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the last word. What do you oppose, by your system, to Universal Suffrage? A man, appointed for seven years. A conflict is inevitable, with his resignation for its obvious issue. If France will not have the Republic, she must give up Universal Suffrage; but if she refuse to do so, she had better make up her mind to it and frankly organise the Republic."

These arguments struck against a solid block of illusions, hopes and convictions which only broke up very slowly.

Thirty years later one of the most distinguished men of that time, the Vicomte de Meaux, whose precious Souvenirs bring much light on many things, still reproached Gambetta and his party with "having made the Republic depend upon the monopolising of power by the new social strata,' at the exclusion of every other class." Gambetta's conduct during that critical period, his speeches, his repeated appeals to the Right for assistance, the solemn words quoted above, his struggles with the more obstinate members of his party, everything, on the contrary, proves the justice and sincerity of his feelings. He would have had the Republic founded by the whole of France, "united France," as Émile de Girardin called it (20th August, 1874). "The Royalists would be making no sacrifice, but acting both wisely and patriotically, if they would sincerely adhere to the Republic. . . . Then should we have a united France, a Republican France-Republican in

new sense of the word without any unpleasant associations with the Republican past. Then should we see France, under the rule of the Elective Right, more powerful, more prosperous, and more glorious.

than ever."

The Right was not unaware of the gravity of circumstances nor of the importance of the choice which it was about to make. The Duc de Broglie himself had said,

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in his recent speech: "If the Republic is voted, if the principle becomes law, we must all submit to it.. it would be puerile and invidious to do otherwise. am convinced that no one in this Assembly would give way to such a feeling. I expect no less from the patriotism of all parties."

Were these words a mere rhetorical concession, a clever dialectical ruse? No. They were too weighty, too exalted not to have been meant; and the part played by M. de Broglie in the conversations which prefaced the Wallon amendment would prove it if necessary.

Where, then, was the cause of the misunderstanding which persisted so unfortunately between men who on either side lacked neither intelligence nor good intentions?

The "ruling classes," by frankly and at once adhering to Republican institutions, might not only have brought in those guarantees and precautions which seemed to them indispensable, but, up to a certain point, they would have sheltered their principles, their doctrines and their interests. They need then no longer have feared popular suffrage, but welcomed it. Reforms would have met with generous and valuable support from Conservatives. Political parties would have vied with each other in the effort to bring about the welfare of the greatest number, and the revolutionary idea, no longer finding any ground for attack, would have disappeared or become singularly attenuated. Let us again quote Emile de Girardin, who saw so far and so clearly: "The successive counsellors of Marshal MacMahon misled his good sense and his patriotism by repeating in every key that it was necessary to 'organise his powers.' . . . The organisation of the powers of the Septennate means the organisation of the conflict, and therefore of the Revolution."

That was indeed to be the result of the blunder committed. Marshal MacMahon, whom every one esteemed, was to be the first victim of a mistake of which thirty years have not exhausted the consequences.

It is not so much violence as obstinacy which ruins parties in France. Men absurdly seize upon new formulas, and equally absurdly cling to them when they should come to an end. Out of sheer complacency people hesitate to fight errors which seem harmless at first. Spread by chance, they are retained by party spirit; fear of general opinion is part of French sociability. And, gradually, mists have darkened and thickened the whole atmosphere.

In order to explain the conduct of the Right at that critical hour, we must take into account an attitude too rapidly assumed, and also a short-sighted obstinacy, sometimes mistaken for loyalty; finally, that habit, too general with the race, of postponing difficulties until the morrow.

Where an American would say "Forward!" a Frenchman says "Patience!" Patience too often means Sufferance. The country still suffers, after so many years, from decisions full of indecision.

CHAPTER II

THE SEPTENNATE-FRANCE AND EUROPE

I. Practical activity of the Assembly.-The Budget of 1875.- Various
Military Measures.-Great Public Works.-The Phylloxera.—Social
Questions and Parliamentary Inquiry on Labour.-The Roussel Law
on the Protection of Young Children.-Reform of the Baccalauréat.
II. External Politics.-German Diplomacy in 1874.-The Ischl meeting.-
The Kissingen affair and the Ultramontane Question.-The Decree
of Cardinal Guibert.-Recall of the Orénoque.-Spanish Affairs.—A
German Intervention feared.-Difficulties between Paris and Madrid.
-The Alfonsist Restoration.-Rivalry between Prince Gortschakoff
and Prince Bismarck.-Eastern Affairs.-First Outlines of a Franco-
Russian Alliance.-Attitude of Great Britain.-The Suez Canal and the
Egyptian Question.-The Tonquin affair.-Policy of the United States.
-International Arbitration.-The Brussels Conference and Inter-

national Law.-International Sanitary Police. III. Society in 1874.-Parliamentary Holidays.-The Marshal's Journeys.Parliamentary Bye-Elections.-Departmental and Municipal Elections. -Return of the Assembly.-Position of Parties.-Presidential Message. -First Reading of the Law on Higher Education.-The Assembly votes for a Parliamentary Inquiry on Bonapartist proceedings.

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THIERS used to say, "We have much too much politics in this country." There is always a fear lest history should fall into the same error, and allow itself to be invaded by the facile abundance of parliamentary papers. A representative Assembly is not a whole people; the voice raised at the tribune rarely carries beyond the surrounding walls. the surrounding walls. Many accurate—

and many false-books will be written by publishing extracts from the Journal Officiel.

Whilst bringing much eagerness to its specially political and constitutional work, the Assembly did not neglect its other duties; whilst declaring itself a constituent body, it did not forget its legislative functions. It carried out the duties of the housewife, so to speak, with a carefulness which caused one to overlook the caprices or fancies of the grande dame.

The Budget of 1875.

The Budget of 1875 had been submitted on the 12th January, 1874: Receipts, 2,573,525,000 fr. ; expenditure 2,569, 163,000 fr. It showed, apparently, a surplus of 4,362,000 fr. For this purpose, it took into account the 146,483,000 fr. of new taxes previously suggested, towards which, as has been seen, the National Assembly, by the Laws of 30th October, 1873, 19th February, 1874, and 21st March, 1874, had only voted 121,858,000 fr. The receipts, thanks to the normal increase in the revenue from taxes and to the produce of the ten centimes added to the principal of the three first direct contributions-having been estimated at an increase of 40,263,425 fr., and the expenditure having swollen by 36,473,702 fr.-the Budget was put forward with a real deficit of 20,263,000 fr.

After 1874, as the Assembly refused to create new taxes, the difficulty in balancing the account was very great. In order to achieve this, M. Magne on the 5th June, 1874, submitted a corrective budget of ways and

means.

He proposed the addition of another half décime to the indirect duties subjected to décimes by the laws already in force; viz. registration duties, customs, indirect contributions, and sugar. This half décime would produce 42,097,000 fr.

1 Vol. ii., p. 350.

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