Massachusetts: Actions of contract founded upon contract or liability express or implied, 6 years (General Laws of Massachusetts 1932, ch. 260, sec. 2).

Michigan: All personal actions, 6 years (Compiled Laws of Michigan 1929, No. 13976).

Minnesota: Action on liability created by statute, 6 years (Minnesota Statutes 1941, vol. 2, ch. 541.05).

Mississippi: All actions for which no other period of limitation is prescribed (covers written contracts), 6 years; any unwritten contract, express or implied, 3 years (Mississippi Code 1942 Annotated, Nos. 722 and 729).

Missouri: Action upon a liability created by statute, 5 years (Revised Statutes of Missouri 1939, No. 1014).

Montana: Action on liability created by statute, 2 years (Montana Revised Code 1935, No. 9033).

Nebraska: Action on liability created by statute, 4 years (Revised Statutes of Nebraska 1943, ch. 25, 206).

New Hampshire: Contracts under seal, 20 years; all other personal actions, 6 years (Revised Laws of New Hampshire 1942, ch. 385).

New Mexicó: Contract in writing, 6 years (No. 27-103); unwritten contracts, 4 years (No. 27-104) (Statutes of New Mexico 1941 Annotated).

New Jersey: Actions in the nature of debt founded upon contract, 6 years (Revised Statutes of New Jersey 1937, 2: 24-1).

New York: Liability created by statute, 6 years (Cahill's New York Civil Practice Act (7th ed.), sec. 48 of the New York Civil Practice Act).

North Carolina: Actions upon a liability created by statute, 3 years (General Statutes of North Carolina 1943, No. 1-52).

North Dakota: Action on right created by statute, 6 years (Revised Code of North Dakota 1913, sec. 7375).

Ohio: Contract not in writing or action on liability created by statute, 6 years (Throckmorton's Ohio Code Annotated 1940, No. 11222).

Oklahoma: Action on liability created by statute, 6 years (Oregon Compiled Laws Annotated 1940, No. 1-204).

Pennsylvania: Actions of debt grounded on contract, 6 years (Purdon's Pennsylvania Statutes 1936, title 12, No. 31).

Rhode Island: All actions of debt founded upon any contract, 6 years (General Laws of Rhode Island 1938, ch. 510, sec. 3).

South Carolina: Actions on liability created by statute, 6 years (Code of Laws of South Carolina 1942, No. 388).

South Dakota: Actions upon liability created by statute, 6 years (South Dakota Code of 1939, 33.0232).

Tennessee: Actions on contracts, 6 years (Code of Tennessee 1932, No. 8600).

Texas: Actions for debt where the indebtedness is founded upon any contract in writing, 4 years (art. 5527); actions for debt where the indebtedness is not evidenced by a contract in writing, 2 years (art. 5526) (Vernon's Texas Statutes 1936).

Utah: Written contracts, 6 years (104-2-22); contracts not in writing, 4 years (104-2-23) (Utah Code Annotated 1943).

Vermont: Actions on contract, 6 years (Public Laws of Vermont 1933, sec. 1648).

Virginia Contract in writing but not under seal, 5 years; oral contract, 3 years; (Virginia Code of 1942, title 57, ch. 238, No. 5810). Washington: Action on contract in writing, 6 years (No. 156). Action on contract not in writing, 3 years (No. 159) (Remington Revised Statutes of Washington Annotated 1932, title 2, ch. 3).

West Virginia: Contracts in writing, 10 years; oral contracts, 5 years (Official Code of West Virginia 1931, ch. 55, art. 2; No. 6).

Wisconsin: Action on liability created by statute, 6 years (Wisconsin Statutes 1943, ch. 330.19).

Wyoming: Contracts in writing, 10 years (89-409); actions on liability created by statute, 8 years (89-410) (Wyoming Revised Statutes 1931).

Senator ELLENDER. Let us take a grocery bill, for example. I know on contracts in some States you can recover within 10 years.

Mr. DONNER. Is that not a contract? Is not that an action in assumpsit?

Senator ELLENDER. I am talking about open accounts, bills.

Mr. DONNER. All of those actions are construed as actions on an oral contract. In all of these States that I have read you the statute of limitations is 5 or 6 years for bills.

Senator ELLENDER. What is it in Louisiana?

Mr. DONNER. In Louisiana, they have got a special statute. Actions of workmen, laborers, and servants for the payment of their wages, 1

year.

Senator ELLENDER. How about open accounts?

Mr. DONNER. I do not have that.

Senator ELLENDER. Three years. That is about the average of all States, from 1 to 3 years, on open accounts.

Mr. DONNER. That is not according to the laws I have checked up. Senator ELLENDER. Well, you better go back and look.

Mr. DONNER. Instruments in writing not under seal, 5 years. All other actions not included in other provisions, 5 years.

All actions of debt funded upon any contract, 6 years in Colorado. Contracts in writing, 6 years, and oral contracts, 3 years, in Connecticut.

The Georgia statute requires 3 years on oral contracts.

Now, what is a grocery bill if not an action of debt on an oral contract?

What is it classifiable legally, if not that? That is what the cases hold it is.

Senator TUNNELL. It is either assumpsit or debt.

Mr. DONNER. That is right, and the contract is what you sue on. That is major argument. You have got to consider the fact that we have a pattern in American jurisprudence that is about 5 or 6 years. I do not think this committee or the Congress should discriminate against the workers' wage claim.

Senator TUNNELL. Let me ask you this: Is there any question of the right of a State to fix a different limitation on an indebtedness created in that State?

Mr. DONNER. Under this Fair Labor Standards Act?

Senator TUNNELL. If the Fair Labor Standards Act becomes a law, that is, this portion of it, is there any question as to the right of a State to have a different statute of limitations? For instance, if we say 5 years and the State of Delaware says 3 years, which we do have

now, a 3-year statute, is there any question of the right of the State to fix a statute of limitations for the contracts in that State?

Mr. DONNER. Not at all, sir, except for actions arising under this Federal statute which would remain uniform subject to the limitation period you fix.

Senator TUNNELL. I have not looked into it at all.

I was just wondering whether there could be a question as to the right of a State to fix its own statute of limitations.

Mr. DONNER. In the absence of Federal legislation, the State statute of limitations governs. When the Federal Government legislates it occupies the field and with respect to that cause of action the Federal law is supreme.

Now, the converse of that has come up in a situation in which a State has unfairly discriminated against a Federal law. Now, that happened in both Iowa and Oregon, and in both those instances the law was held unconstitutional, because it was unfair discrimination.

Senator TUNNELL. Do you have a list of States in which there is a distinction between contracts for labor and other contracts?

Mr. DONNER. Yes. I have listed here all the statutes of limitations relating to this problem, and I have read them to you.

Senator TUNNELL. You have not answered what I asked. I asked if you have a list of States, if there are such, where there is a distinction. or a difference between the statute of limitations in the recovery of labor claims and other claims.

Mr. DONNER. The only one that I have come across is Louisiana. Now, there may be others. I would not say my list was complete on

that.

Senator TUNNELL. What is the one on labor again?

Mr. DONNER. Actions of workmen, laborers, and servants for the payment of their wages, 1 year. That is the Louisiana Civil Code, 1932 Senator TUNNELL. And on other bills it is how much?

Mr. DONNER. Some are 3 years.

Senator ELLENDER. That is open account.

Senator TUNNELL. That is what it is in our State.

Senator ELLENDER. I do not know of a State where it is over that. There may be a few that may go over 4 or 5 years.

Mr. DONNER. I have not doctored this compilation. I took it from an authoritative source.

Senator ELLENDER. You have it there probably for contracts.
Mr. DONNER. Well, that is what an action for a bill is.
Senator ELLENDER. I am talking about written contracts.
Mr. DONNER. I have it both for oral and written contracts.
Senator ELLENDER. We have in Louisiana statutes of limitation from

30 years down, depending on the kind of transaction it is.

Mr. DONNER. In New Jersey, actions in the nature of debt founded upon contracts, 6 years. That is in the Revised Statutes of New Jersey, 1937.

Senator ELLENDER. A negotiable instrument may be 5 years.

Mr. DONNER. Of course, they vary.

Senator ELLENDER. Sure; but on open accounts I do not believe it is over 3 years.

Mr. DONNER. That is construed as an action in debt on an or contract.

Senator ELLENDER. Yes.

Mr. DONNER. My statement is that they provide 5 or 6 years in those

cases.

Senator ELLENDER. I will put that in the record. Maybe it has been changed since I practiced law, but my recollection is it averages about 3 years. Very few States have more than 3 years on open accounts. Mr. DONNER. I may be wrong, but this is what my sources reveal. Senator TUNNELL. We have a different statute on instruments under seal.

Mr. DONNER. That is usually longer, and it is longer for a certain reason, because of the facility of proof. That is analogous to our situation. If you do not have facility of proof the employer has violated another section of the statute. He has failed to keep his records.

It will be noted that in the great majority of State statutes relating to wage claims, contracts, and liability created by statute, the period that governs is 5 or 6 years.

Now, if this committee is prepared to depart from this generally accepted and time-tested period of 5 or 6 years it must supply an answer to this question: "Why should a worker be required to face a suit for his grocery bill or his clothing bill or for an automobile accident 5 years after he incurred such a bill and be required to sue in a shorter period of time for his wages with which to pay such obligations." Let us bear in mind in considering the equities in the situation that we are dealing here with the attempts of the most underpaid and underprivileged people in our society to secure their rights under a Federal statute. Even under 5- and 6-year limitation periods employers all too frequently escape liability because of the unwillingness on the part of the employee, part of whose wages he has been withholding, to risk his job. Under such circumstance the very least that a Federal statute of limitations can provide for is 5 years.

It may be anticipated that this committee will hear the views of those who will picture the plight of an employer faced with large claims for compensation and liquidated damages. But one thing must be borne in mind even on the most favorable view of the facts for the employer, and that is this: That the statute places the burden of compliance upon the employer and that any legislative adjustment which rests upon a theory that the employee should be prompt in asserting his rights will tend to take money away from the lowest-paid groups in our community and to permit employers to pocket such money at their expense. In Overnight Motor Co. v. Missel (316 U. S. 572) the Supreme Court specifically held that violations which "resulted from an inability to determine whether the employee was covered by the act" would not justify relieving the employer of the burden and shifting it to the employee. The Court said:

Perplexing as petitioner's problem may have been the difficulty does not warrant shifting the burden to the employee. The wages were specified for him by the statute, and he was no more at fault than the employer. The liquidated damages for failure to pay the minimum wages under sections 6 (a) and 7 (a) are compensation, not a penalty or punishment by the Government.

The cases abound with instances where employees are deliberately deceived as to their rights by the law departments of corporate employers (e. g., Smith v. Continental Oil Co., 8 W. H. R. 152), where employers have launched criminal schemes involving fraudulent bookkeeping (e. g., Butler v. Carter, 8 W. H. R. 92, Georgia Supreme Court: Gosinski v. Eclipse Glass Co., 8 W. H. R. 587), where even after the

entry of a court decree employers have extracted fraudulent releases from their employees, where powerful employers have terrorized their employees for years into a surrender of their statutory rights, these employers and thousands like them are certainly entitled to no procedural relief. If the act is to be meaningful it must be uniformly enforced, it must be rigidly enforced, and it must be enforced with a view to the realities of the situation so that employees deceived by their employers as to their rights and without benefit of counsel, frequently subjected to strong economic coercion, may receive and enjoy the rights accorded to them by their Federal Government.

That completes my statement.

Senator TUNNELL. Thank you, Mr. Donner. Is Mr. Beardsley here? Mr. BEARDSLEY. Senator, Mr. Lawrence, of our organization, is also here, and we planned that he go on first.

Senator TUNNELL. All right, Mr. Lawrence, you may proceed.

TESTIMONY OF JOHN W. LAWRENCE, MANAGING DIRECTOR, AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS, INC.

Mr. LAWRENCE. Mr. Chairman and members of the subcommittee, my name is John W. Lawrence. I am managing director of American Trucking Associations, Inc., the only national organization representing the interests of operators of motortrucks generally. We have some 52 affiliated associations, at least 1 in each State, the District of Columbia, and the Territory of Hawaii. Our membership is composed of both for-hire and private carriers, the latter being engaged in the transportation of their own property.

Our industry is opposed to enactment of S. 1349 as presently worded. My colleague, Mr. Beardsley, and I shall try, briefly, to give you the reasons for our opposition.

In discussing the economic picture of the industry, I shall for obvious reasons have to confine myself primarily to that found in the for-hire branch. Private carriage is incidental to some other form of enterprise, and consequently it would be quite impossible to discuss the effects of this bill on that branch of the industry in the limited time

available here.

During the past year the revenue position of most motor carriers has become critical. Just prior to the war motor carrier operating expenses absorbed about 94 cents out of each revenue dollar. In other words, this was an operating ratio of 94. Then came Pearl Harbor, which cut off our rubber supply, caused Government to stop production of motor trucks and led to the making of replacement parts of inferior quality in order to save strategic materials. Many people in Government were of the firm opinion that the industry would collapse in March 1943, or at the latest in June of that year. We know now hat the industry carried on right through VJ-day to now. In 1943 rapidly mounting costs, although offset to some extent by ncreases in rates, increased the operating ratio of 94 to nearly 96. Additional rate increases were received in 1944 but the ratio of expenses to revenue in that year was over 97 percent. In continues at in alarming rate in 1945.

The upward trend in cost was decidedly similar in all territories as vill be found by examining exhibit No. 1. The Eastern District had in operating ratio of 95 in the year 1942, 96.8 in 1943, 97.0 in 1944. The