ent collateral facts to be drawn into the issue. The question is, is the fact sought to be proved, namely, the effect of the construction of a railroad upon other hotels, a fact relevant to the issue, which is one involving the Fountain House? I think it is not. If the evidence proposed to be introduced is admitted, it must be that the plaintiff would have the right to rebut it, and then the defendant might have the right to reply to the testimony in rebuttal, and thus we should be engaged in a trial of the question as to other hotels, an independent collateral fact not germane to the principal issue we are trying. It is the duty of the court to allow the defendant to do in support of its contention just what it has allowed the plaintiff to do in support of his theory of the case, that is, to call witnesses who may show themselves qualified to speak on the subject from experience in the summer hotel business; to give to the jury their opinion and judgment as to whether the construction of this railroad will injuriously affect the patronage and business of the Fountain House. This the defendant has the right to do, and such testimony will be admitted. But to testimony offered only to show the effect of the construction or proximity or operation of a railroad upon other hotels, the objection must be sustained." upon the business and patronage of the Fountain House. The witnesses were shown to have been long acquainted and experienced in the business of keeping summer hotels, supported by a class of patrons similar to those which the testimony tends to show are received as guests at the Fountain House, and appeared to be qualified to speak upon the subject to which their examination related. The testimony referred to was, of course, offered as bearing, in its ultimate effect, upon the question of the value of the property for summer hotel purposes after the railroad was built across the plaintiff's land. The admission of this testimony was contested with much force by counsel for the defendant, but the court was unable to see why, within the doctrine of the cases on the subject decided by the Supreme Court of this State (Wisconsin), it was not admissible. The only doubt I had was whether the matter inquired about was the proper subject of expert testimony. There may be doubt upon that point, but so much has the law in relation to the competency of such testimony, as applied to various subjects, been extended, or its scope broadened by modern authority, that it seemed to me when the question came up that the doubt ought to be resolved in favor of the admission of the testimony. I have given a good deal of thought to the question since, because if satisfied that the testimony was improperly admitted I would not hesitate to strike it out before submitting the case to the jury, this being held to be proper practice, and to cure the error of original admission of improper testimony by the Supreme Court of the United States. But after careful reflection my conviction still is that the testimony was admissible. Now the defendant offers the testimony of witnesses - gentlemen engaged in the summer hotel business, and under-court said: "In considering the first of these quesstood to be experienced in that business by which it is sought to show that they have kept hotels in even nearer proximity to railroads than is the Fountain House to the defendant's road, and that the business of such hotels has not been injuriously affected by that fact. The question is, is this testimony admissible? It is not proposed to show this merely as establishing the experience of the wit-handwriting, for instance, it has always been nesses in the summer hotel business, and then to follow it with an expression of opinion from the witnesses as to whether the business of the Fountain House is likely to be diminished by the construction of the defendant's railroad. This is frankly admitted. But the object of the proposed testimony is simply to show that the business of other summer hotels is not injured by their proximity to a railroad. Clearly this would be introduc-plagiarized papers have been read, and the so-called ing into the case what might prove to be a new and independent issue, foreign to that we have to try, namely, an issue in relation to the business, situation and surroundings of other hotels, and all the various circumstances under which business is transacted in them. There are exceptional instances where this is allowable, such as cases involving matters of science, art or questions of professional skill. But the cases are rare which allow independ In Gaunt v. State, New Jersey Supreme Court, June 20, 1888, it was held that upon the trial of an indictment for fornication, where both the bastard and the putative father were viewed by the jury, the jury may consider whether there is a resemblance or not between them. In such cases the proper instrument of proof is inspection by the jury, and not the testimony of witnesses. The tions, viz., as to the relevancy of resemblance as an element of proof, it is clear that testimony of this character must be treated as a class. Thus viewed, whatever opinion may be held as to the illusory nature of such evidence in cases like the present, there is no question that as a class resemblances are admitted wherever relevant. In cases involving deemed pertinent to have a comparison of hands. In materialization of spirits exhibited — all within the scope of the doctrine of the relevancy of resemblance; while in a case now pending in the courts of Pennsylvania a board of experts have been ordered to inspect a certain contrivance called the Keeley Motor,' with a view to the determination of its resemblance or mechanical equivalency to a motor described in plaintiff's partnership bill. Examples of the application of the same rule to family ceived testimony ss to the color of the hair of plaintiff's other children, the illegitimate child having hair of a different color. In Gilmanton v. Ham, 38 N. H. 108, counsel commented upon the resemblance of the child to the defendant, and upon appeal the court affirmed his right so to do, upon the ground that the matter was relevant, and the parties before the jury. Finnegan v. Dugan, 14 Allen, 197. In this case the child was in court, and the judge, against defendant's objection, charged the jury that they might consider whether there was any resemblance between the child and the defendant. In affirming the judgment the Supreme Court says: 'It is a well-known physiological fact that peculiarities of feature and personal traits are often transmitted from parent to child. Taken by itself, proof of such resemblance would be insufficient to establish paternity, but it would be clearly a circumstance to be considered in connection with other facts tending to prove the issue on which the jury are to pass.' The same court, in Eddy v. Gray, 4 Allen, 435, sustained a ruling rejecting testimony upon the same subject, upon the ground that it did not come within the rule of expert testimony. The further question then arises whether the court below erred in refusing to charge the jury that they must judge of this matter of resemblance not from their own view, but from the testimony delivered in the case from the mouths of witnesses. Upon this point the position of the plaintiff in error lacks the support of the weight of authority. Of the cases cited in his brief as against the admission of testimony as to resemblance, many proceed solely upon the ground that the opinions of witnesses cannot be received for this purpose, while not intimating that the question of resemblance is impertinent. There seems to be no good reason why a jury, if the question of resemblance is to be considered by them, should be compelled to base their decision upon a second-hand view. The effect of the substitution of testimony for inspection is to put the subject-matter of investigation one further removed from its responsible judges, and thus to add to the infirmities inherent in proof of this class the additional danger of bias and imposition. Inspection is like admission, in that while not testimony it is an instrument for dispensing with testimony, and in a doubtful case the class of testimony it dispenses with might be a controlling circumstance. Thus regarded, and in view of the almost utter worthlessness of the testimony of witnesses adduced on the question of the resemblance of a bastard to an alleged parent, it is obvious that inspection is on this account also to be preferred. In the case under consideration the child was in court during the trial; the attention of the jury was directed to it as the offspring of the alleged fornication; the defendant was a witness in the likeness are not wanting. In the notorious Doug- | case, which was for crim. con., the court had relass case, House of Lords, 1769, Lord Mansfield allowed the resemblance of the appellant and his brother to Sir John Stewart and Lady Jane Douglass to be shown, as well as their dissimilarity to those persons whose children they were supposed to be; while as late as 1871 Lord Chief Justice Cockburn, in the Tichborne case, held that the resemblance of the claimant to a family daguerreotype of Roger Tichborne was relevant, and intimated that comparison of features between the claimant and the sisters of Arthur Orton would be permitted. The extension of this rule to cases of family likeness in bastardy and other suits of alleged parentage cannot be questioned seriously on principle; the illusory nature of such resemblances rather imposing a duty on the court in conjunction with the admission of the proof than militating against the relevancy of the inquiry. Such has been the view taken by the courts in this country. In Garvin v. State, 52 Miss. 207, an indictment rested on the ground that the defendant was a colored man. Of this there was no proof, but as the defendant had been before the jury the court held that their inspection did away with the necessity of proof, saying, 'juries may use their eyes as well as their ears.' In Jones v. Jones, 45 Md. 151, the court permitted the jury to judge as to a personal resemblance but not to hear testimony on that subject, upon the ground that when the parties are before the jury whatever resemblance there is will be directly apparent, but to permit third persons to give their opinions would be raising a class of experts where expertism does not exist. In Iowa the courts have held, on the question of resemblance of a bastard to its alleged father, that an infant two years old might be exhibted to the jury (State v. Smith, 54 Iowa, 104), while a baby of three months could not be shown. State v. Danforth, 48 id. 45; S. C., 30 Am. Rep. 387. This discrimination rests upon a physiological notion adopted by the court, which can scarcely find justification as a rule of evidence. In Risk v. State, 19 Ind. 152, a child of three months was put in evidence. The court held that as there had been no objection to the evidence the jury had a right to consider it. In North Carolina, in the case of State v. Woodruff, 67 N. C. 89, the charge of the court that the resemblance of a bastard to the defendant was relevant was held good. In the case of Warlick v. White, 76 N. C. 175; S. C., 41 Am. Rep. 453, the question was whether a girl was of mixed blood. Plaintiff had subpoenaed the girl for the sole purpose of having her seen by the jury. Upon objection being made the court overruled the offer. Held, on appeal, that the court erred; that on a question of mixed blood the offer to exhibit the girl should have been permitted. In the cases in New York which prohibit testimony upon resemblances the question of view by the jury does not arise, but in Petrie v. Howe, 4 Thomp. & C. 85, the court, in rejecting the testimony, says: 'If this species of physiological evidence is admissible it should not be covertly introduced.' In that cause. Under these circumstances it was not error for the court to refuse to charge the jury that they mus not consider the question of resemblance at all, and that if they did consider it, it must be THIRD NATIONAL BANK OF BUFFALO V. GUENTHER. A wife, conducting a separate business solely through the agency of her husband, agreed, in consideration of his services therein, to pay him a salary of $1,600 a year and to pay all the expenses of supporting the family. The business was so conducted for seven years, when she became insolvent and made an assignment for creditors, preferring her husband for an unpaid balance of $7,000 for such salary. The family expenses during that period amounted to more than the agreed salary. Held, that the assignment was vold as to creditors. PRIOR RIOR to 1874 Henry T. Gillett carried on business as a wholesale and retail liquor dealer at Buffalo. For a portion of the time his son Albert A. Gillett and John G. Guenther were partners with him, under the firm name of Henry T. Gillett & Son. Albert A. Gillett died, and the business was then conducted by the surviving partners, each having an equal interest. In November, 1874, Henry T. Gillett died, leaving a will, in which, after making several bequests, he bequeathed to his daughter, Georgianna J. Guenther, the residue and remainder of his estate. The business continued to be carried on by John G. Guenther, the husband of Georgianna, as surviving partner, until May 1, 1876, when as executor and surviving partner of Henry T. Gillett he turned over all the property and business of the firm to Georgianna, she absolving him from all liability, assumed the debts and liabilities then existing, and also the payment of the legacies remaining unpaid. After the transfer to her of said property and business, she caused to be filed in the clerk's office of Erie county a certificate stating that she was the person now and hereafter dealing under the firm name of Henry T. Gillett & Son, and that her place of abode was in Buffalo, N. Y., and that John G. Guenther was her agent for the carrying on of said business. At the time of the consummation of this arrangement she entered into a verbal contract with her husband, whereby she agreed to pay, in consideration of his carrying on the business as her agent, the sum of $1,600 a year, and further agreed to pay and assume all the expenses of supporting the family of the said John G. Guenther during said time. The reasonable and proper living expenses of the said family were from $2,000 to $2,500 a year. Under this agreement the business was carried on from said 1st day of May, 1876, to the 9th day of May, 1883, during which time there was paid from said business for living expenses of the family in the aggregate upwards of $10,000, the exact amouut not being stated. There was also drawn by John G. Guenther to apply upon this salary as agent the sum of $2,031.38. The aggregate sum drawn from the business and paid as family expenses exceeded the aggregate sum of $1,600 per year, agreed to be paid said Guenther as salary for his services as agent. Georgianna J. Guenther, during the time the business was carried on by her husband as agent for her, was entirely unacquainted with the details or methods by which it was conducted or whether it was profitable or unprofitable; she was without business experience, and the sole management devolved upon her husband. The business was so conducted by her husband until the 8th day of May, when it was discovered that Georgianna J. Guenther was insolvent and unable to pay her debts in full, and upon said 8th day of May she made and executed a general assignment for the benefit of her creditors to John L. Romer as assignee. In said assignment she preferred her husband as a creditor in the sum of $7,000 for unpaid salary arising out of his employment as agent aforesaid. An action was brought to declare said assignment void as tending to hinder, delay and defraud creditors. The action was referred, and the referee found that the said preference of $7,000 was fraudulent and directed judgment declaring said assignment void. H. C. Day and John L. Romer, for appellants. HATCH, J. The question presented for determination is, can the husband and wife by contract between themselves change the rights, liabilities and obligations which inhere to the marital relation? It is clear that no such power existed at common law? Beach v. Beach, 2 Hill, 260; 1 Sharswood's Bl. Com. 441, 442; 2 Kent's Com. (12th ed.) 129. Among the liabilities thus created by the marital relation, always existing and which still exists, is the obligation resting upon the husband to support aud maintain the wife, and this without regard to whether the wife is possessed of a sole and separate estate or not. 2 Kent's Com. (12th ed.) 146; Maxon v. Scott, 55 N. Y. 247-49; S. C., 62 Barb. 531; Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 15-24. The unity of the husband and wife has not been destroyed by the several acts which have been passed, removing very largely her common law disabilities, except so far as the statutes expressly provide. Accordingly it has been held that a deed running directly from the wife to the husband was ineffectual to pass title. Wager v. White, 25 N. Y. 328. That by the conveyance of land to the husband and wife, their heirs and assigns each became seized of the entirety. Bertles v. Nunan, 92 N. Y. 150. That the husband and wife are not authorized to form a copartnership for the purpose of trade or busiKaufman v. Schoeffel, 37 Hun, 140. ness. These authorities clearly show that only to the extent to which the common law disabilities have been removed may the husband and wife contract. The intent of the Legislature to still retain the oneness of the husband and wife is made more manifest by the most recent legislation, as the statutes of 1884 removed all disabilities with respect to contracts made by the wife, except contracts between husband and wife, which were expressly excepted. The obligation resting upon the husband to support and maintain the wife, not having been modified or abrogated by any statute, it follows that no legal contract with the wife can be entered into which will relieve him from such obligation. Nash v. Mitchel, 71 N. Y. 199; Perkins v. Perkins, 7 Lans. 19. It is claimed however that the several acts, so far as the same relate to the separate estate of the wife, have removed all disability with respect to her dealings therewith, and that this contract relating alone to management of her sole and separate property, and in her sole and separate business, can be upheld for the reason that she may do with such property as she sees fit. It is no longer open to debate that a married woman, by virtue of the enabling statutes, may carry on a sole and separate business, is entitled to all the benefits arising therefrom and subject to all the liabilities attaching thereto. She may transact business in person or through an agent, and she may employ her husband to act for her as such agent. Knapp v. Smith, 27 N. Y. 277; Abbey v. Deyo, 44 id. 343; Owen v. Cawley, 36 id. 600; Baum v. Mullen, 47 id. 577. So far as her separate estate is concerned, she has the power to dispose of it for any legal purpose to the fullest extent to which any other person has. In this respect the statutes have swept away the common law disability. Tiemeyer v. Turnquist, 85 N. Y. 516; Buckley v. Wells, 33 id. 518. Such right however to acquire and use property car. ries with it corresponding and correlative obligations. As she can purchase property, so the obligation is imposed to pay. Cashman v. Henry, 76 N. Y. 103. Where she transacts business through an agent, she is estopped by his acts, where doing the act in person she would be estopped. Noel v. Kinney, 106 N. Y. 74; Bodine v. Killeen, 53 id. 93. She is liable for the frauds of the husband perpetrated in the management of her estate, although without knowledge of the fraud and acting innocently. Warner v. Warren, 46 N. Y. 228; Kraum v. Beach, 96 id. 398. The cases are uniform in holding that her right to deal with property as if unmarried attaches to it all of the incidents and obligations that attach to like rights exercised by other persons. The authorities which hold that she may use, consume, keep, give away or sell property of which she is possessed do not hold or say that she may so use it if she thereby deprives or defrauds another of what she is legally under obligations to render. The sense in which such language must be understood is that she may so use her property when such use does not thereby deprive others of what is their due, and she is untrammelled by obligations which good faith requires to be discharged; she may not then give away, destroy, consume or keep property which she has acquired. Her disabilities removed, she drops into the category of legal responsibility; she may no more commit a fraud in the disposition of her property than her husband can in the d sposition of his property; what will taint his transaction will equally tarnish hers. This right therefore which the statutes have conferred upon her does not authorize her to make illegal contracts, nor do they dispense with any requirement which the law imposes with respect to the ownership of property. So that it is not accurate to say that she may deal with her property as she sees fit, or consume it in the payment of what the husband is legally liable to pay, if thereby the rights of creditors are affected. It is however claimed that if this contract to pay the household expenses could not be enforced, yet it not being a contract, malum in se, and having been executed, it cannot now be attacked. It may be conceded for present purposes, that as between the parties, the wife having received the benefit of the husband's services could not recover back from him what she had paid as family expenses, and this upon the principle of estoppel. He was not bound to work for her in the management of her separate business, but having done so upon her agreement to relieve him from marital obligation, the law would not allow her to repudiate the contract after having received the benefits. But such is not the case here; while the wife may not take advantage of the executed, void agreement, creditors who are prejudiced thereby may. They had the right to assume, when dealing with the defendant, that her property would not be absorbed by the husband in right of any void agreement, or that her property would be used in the payment of obligations legally resting upon the husband to pay, while he at the same time exhausted her estate by accumulating salary. Such dealing misleads the creditor and opens the door for perpetrating the grossest frauds. I uuderstand this to be in part the principle which controlled the decision in Coleman v. Burr, 93 N. Y. 17, and Whitaker v. Whitaker, 52 id. 368. The husband could no more contract to be relieved from supporting his wife and family here than the wife could contract for payment for services which she was bound to render in the Burr case. In both the agreement is in fraud of the rights of creditors. It is conceded, and the referee found upon the trial that the services of the husband in carrying on this business were fairly and reasonably worth the sum of $1,600. The inference which arises from such concession and finding is that they were worth no more than that sum. It was further conceded and found that the reasonable and proper living expenses of the family were from $2,000 to $2,500 a year. Thus we have the husband receiving compensation at the rate of from $3,600 to $4,100 a year for services concededly worth but $1,600 a year. Seven years of such methods equals an assignment, or more accurately speaking, obligations of the husband paid by the wife from $14,000 to $17,500; paid upon salary, $2,031.38, making a total paid of from $16,031.38 to $19,531.38, to which must be added the balance of salary remaining unpaid, amounting to the sum of $9,168.62, making a grand total which the husband became entitled to receive for his seven years' service of from $25,200 to $28,700. And this for services confessedly worth but $11,200. Although the balance remaining unpaid was $9,168.62, the husband is only found preferred for $7,000. Nothing more is needed to show the fraudulent character of such a preference, either as an inference created by law or as a matter of fact. Coleman v. Burr, supra, 31. The longer such a contract was executed the more deplorable becomes the condition of the creditors; good faith and fair dealing towards them require that the husband shall be chargeable with what he was legally under obligations to pay. With this done there remains no debt to prefer. We therefore think the referee right in deciding this assignment fraudulent and void as hindering, delaying and defrauding creditors. There was no error committed in the admission of the judgment rolls in evidence. They were proper as showing the insolvency of Mrs. Guenther at and previous to the making of the assignment and while she was paying the living expenses of the husband's family. So far as the admissions contained in the an. swer are concerned, if we treat them as technically admissible, they iu no wise injured or prejudiced the defendants, as Mrs. Guenther and her husband, on behalf of the defendants, testified to substantially the same facts as matter of defense. Bardin v. Stevenson, 75 N. Y. 167; Foote v. Beecher, 78 id. 155. [Omitting minor points.] We find no error in the determination of the referee. The judgment appealed from should therefore be affirmed with costs. Beckwith, Ch. J., concurs. Titus, J., dissents. Where a testator made a specific disposition of certain property, including all his land, and proceeded to give the legatee all the loose property in, on and around the homestead, consisting of one cow, two hogs, and a lot of wood," concluding by giving to her "all other property of every kind," the concluding clause carries to the legatee the entire residue of personal property, including promissory notes, and the next of kin cannot invoke the doctrine confining her to property ejusdem generis with cows, hogs and wood about the premises. APPEAL from appellate court, First district. Pe tition in the Circuit Court of Carroll county (John V. Eustace, Judge,) by Christiane C. Taubenhan, Auguste F. Unger and Allwine C. Weiss against Margareth Dunz, seeking a construction of the will of Charles Medler. Petition dismissed and plaintiff ap pealed. Vocke & Storck, for appellants. James M. Hunter and Geo. L. Hoffman, for appellee. SHOPE, J. But a single question is presented by this record, namely, what portion of the estate of Charles Medler, deceased, did Margareth Dunz take under his will? Or otherwise stated, was any portion of said estate intestate estate? It is not controverted but that Margareth Dunz took possession of and had received the lands described and referred to, the sum of money named, the particular note and the specific articles of personal property described and referred to in the will; but after this was done, there remained in the hands of the administrator about $2,000 in money, and $2,420 of notes reported by him as uncollectible; and this residue of the estate was claimed both by Margareth Dunz, under the will, and by appellants, the sisters of the testator, his heirs at law, as intestate estate. The question of first importance in every case of construction of a will is, what was the intention of the testator? and when that is ascertained, effect is to be given thereto. In the absence of latent ambiguity, the intention of the testator is to be gathered alone from the will itself-from a full view and consideration of every thing within "the four corners of the instrument." Hoxie v. Hoxie, 7 Paige, 187; Updike v. Tompkins, 100 Ill. 406; Blanchard v. Maynard, 103 id. 60. Every portion of the instrument must have its just operation, unless there arises an irreconcilable repugnance or some portion is absolutely unintelligible. As was said in Dawes v. Swan, 4 Mass. 208, it is the duty of the conrt "to give effect to all words, without rejecting or controlling any of them, if it can be done by a reasonable construction not inconsistent with the manifest intention of the testator." See also 1 Redf. Wills, 434; Loun Co. v. Bonner, 75 Ill. 315. And further, the natural construction of the words employed will be adopted, unless there is such an impracticability of so construing them as to authorize their rejection, or such uncertainty that uo effect can be given them. Mowatt v. Carow, 7 Paige, 328; Welsch v. Bank, 94 Ill. 191. In the will before us there is neither ambiguity, repugnance nor unintelligibility; and if the words employed are given their natural construction and meaning, disposition is made of the testator's entire estate. "It is presumed that a testator, when he makes and publishes his will, intends to dispose of his entire estate, unless the presumption is rebutted by its provisions or evidence to the contrary." Higgins v. Dwen, 100 Ill. 554. There is here not only no evidence aliunde of a contrary intention, but in the will itself no words are to be found manifesting an intention to leave any part of the testator's estate undisposed of. His estate in fact consisted of both real and personal property, a large part made up of promissory notes. No question is made in respect to his real estate-all that was specifically devised; nor in respect to the Stober note, the $3,000 in money or the loose property "in, on and around the homestead,"-all that, it seems to be conceded, was specifically bequeathed; nor is it contended but that the final granting words of the will, "and all other property of every kind," are sufficiently broad and comprehensive in meaning, if given their natural Construction, to embrace the residue of the estate, consisting of the proceeds of the choses in action possessed by the testator at the time of his decease. But the contention on behalf of appellants is (1) that the heir is not to be disinherited without an express devise or necessary implication, and (2) that the words "and all other property of every kind" should be confined to articles ejusdem generis with loose property in, on and around the homestead; and that as to all that part of his estate not specifically disposed of by will, testator died intestate, and the same descended to his heirs at law. The rule that the heir is not to be disinherited without an express devise or necessary implication is not questioned; but the rule can have no application here, and need not be further considered, because we have in this will an express devise, broad and comprehensive enough to embrace every species of property owned by the testator, unless the words "and all other property of every kind," by their connection and juxtaposition, are to be limited to property ejusdem generis with property theretofore particularly named. The principle of construction secondly invoked, and upon which chief reliance is placed, and by which it is sought to limit and circumscribe the application of the words of the will last referred to, which, torn from their context and standing alone, would manifest the clearest intention to bestow upon the only person named in the will the residue of the testator's estate, is in the highest degree technical, and ought not to be adopted and applied, unless from an inspection and consideration of all the provisions of the will its adoption and application is required to carry out and give effect to the discerned intention of the testator. There is not in the principle itself any thing that can give it the nature and character of a rule of property. But does the will before us present a case of either doubt or uncertainty? We think not. But a single legatee is named in the will. But one object of his bounty seems to have been in the mind of the testator. True he specified only a part of his property, but such specific designation was followed by words of comprehensive import. As said by Lord Romilly in Nugee v. Chapman, 29 Beav. 290: "It is not uncommon for persons who intend to include every thing, and who do not write accurately, to specify many items, and then to add a general expression." This will is inartificially drawn. It is manifest that the scrivener had some knowledge respecting the words employed in making testamentary devises and bequests; but it is apparent, from an inspection of the will itself, that he had little knowledge of the forms necessary in making testamentary disposition of estates. If it was the intention of the testator to bestow all his estate upon one person, that intention will not be defeated by a partial designation, if the general words, giving to them their natural meaning and operation, were comprehensive enough to embrace the whole estate. It is easy to see it was the intention that the legatee should take the particular lot of land occupied by him as a homestead, and from the description thereof in the will it is apparent that the draughtsman supposed the testator owned it in fee, whereas the fact is he only owned the undivided one-half interest. And it is also apparent that the intention was to give the same legatee a portion at least of the loose property in, on and around the homestead; but it might very well have been questioned whether it was the intention to give to the legatee "all the loose property in, on and around the homestead," since these general words are immediately followed by the particular words, "consisting of one cow, two hogs, and a lot of wood." There were in fact in, on and around the homestead many other articles of property, such as kitchen furniture, ten bushels of potatoes, three boxes export beer, four and three-quarter barrels cider, thirty bushels corn, fifty bushels oats, a ton of hay, a lot of ice and lumber, and implements and tools of various sorts, and it might well have been said that the general words, "all the |