. Peace hath her perils no less deadly than war. One of Napoleon's marshals, we believe, escaped from many bloody fields to die at his dinner-table of a chicken bone. So the unwary or absent-minded citizen is environed by unknown perils from the moment he leaves his door-steps in the morning until he ascends them at night. Indeed, before he leaves them, for in slippery weather his first peril is that of sliding prone down the steep descent and bringing up, even at this early hour, in the gutter. Then the sidewalk may be slippery, and the law reports attest the frequency of accidents from this score. His skull may be cracked by a huge icicle, or he may be overwhelmed by a natural avalanche, or an artificially precipitated mass of snow, from his neighbor's roof. Especially must he be on guard against this perilment on his "golomphing" way to a conflagration, in passing our noble State Capitol. On the steep hills the coasting boys have worn the footway to a glassy surface, and the wayfarer is liable to be cut down by some young scamp who is not considerate enough to shout a warning to jump into the gutter. Snow-balling is another source of danger. These are perils peculiar to winter, bnt summer produces her own. Instead of snow-balling there is the baseball-playing nuisance maintained by small boys without pay in imitation of men who play ball for salaries larger than those allotted to most of the judges. Instead of coasting or "bobbing" there is the swift and stealthy bicycle, as deadly as the ancient war chariot, running people down, or at least causing the nervous man to jump to one side like a tarantula. Then a school of sweet little girls on roller-skates swoop down upon us, making it dangerous to turn either way, and compelling us to stand still and see our salvation. Our neighbor's coal-hole is open or insecurely covered, and one leg slips in or both heels fly out, with woe to brittle bones. There is the peel of orange or banana dropped upon the flagging in disregard or defiance of our statute in that case made and provided. There is the danger of the whip-lash flourished by the profane driver of over-freighted wagon, or stuck out at conventional right angle over the sidewalk by the liveried lackey upon the carriage-box, threatening loss of eyesight or a mark on the cheek like a sabre slash in a German student duel. We bruise our legs in climbing over skids stretched across the walk, or we barely dodge a box or barrel, or one of those pasteboard safes spoken of by the funny man of the Times, falling from a hoistway. VOL. 38- No. 16. A St. Paul. Most of them indeed are "perils by false brethren," against which the injunctions and penalties of the law are futile. To avoid misapprehension we will add that these lines are not written in the interest of any particular accident insurance company. A case of dying declarations has given rise to some interesting comments in the last London law journals. The Law Journal says: "The evidence, on the strength of which the deathbed declaration of Eliza Schumacher was tendered in the case of Reg. v. Gloster, tried this week at the Old Bailey, was very slight indeed.' It was simply that the doctor who received it and attended her in her last moments asked her if she made it with the fear of death before her eyes, and that she replied in the affirmative. With all persons and at all times there is the expectation of death which may take the form of fear, and all that was added in the case in question was an expectation of death by the illness from which the patient suffered. If we accept the view of Lord Justice Lush in Reg. v. Jenkins, 38 L. J. Rep. M. C. 82, that if the declarant thinks that he will die to-morrow that will not do,' the evidence was obviously not enough; but most lawyers will agree with Mr. Justice Charles that the view of Mr. Justice Willes in Reg. v. Peel, that death must be thought impending within a few hours, better expresses the true test. Lawyers will also agree that the evidence in this case clearly did not answer that test. One of the reasons given by Mr. Justice Byles for the scrupulous, almost superstitious care necessary in accepting dying declarations—namely, that the prisoner was not present was perhaps a little unfortunate, as likely to suggest that the presence of the prisoner might make them admissible. That is however not the test, which is solely and simply whether the state of mind of the declarant was such that he believed he was lying in the presence of imminent death." And the Solicitors' Journal says: "The decision of Mr. Justice Charles, which we report elsewhere, with regard to the admissibility of dying declarations, affords a useful qualification of the vague common statement that such declarations must be made in articulo mortis. In the latest previous authority on the subject (Reg. v. Osborne, 15 Cox C. C. 169) Lord Justice Lush laid it down that the declarant must entertain a settled, hopeless expectation of immediate death; if he thinks he will die to-morrow that will not do.' Mr. Justice Charles however preferred to accept the test given by Mr. Justice Willes in Reg. v. Peel, 2 F. & F. 21, that the declarant must have believed death to be impending, not on the instant, but within a very short time. The recent case however, on the other hand, shows the scrupulousness with which the condition precedent to the admissibility of the statement viz., the abandonment by the declarant of all hope of recovery is to be observed. It only appeared that the declarant thought she would die, but had not entirely given up every hope of recovery, and the learned judge therefore rejected the declaration, observing that all the authorities showed that in order to render a dying declaration admissible there must be an unqualified belief in the nearness of death. In one of the most recent of these authorities (Reg. v. Jenkins, 17 W. R. 621; 1 C. C. R. 187) the magistrate's clerk who took the deposition of the deceased appended to it the words: 'I have made the above statement with the fear of death before me and with no hope of my recovery,' but had afterward, in consequence of something else which the deceased said, added the words 'at present' after the word 'hope.' The court held that the declaration was inadmissible, because it was not shown that the defendant was under an unqualified belief that death was immediately impending, and Mr. Justice Byles observed that dying declarations were to be received with scrupulous- I had almost said with superstitious-care.'” The Ameri can cases, as we recollect, do not lay stress upon the nearness of death-they do not seem to consider time as of the essence of the declaration; but the | universal and indispensable test is that the victim must have utterly abandoned all expectation and hope of recovery. If we ever get time we shall write a book on the humorous phases of actions for negligence brought by servants against masters, and in it we shall include the case of Reinig v. Broadway Railroad Co. of Brooklyn, 49 Hun, 269. It was held that where a servant is directed to clean off the snow from a roof, and in returning to the ground after doing so, in order to avoid a snow-drift at the bottom of a ladder on which he is descending, jumps off the ladder and falls through a skylight in the roof, which is so covered with snow that it cannot be seen, he has no right of action against his employer for injuries arising therefrom. A case almost as impudent as this was that of a brakeman out west who sued his company because he slipped on the icy ground along the track. He seemed to think the company should have sprinkled it with ashes. There is another recent skylight case in our Court of Appeals, brought by a child of a tenant against the landlord for falling from an upper story through a skylight. Such injuries are painful, no doubt, but we do not see how the maintainer of the window-panes is to blame. NOTES OF CASES. N People v. De Kroyft, 49 Hun, 71, an indictment instrument also signed by Mary Vogt, his wife, it was claimed by the defendant and by Mary that the defendant had signed the name of Mary and that Mary had signed that of Jacob. On cross-examination of Mary by the district attorney a juror asked her to write her own and her husband's name, which she did, and the signatures were put in evidence for comparison. Held, no error. The court said: "The defendant's counsel attempts to sustain his objection and exception by the rule of evidence adopted and in force in this State prior to the enactment of chapter 36 of the Laws of 1880, that when the genuineness of a signature to an instrument is in dispute other signatures cannot be given in evidence which are genuine to enable the jury to compare the same with the one in dispute, and that no documents can be used for the purpose of making a comparison except such as have already been put in evidence for other legitimate purposes. Two reasons have been assigned for the support of the rule mentioned, viz.: First. The danger of fraud in the selection of the writings offered as specimens for the occasion. Second. That, if admitted, the genuineness of these specimens may be contested and others successively introduced, to the infinite multiplication of collateral issues and the subversion of justice. To which Mr. Greenleaf, in his work on Evidence, added another, to wit: The danger of surprise upon the other party who may not know what documents are to be produced, and therefore may not be prepared to meet the inferences drawn from them. Van Wyck v. McIntosh, 14 N. Y. 439; Doe v. Newton, 5 Ad. & El. 514; 1 Greenl. Ev., § 580. But these objections do not apply, and the rule is not applicable where the signature offered in evidence was written in the presence of the court and jury by the person whose signature is in dispute as in this case. The issue to which the evidence related was whether the witness, Mary Vogt, or the defendant wrote the name of Jacob Vogt to the instrument set forth in the indictment. The witness was called by the defendant to prove that he did not and that she did write the name of Jacob Vogt to the note, and also that the defendant did and that she did not sign her own name thereto. If the district attorney was willing to take the risk of such evidence the defendant cannot complain that this method was adopted for the purpose of testing the truthfulness of the defendant's own witness. There is authority to be found in the decisions of this and other States in support of the argument that the signatures made by the witness during her cross-examination in the presence of the court and jury was competent evidence on the question of the witness' veracity. In Bronner v. Loomis, 14 Hun, 341, the action was on a promissory note claimed by the plaintiff to have been made by the defendant, who interposed the defense that her signature thereto was a forgery. The defendant was examined as a witness in her own behalf, and on her cross-examination she at the request of the plaintiff wrote her name on a slip of paper, which was received in evidence on the plaintiff's offer and over the defendant's objection, and it was held to be competent evidence. In that case, as in this, the inquiry was whether the signature in question was or was not that of the witness who had testified on the direct examination that it was not. In Chandler v. Le Barron, 45 Me. 534, it was held that a writing made in the presence of a court and jury by the party whose signature is in dispute may be submitted to the jury for the purpose of comparison. In the case of Doe v. Wilson, 10 Moore Priv. Coun. Cas. 202, that tribunal in its opinion said: "Their lordships have no doubt that if on a trial in nisi prius a witness had denied his signature to a document produced in evidence, and upon being desired to write his name had done so in open court, such writing might be treated as evidence in the case and be submitted to the jury, who might compare it with the alleged signature to the document.' We think the court below committed no error in allowing the signatures to be introduced in evidence under the circumstances of this case. We may properly add, in this connection, that the rule as stated does not permit a party, the genuineness of whose signature is in dispute, to write his name in the presence of the court and jury and then give it in evidence in his own behalf for the jury to institute a comparison between it and the one in question. The party so situated would be under a great temptation to produce a signature in appear ance altogether dissimilar to the one sought to be sustained by the adverse party as genuine. King v. Donahue, 110 Mass. 155. The district attorney, in his argument in support of the competency of the evidence objected to, contends that by the provisions of chapter 36, Laws of 1880, the evidence was made competent, even if the same was not by the common-law rule which previously prevailed in this State. It may be that the act referred to is broad enough in its provisions to make the evidence competent, but we prefer to place our decision on the ground already stated." See Springer v. Hall, 83 Mo. 693; S. C., 53 Am. Rep. 598; National Bank of Chester Co. v. Armstrong, 66 Md. 113; S. C., 59 Am. Rep. 156; Morrison v. Porter, 35 Minn. 425; S. C., 59 Am. Rep. 331; Rose v. First National Bank of Springfield, 91 Mo. 399; S. C., 60 Am. Rep. 258. In First National Bank v. Robert, 41 Mich. 709, it was held that a defendant whose signature is in dispute may not be required on cross-examina tion to write his name for the purpose of comparison. See also Hayes v. Adams, 2 T. & C. 593. In Fitzpatrick v. Garrisons and West Point Ferry Co., 49 Hun, 288, it was held that where a ferry company carries on a business which naturally draws together numbers of people in a place which is open to the public, with instruments which are so defective as to be eminently dangerous to human life, it is guilty of a breach of duty to the public for injuries resulting therefrom, although the party injured may not have come upon the place on any business connected with the ferry company. The plaintiff and other boys had gathered on the dock where the ferry-boat landed, and got upon a bridge and by their weight brought it down on the boat with some force, the result of which was that a bolt, which had fastened to it a chain running over a pulley with a weight at the other end, pulled out of one corner of the bridge, and the weight on that side fell, striking the plaintiff. The place at which the accident happened was Cranstons' dock, at Highland Falls, which was private property, which did not belong to the defendant, nor did the defendant have any lease of it, although it had been used by the defendant for some time for the landing of its boat. The court said: "The accident under consideration occurred at a place which was open to the general public, which they had been long accustomed to use, and into which they were impliedly invited to enter. They had therefore a right to assume that no traps existed that would make such entry dangerous. The appellant claims that as the plaintiff came upon the premises solely to gratify his curiosity, and was at most but a licensee, the defendant owed him no duty of active vigilance. But defendants must be held to have contemplated the natural consequences of their acts. They carried on an occupation which would natur ally draw together numbers of people in a public place, with instruments that were so defective as to be eminently dangerous to human life. |